Nuclear Security Series
Nuclear security issues relating to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material and other radioactive substances and their associated facilities are addressed in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series of publications. These publications are consistent with, and complement, international nuclear security instruments such as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, the Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1540 and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.
Categories in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series
Publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series are issued in the following categories:
- Nuclear Security Fundamentals contain objectives, concepts and principles of nuclear security and provide the basis for security recommendations.
- Recommendations present best practices that should be adopted by Member States in the application of the Nuclear Security Fundamentals.
- Implementing Guides provide further elaboration of the Recommendations in broad areas and suggest measures for their implementation.
- Technical Guidance publications comprise: Reference Manuals, with detailed measures and/or guidance on how to apply the Implementing Guides in specific fields or activities; Training Guides, covering the syllabus and/or manuals for IAEA training courses in the area of nuclear security; and Service Guides, which provide guidance on the conduct and scope of IAEA nuclear security advisory missions.
Drafting and review
International experts assist the IAEA Secretariat in drafting these publications. For Nuclear Security Fundamentals, Recommendations and Implementing Guides, open-ended technical meetings are held by the Secretariat to provide interested Member States and relevant international organizations with an appropriate opportunity to review the draft text. In addition, to ensure a high level of international review and consensus, the Secretariat submits the draft texts to all Member States for a period of 120 days for formal review. This allows Member States an opportunity to fully express their views before the text is published.
Technical Guidance publications are developed in close consultation with international experts. Technical meetings are not required, but may be conducted, where it is considered necessary, to obtain a broad range of views. The process for drafting and reviewing publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series takes account of confidentiality considerations and recognizes that nuclear security is inseparably linked with general and specific national security concerns. An underlying consideration is that related IAEA safety standards and safeguards activities should be taken into account in the technical content of the publications.
The IAEA Nuclear Security Series was launched in 2006. Eleven guides in the Series have been published to date:
- Technical and Functional Specifications for Border Monitoring Equipment (available on request only) provides Member States and equipment manufacturers with guidance on design, testing, qualifying and purchasing of radiation monitoring equipment for use at borders. The system parameters can serve as state-of-the-art conceptual specifications for the deployment of equipment as well as for procedures for testing and confirming the performance parameters for border radiation monitoring equipment.
- Nuclear Forensics Support describes the tools and procedures for nuclear forensic investigations. The guidelines incorporate a decade or more of experience in dealing with illicit trafficking events accumulated by law enforcement agencies and nuclear forensics laboratories.
- Monitoring for Radioactive Material in International Mail Transported by Public Postal Operators describes the techniques and equipment available to detect radioactive material being carried in mail processed by public postal operators. These guidelines were developed in cooperation with the Universal Postal Union.
- Engineering Safety Aspects of the Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against Sabotage provides guidelines for evaluating the engineering safety aspects of the protection of nuclear power plants against sabotage, including standoff attacks. The guidance takes into account the existing robustness of structures, systems and components, and emphasizes those aspects of sabotage protection that work synergistically with the protection against extreme external occurrences of accidental origin, such as earthquakes, tornadoes and human induced events.
- Identification of Radioactive Sources and Devices aids non-specialist individuals and organizations in initial identification of radioactive sources, devices and packages that they may come into contact with by accident or in the normal course of their work.
- Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and other Radioactive Material focuses on unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material. It was developed as an information and training resource for law enforcement personnel who may be called upon to deal with detection of and response to the illicit trafficking incidents, but likewise will be of use for legislators, government officials, technical experts, emergency responders, lawyers, diplomats, users of nuclear technology, media and the general public. While recognizing that a certain level of technical understanding is essential for dealing with radioactive material, the drafters of the Handbook sought to keep technical information to a minimum and to present it in a simplified format for ease of use.
- Nuclear Security Culture explains the basic concepts and elements of a nuclear security culture and how they relate to arrangements and policies for other aspect of nuclear security. It provides an overview of the attributes of nuclear security culture, emphasizing that nuclear security is ultimately dependent on individuals: policy makers, regulators, managers, individual employees and, to a certain extent, members of the general public.
- Preventive and Protective Measures against Insider Threats provides general guidance to the competent authorities and operators on prevention of and protection against insider threats. Threats to nuclear facilities can involve outsiders, insiders or both together in collusion.
- Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material which provides States with guidance in implementing, maintaining or enhancing a nuclear security regime to protect radioactive material (including nuclear material) while in transpost against theft, sabotage or other malicious acts that could, if successful, have unacceptable radiological consequences.
- Development, Use and Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat provides guidance on how to develop, use and maintain a design basis threat, which is defined as a description of the attributes and characteristics of potential insider and/or external adversaries who might attempt a malicious act, such as unauthorized removal or sabotage against which a physical protection system for nuclear or other radioactive material or associated facilities is designed and evaluated. This publication is intended for decision makers from organizations with roles and responsibilities for the development, use and maintenance of the DBT.
- Security of Radioactive Sources provides guidance and recommended measures for implementing security measures on radioactive sources, including for the prevention of, detection of, and response to malicious acts involving radioactive sources. It recommends that security measures be applied to radioactive sources in manufacture, use and short term or long term storage. This publication is intended for use by States in formulating security policy for radioactive sources and by regulatory bodies in developing regulatory requirements that are consistent with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. It will assist State Parties to fulfil certain obligations under the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. It may also be useful to operators managing radioactive sources in developing their security programmes.
Further documents are in various stages of development and will be eventually published as part of the Nuclear Security Series.
For further information please contact NuclearSecurity@iaea.org
