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Nuclear Safety: Basic principles
4. Defense in depth
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Challenges and risks
Operation objectives
Definition of safety
Defense in depth
Three safety functions
Development of safety
Summary
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Summary (10 kb)

4.1 Definition

Defense in depth consists of recognizing technical, human or organizational failures and to guard against them by successive lines of defense.

The Three lines of defense that are normally provided for each failure envisaged are the following:

  • Prevention
  • Monitoring
  • Means of actions

However, all three lines of defense are not always possible. For instance, there are no means available for mitigating the consequences of rupturing the reactor or pressure vessel. In this case, other lines of defense must then be reinforced.

Consequently, there are multiple lines of defense to provide for "prevention" such as the following:

  • Choice of materials
  • Safety margins in the design basis
  • Extremely stringent manufacturing verifications

There are also multiple lines of defense for "monitoring" such as:

  • Non-destructive testing during full and partial inspections
  • Expert appraisal of irradiated specimens to monitor the ageing of the pressure vessel material
Defense in depth is a concept which applies to all stages, from the design to the dismantling stages, in the life of the facilities.

The lines of defense must be as reliable and as independent as possible.

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