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Safety Assessment Review Service

Design and Safety Assessment Review Service - DSARS


The IAEA provides the Design and Safety Assessment Review Service (DSARS) to assist and advise Member States in achieving and maintaining a high level of safety of nuclear power plants.

This service is organized in modules that cover the review of the design at different phases based on the IAEA safety standards.

DiD Assessment

DSARS – An Integrated Review Service

The objective of DSARS is to provide to the requesting Member State a tailored, independent peer review and assessment of the plant design safety and to make recommendations on additional actions/analysis to be performed. DSARS can assist countries in the following areas:

  • Review of safety analysis in support of licensing
  • Safety assessment in support of plant modifications
  • Assessing actions taken to address emerging safety issues
  • Establishing national regulations related to design and safety assessment
  • Periodic safety review

The DSARS has been developed in support of stated Member States’ needs, and in response to the IAEA Action Plan as well as a review of NSNI services.

DSARS modules and workflow

Upon request of a Member State organization the IAEA provides advisory services to review the design safety and safety assessments of power reactors against the IAEA Safety Standards. The services include and integrate the following complementary services in key technical safety assessment areas:

  • Design Safety Review - DSR/GRSR
    The objective of this DSARS module is to provide a detailed review of a reactor’s safety documentation for technical robustness, completeness, and comprehensiveness. The scope of this module can be tailored to support Member States’ needs, covering a preliminary safety analysis report, a full safety analysis report, specific chapters of the report, or specific technical topics. This can be done in support of licensing, plant modifications, safety upgrades, life extension, or in light of revised IAEA safety assessment and design safety requirements.
    A specific model of DSR, GRSR, is offered for the review of safety cases (completely or partially developed) of new concepts that are not at the licensing stage yet. This review is focused on checking the status of the documentation (completeness and comprehensiveness).
  • International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team - IPSART
    The objective of this DSARS module is to provide a peer review on the adequacy of the treatment of technical and methodological issues in the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and the results obtained. The results provide advice on the completeness and accuracy of a PSA. In addition, various PSA applications pursued by both utility and regulatory organizations may be a subject for the review.
  • Review of Accident Management Programme and Emergency Operating Procedures - RAMP
    The objective of this DSARS module is to provide a peer review on the completeness and adequacy of plant specific Severe Accident Management Guidelines and Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs).
  • Periodic Safety Review - PSR
    The objective of this DSARS module is to provide a peer review on the Periodic Safety Review performed by an operating organization.

Tailored to meet specific needs

Elements of the DSARS services provide the technical bases for tailoring the reviews to the different phases of a reactor project. Also elements from these services can be combined to address specific needs of a requesting Member State Organization or to reviewing the documentation of complete safety cases.

Conduct at various phases of a reactor project

The design and safety assessment reviews may be carried out at the various phases of a reactor project, e.g. at the conceptual design stage, during various pre-licensing phases, for reactors under construction or in operation and for reactors undergoing a periodic safety review or life extension. The services also offer to address specific technical aspects such as plans for plant modifications. The services make use of guidance documentation which provides guidance to the reviewers, includes references to related Agency standards, and refers to good practices.

DSR/GRSR - ​Design Safety Review

The objective of the Design Safety Review, performed at the request of a Member State organization, is to evaluate the completeness and comprehensiveness of a reactors’ safety documentation by an international team of senior experts.

In principle, the DSR is based on IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles
(SF-1) Safety Requirements for Safety Assessment for Facilities and Activities (GSR Part4), and Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design
(SSR-2/1). These Safety Requirements are high level standards addressing broadly the safety issues for nuclear installations and activities. The GS-R Part 4 requirements are generic and technology independent, therefore they are applicable at different stages of design evolution as well as to operating plants. The depth of the review and selection of requirements also depends on the design maturity and available documentation.

The design safety review is done using one of two available modules, depending on the design stage. For pre-licensing stage the review is done using the Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR) module, while during the licensed stages the review is done using the Design Safety Review (DSR) module.

The aims of the DSR are to:

  • Provide advice regarding the design’s follows the IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles
  • Determine whether the safety requirements are being addressed in the design safety case and identify any that have been omitted
  • For those requirements that are addressed, form a view on whether they are being addressed in a way that is consistent with the spirit of the IAEA requirements
  • For the safety requirements that are not being addressed or are partially addressed, form a view on their relative significance and highlight their importance to safety.

As a response to renewed interest in the development of nuclear energy capacity across the globe, vendors are designing new reactors, with innovative systems, to meet the growing demand for safety and more economical nuclear power generation.

A specific model of DSR, the Generic Reactor Safety Review (GRSR), provides for the review of safety cases (completely or partially developed) of new concepts that are not at the licensing stage yet. This review is focused on checking the status of the documentation (completeness and comprehensiveness).

The GRSR provides for an early harmonized appraisal of safety cases made by vendors as a basis for an individual evaluation or the licensing process, which remains a sovereign activity of the Member States. Consequently, such safety evaluations, conducted against selected sets of Safety Standards, contribute to more effective management of subsequent activities within a global framework consistent with a harmonized approach to safety worldwide.

