Operational Safety Services
The operational safety services provide advice on selected operational aspects and on safety management and safety culture of nuclear power plants:
- Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
- Independent Safety Culture Self Assessment (ISCA)
- Peer Review of Operational Safety Performance Experience (PROSPER)
- International Reporting System for Operating Experience (IRS)
- Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation (SALTO)
In 1982, the IAEA created the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme. Under this programme, international teams of experts conduct in-depth reviews of operational safety performance at a nuclear power plant. They review the factors affecting the management of safety and the performance of personnel. As a result, the OSART programme has provided advice and assistance to Member States to enhance the operational safety of nuclear power plants. In addition, the OSART programme provides an opportunity to disseminate information on “Good Practices” which are recognised during OSART missions.
OSART missions in general review performance in the following areas:
- Management, organization and administration
- Training and qualification
- Technical support
- Operational experience feedback
- Radiation protection
- Emergency planning and preparedness
- Severe Accident Management, etc.
- OSART Brochure: English French Spanish Russian
- OSART Guidelines: The OSART guidelines are being revised under the EC-IAEA 2013 313-757 project on Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Safety
- OSART Good Practices
- OSART Mission results (OSMIR)
- OSART Highlights 2003 - 2006
- OSART Highlights 2007 - 2009
- OSART Highlights 2010 - 2012
- OSART Mission list
- Most recent OSART missions and requested missions in each country
The overall purpose of an Independent Safety Culture Assessment (ISCA) is to provide advice and assistance to Member States in enhancing the safety culture of a nuclear facility. The IAEA offers ISCA in the frame of an OSART to take benefit from the synergy between technical and behavior science/safety culture experts.
The joint operational safety and safety culture assessment provide the organization the opportunity to better understand the interactions between technical, organizational and cultural aspects. This approach helps the organization to take actions that fully address the root causes of identified issues.
The results cover also the strength of the safety culture so that the organization can consolidate them.
The safety culture assessment may be requested by governments, regulatory authorities and licensees for nuclear facilities and activities in any stage of development (design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning).
The ISCA process is based on a scientific approach of safety culture and follows the IAEA Safety Standards. It uses several assessment methods like survey, interviews, observations, focused groups, documents review. Technical experts’ findings are also integrated in the analysis.
The key objectives of an Independent Safety Culture Assessment are to provide the host nuclear facility with advice in areas where safety culture should be improved to meet IAEA Safety Standards, and to identify strength in safety culture.
Eighteen to twenty-four months after the joint Operational Safety and Safety Culture Assessment, a safety culture workshop is conducted in the frame of the follow-up visit to allow the organization to present their action plan and self-assessment results.
- Safety Culture
- ISCA leaflet
- Safety culture continuous improvement process
- Safety culture leaflet
- Meetings and workshops on safety culture
To promote at individual NPPs the process and practice of learning from operating experience (either individual NPP experience, that of other NPPs or that of the industry at large) in order to enhance their safety performance. To encourage NPPs worldwide to perform self-assessments of the effectiveness of their operating safety performance experience review process. To benchmark/confirm, through an international Peer Review of NPPs' operational safety performance, that lessons are learned and acted upon and that these are disseminated nationally and internationally. To provide the necessary tools, methods and training to carry out these self-assessments.
Operational performance information comprises the following: external operating experience; internal event reports including internal low-level and near miss event reports; and other relevant operating performance information, such as performance indicators and non-compliance reports on quality assurance.
Related information: PROSPER Guidelines
The International Reporting System for Operating Experience (IRS) is an international system jointly operated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD/NEA), through which thirty-one participating countries exchange experience to improve the safety of nuclear power plants by submitting event reports on unusual events considered important for safety.
The aim of the IRS is to increase the effectiveness in analysing and communicating operational safety experience.
Timely feedback of operational experience provides information on events useful in preventing similar occurrences at other plants. Shared experience is valuable in determining actions to be taken to mitigate the potential consequences of discovered design or operating weaknesses should an event occur. The lessons learned may also be incorporated into new designs for future generations of nuclear power plants.
To reflect the evolution of the ‘Incident Reporting System’ to one which includes an expanded view/use of operating experience feedback, the name of the system was revised to ‘International Reporting System for Operating Experience’. The system will retain the term ‘IRS’.
- IRS Leaflet
- IRS Guidelines
- IAEA Safety Standards Series Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.11 A System for the Feedback of Experience from Events in Nuclear Installations
- NPP Operating Experiences 1996 - 1999
- NPP Operating Experiences 1999 - 2002
- NPP Operating Experiences 2002 - 2005
- NPP Operating Experiences 2005 - 2008
- NPP Operating Experiences 2009 - 2011
The purpose of the Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation (SALTO) peer review service is to assist Member States in ensuring the safe long term operation of nuclear power plants, and to promote the exchange of experience and information on good practices. The peer review addresses the strategy and key elements of long term operation (LTO) and ageing management programmes.
SALTO missions review the following areas:
- A: Organization and functions, current licensing basis, configuration/modification management
- B: Scoping and screening and plant programmes relevant to LTO
- C: Ageing management review, review of ageing management programmes and revalidation of time limited ageing analyses for mechanical components
- D: Ageing management review, review of ageing management programmes and revalidation of time limited ageing analyses for electrical and I&C components
- E: Ageing management review, review of ageing management programmes and revalidation of time limited ageing analyses for civil structures
- F: Human resources, competence and knowledge management for LTO (optional area).
- IAEA Safety Standards Series Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.12 Ageing management for Nuclear Power Plants
- IAEA Safety Report Series No 57 Safe Long Term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants
- IAEA Services Series No 26 SALTO Guidelines – Guidelines for peer review of long term operation and ageing management of Nuclear Power Plants
- IAEA EBP – Final Report of Extrabudgetary Programme on Safety Aspects of Long Term Operation of Water Moderated Reactors (SALTO)
- SALTO Mission list
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