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The approach used in the design of nuclear power plants
was initially deterministic. It consisted of listing the events
which could lead to the dispersal of radioactive material into the
environment so as to establish "upper boundary" accidents.
In other words, accidents representing the worst cases in terms
of consequences for the environment. Estimates were made of these
upper boundary accidents and the defense in depth concept was used
to limit the risks to acceptable levels.
The deterministic approach was subsequently complemented
with the probabilistic approach.
Probabilistic Safety Assessments (PSAs) make it possible
to assess the probability of accident scenarios. The probabilistic
approach allows for the probability of success or failure of the
safety functions designed to mitigate the consequences of the initiating
events to be determined based on the frequency of occurrence of
initiating events (transients, breaks, steam generator tube ruptures
etc.). The probability of success or failure depends on the reliability
of the systems as determined from the experience acquired in operation
and the reactions of operators during simulator tests.
It is therefore possible to calculate the probability
of each accident scenario leading to core meltdown (level 1 PSA)
or even to releases into the environment (Level 2 PSA incorporates
the probabilities of success or failure of the "containment"
function). This method has revealed certain weak points in the design,
which have since been corrected. It has shown the need to allow
for events which were not taken into consideration during the initial
design, such as the total loss of electrical power. This is why
additional provisions such as the H procedures (out of design basis
procedures), or complementary procedures, were introduced.
The incorporation of severe accidents (with
core meltdown) has resulted in the development of additional resources
in the form of the U (ultimate) procedures.
The H and U procedures are described in Chapter
4: Safe Operation (What?).
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