It should be noted that the IAEA Safety Standards applied in the DSR and GRSR, at the fundamental and requirements level, are generic and apply to all nuclear installations. Therefore, it is neither intended nor possible to cover or substitute licensing activity, or to constitute any kind of design certification.

Status of reviews:

DSR

Member
State
Year Service
Pakistan 2006 Chashma 2 NPP: PSAR Chapters 11 & 12 (PAK/9/030)
Ukraine 2008 • Khmelnitski 2
2009 • Rivne 1, 2, 3 & 4
• South Ukraine 1, 2 & 3
• Zaporozhe 1-6
• Khmelnitski 1
Bulgaria 2008 Followup mission to Kozloduy NPP: “Programme for modernization of Units 5 & 6" (BUL/4/013)
Armenia 2009 Followup mission: “Assess the resolution of IAEA safety issues at the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant” (ARM/9/020P)

GRSR

Reactor type Status
ACR1000 (CANDU) Completed 2008
AP1000 (Westinghouse) Completed 2008
ESBWR (GE/Toshiba) Completed 2008
EPR (AREVA) Completed 2008
ATMEA1 (AREVA-MHI) Completed 2008
APR1400 (KHNP Korea) Completed 2009
APR1000 (KEPCO Research Institute Korea) Completed 2010
AES 2006 (Rosenergoatom Concern) Completed 2012
VVER-TOI (Rosenergoatom Concern) Planned for 2013

IPSART

International Probabilistic Safety Assessment Review Team

IPSART guidelinesThe IPSART service organizes peer reviews for probabilistic safety assessments (PSAs) performed in Member States to improve the quality of probabilistic safety analyses and to provide for technology transfer among the Member States; the IPSART team assists Member States in the application of PSA results and methods. Scope of review:

  • Organization of management
  • Methods and data
  • External hazards
  • Level 1 and 2 analysis
  • Interpolation of results
  • Quality assurance and documentation
  • PSA applications.

IPSART peer review missions are conducted in accordance with dedicated guidelines.

IPSART workflow

An IPSART is organized in 4 main stages, as follows:

  • Pre-Mission - with the objective of defining the scope and deepness of the review and the necessary inputs (documents, models, reference documents) to be provided to the review team

  • The Mission - conducted by a team of IAEA staff and international experts, with the objective of assessing the PSA methodology, results and applications against applicable IAEA standards

  • Final Experts Meeting - with the objective of compiling the conclusions and recommendations and agree on the content of the Review Report
  • Followup Mission - with the objective of reviewing the status and results of the implemented recommendations.

IPSART mission stages

Status of reviews:

Member
State
Year Service
Slovenia 2000 IPSART Mission to Krsko NPP: Level 1/2 PSA (RER/9/046)
Spain 2000 IPSART Mission to Jose Cabrera NPP (Reimbursed)
Ukraine 2000 IPSART Mission to South Ukraine NPP: Level 1 PSA internal event initiator (RER/9/052)
Lithuania 2000 IPSART Mission to Ignalina NPP: Level 1 PSA (RER/9/052)
Netherlands 2000 IPSART Mission to EC Joint Research Centre Petten High Flux Reactor: risk scoping study (Reimbursed)
Russia 2000 Followup IPSART mission to Tianwan NPP: Level 1 PSA, China (EBP funding)
Pakistan 2001 IPSART Mission to KANUPP NPP: Level 1 PSA (PAK/9/022)
Ukraine 2001 IPSART Mission to Zaporozhye Unit 5 NPP: Level 1 PSA (RER/9/061)
Russia 2001 IPSART Mission to Novovoronezh NPP: Level 1 PSA external events & Level 2 PSA (RUS/9/003)
Lithuania 2001 IPSART Mission to Ignalina Unit 1 NPP: Level 1 & 2 PSA (RER/9/061)
Slovakia 2001 IPSART Mission to Mochovce Unit 1 NPP: Level 1 PSA (RER/9/061)
Romania 2001 Pre-IPSART Expert mission to Cernavoda Unit 1 NPP: Level 1 PSA internal event (Rom/9/024)
Iran 2002 IPSART Expert mission to Bushehr Unit 1 NPP: Level 1 PSA internal event (IRA/4/029)
Slovakia 2002 IPSART Mission to Bohunice VI NPP: Level 1 PSA (RER/9/061)
Netherlands 2002 IPSART Mission to EC Joint Research Centre Petten High Flux Reactor: risk scoping study (Reimbursed)
Russia 2002 2nd IPSART Followup mission to Tianwan NPP: Level 1 PSA (EBP funding)
Romania 2003 IPSART Mission to Cernavoda UNIT 1 NPP: Level 1 PSA (ROM/9/024)
Czech Republic 2003 IPSART Mission to Temelin NPP: PSA (CZR/9/015)
China 2003 IPSART Mission to Qinshan NPP: Level 1 PSA (EBP funding)
United
Kingdom
2004 IPSART Mission to Sizewell B NPP: Living PSA, full scope PSA (Reimbursed)
China 2004 Mission to Tianwan NPP: Level 2 PSA
Romania 2004 Follow-up IPSART Mission to Cernavoda UNIT 1 NPP: Level 1 PSA (ROM/9/024)
Romania 2005 Expert Mission to Cernavoda NPP: review qualitative assessment of risk impact of Unit 2 design changes based on PSA for Unit 1 (ROM/9/024)
Romania 2005 IPSART Mission to Cernavoda Unit 1 NPP: Fire & Flood & Seismic PSA (ROM/9/024)
Armenia 2007 IPSART to Metsamor NPP: Level 1 PSA internal IEs (power operation) (ARM/9/018)
Pakistan 2007 Pre-IPSART to Chashma NPP: Level 1 PSA for internal IEs (power operation) (PAK/9/025)
Bulgaria 2009 IPSART Mission to Belene NPP: Level 1 & 2 design PSA internal IEs, internal & external hazards (excl. seismic) (power operation & shutdown mode) (BUL/9/022)
Pakistan 2009 IPSART Mission to Chashma NPP: Level 1 PSA internal IEs (power operation) (PAK9/025)
Netherlands 2010 IPSART Mission to Borssele NPP: Level 1 through Level 3 PSA internal IEs, internal & external hazards (excluding seismic) (power operation & shutdown mode) (Reimbursed)
Bulgaria 2010 Follow-up IPSART to Belene NPP: Level 1 & 2 design PSA for internal IEs, internal & external hazards (excl. seismic) (power operation & shutdown mode) (BUL/9/022)

RAMP

Review of Accident Management Programme and Emergency Operating Procedures

RAMP GuidelinesThe RAMP module provides advice and assistance at the utility/NPP level for effective plant specific Accident Management Programme (AMP) preparation, development and implementation. This module is to provide a peer reviewon the completeness and adequacy of plant specific Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) as well as the plant accident management programme performed in Member States. The RAMP module allows for a tailored approach depending on the current development of the accident management programme.

Three options are available to Member States:

  • A seminar on accident management (Pre-RAMP), to include: plant behavior during accidents; severe accident phenomenology; principles of accident management; approaches and their features; development phases and tasks
  • The Review of Safety Analysis for Accident Management (RAAAM), to include: selection of accident sequences; selection of analytical tools; analysis of accidents without operator actions; analysis of preventive and mitigative accident management measures; quality assurance in accident analysis
  • The Review of Accident Management Programme (RAMP), to include: selection and definition of AMP; safety analysis for AMP; assessment of plant vulnerabilities; development of strategies; evaluation of equipment performance; development of procedures and guidelines; verification and validation of procedures and guidelines; integration between AMP and emergency plans; staffing and qualification; training needs; AMP revisions.

The RAMP review service is conducted in accordance with specific guidelines.

Ramp workflow


A RAMP Mission is usually conducted in three steps:

  • PRE - RAMP Mission, with the objective of presenting the beneficiary organizations the international best practices in the development and implementation of an Accident Management Programme (AMP) for a NPP
  • The Mission - with the objective of evaluating the AMP arrangements for the beneficiary NPP and provide recommendations for improvements
  • Final Experts Meeting - with the objective of compiling conclusions and recommendations and agree on the Mission Report
  • Followup Mission - with the objective of evaluating the AMP implementation and safety improvements resulted from the implementation of RAMP Mission recommendations.

RAMP mission stages

Status of reviews:

Mission
Type
Member
State
Year Service
Pre-
RAMP
Pakistan 2004 Kanupp NPP: Emergency control center
Russia:
Workshops
2006 Workshops: Severe accident phenomena, analysis & AMPs, & computer code training (MELCOR, ASTEC, RELAP5)


Expert mission: Development plan & AMP development
China, Pakistan:
Expert mission
Ukraine: Workshops 2007
Romania: Expert mission
RAAAM China

2006

Bine: Review analysis results of severe accident in Chinese PWRs
2007
RAMP Slovenia 2001 Krsko: Review the first SAMGs
Pakistan 2007 Kanupp: Review post-accident monitoring instrumentation
Lithuania 2007 Ignalina: Review SAMGs for RBMK reactors
Mexico 2012 Review the first SAMGs
2013

PSR - Periodic Safety Review

To assist Member States in maintaining a high level of safety of operating nuclear power plants including those in long term operation, the IAEA provides a DSARS module to review the Periodic Safety Review (PSR) national requirements, PSR process and the PSR self-assessment report against IAEA Safety Standards. The module provides Member States (Safety Authorities and Operating Organizations) with recommendations to improve their PSR activities for the future. The service can be tailored to the specific needs of the Member State. The module is also aimed at collecting feedback to update and improve the IAEA safety standards.

PSR Workflow

Review areas:

  • National PSR requirements and reference documents for the self-assessment
  • PSR Basis document
  • Methodology of the self-assessment
  • Safety factors self-assessment reports (14 safety factors, e.g. design basis, aging status and management, equipment qualification, operational experience, organization and management system)
  • Evaluation of the safety relevance of the findings and ranking
  • Final global assessment and corrective actions.

PSR Mission stages

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| Last update: Thursday, June 20, 2013.