



**International Atomic Energy Agency**

# **Safety Assessment Framework**

Prepared by Jörg Kaulard

Edited and presented by P. J. Dinner ([p.dinner@iaea.org](mailto:p.dinner@iaea.org))

Workshop on Safety Assessment for Decommissioning  
of Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors

4-9 October, 2010: Risø Denmark

# Safety Assessment Considerations (I)

Based on WS-G-5.2 the Safety Assessment should:

- **Be consistent with its basis documentation** the decommissioning plan and other relevant national and site-specific strategies, e.g. for radwaste management; the release of material and sites from regulatory control
- **Provide systematic hazard evaluation** of the nature, magnitude and likelihood of consequences to workers, public & environment under normal + accident conditions
- **Quantify hazard potential** and its systematic and progressive reduction through implementation of the decommissioning activities



# Safety Assessment Considerations (II)

- **Identify the limits, controls and conditions** that will need to be applied **during** the decommissioning activities to ensure that the requisite safety standards are met and maintained throughout the project
- **Provide for optimisation of institutional controls** after decommissioning, e.g. they should not impose undue burden on future generations
- Provide input to on- and off-site **emergency planning and other safety management arrangements**



Safety Assessment Framework

Description of Facility/ & Decommissioning Activities

Hazard Identification and Screening

Hazard Analysis

Engineering Analysis

Evaluation of Results & Identification of Safety Measures

Compliance with Criteria?

Independent Review

# Safety Assessment Methodology

# Safety Assessment Framework Elements

- The Safety Assessment Framework consists of:
  - Context of Safety Assessment
  - Scope
  - Objectives
  - Timeframes
  - End-points of decommissioning phases
  - End-state of decommissioning
  - Requirements and criteria
  - Assessment Outputs
  - Safety assessment approach
  - Existing safety assessments
  - Safety Management Measures



# Context & Scope

- **Context of the Safety assessment** – the safety assessment usually forms part of a larger project-decommissioning plan
  - assessment carried out in the context of that plan
  - needs to be linked and be consistent with the scope of the project decommissioning plan as a whole
- **Scope of the safety assessment**
  - needs to cover all the safety-related activities set out in the decommissioning plan
  - it may be appropriate to subdivide the overall decommissioning activity into phases with separate safety assessments for each phase



# Context

## Examples from DeSa Test Cases

- NPP Test Case
  - developed in support of the **final decommissioning plan** necessary to obtain authorization for decommissioning
- Research Reactor Test Case
  - forms part of the **documentation package** presented by the operator for approval by the Regulatory Body prior to initiating decommissioning of the research reactor
  - explanation and justification of what is **included/ excluded from the safety assessment** based on interdependencies with other facilities at the site, waste management, clearance (subject to separate / prior analysis)



# Scope

## Examples from DeSa Test Cases

### **NPP Test Case**

- Safety assessment limited to two systems
- General explanation of activities covered (cutting, removal in waste containers)
- Explanation of what's not in (e.g. waste treatment) & why

### **Research Reactor Test Case**

- All decommissioning activities starting after de-fuelling and removal of operational waste, terminating with release for unrestricted release
- Only decommissioning activities inside the reactor hall
- Clarification of the approach to radioactive waste and material to be cleared





# Objectives

- To support the selection of the decommissioning strategy, the development of a decommissioning plan and associated specific decommissioning activities
- To demonstrate that all safety requirements and criteria are fulfilled:
  - e.g. exposures to members of the public and workers do not exceed the relevant constraints or limits, are as low as reasonably achievable and that protective measures are optimised



# Objectives

## Examples from DeSa Test Cases

### NPP Test Case

- Demonstrate safety of workers and the public
- Show compliance with regulatory requirements and criteria
- Confirm existing or new safety measures / controls
- To be independently reviewed
- =>Show, that the selected systems serve well to demonstrate that the DeSa methodology is fit for purpose

### Research Reactor Test Case

- Demonstrate, that decommissioning activities can be carried out without undue exposure
- Main focus on radiological hazards, but non radiological hazards are taken into account
- Demonstrate to regulatory body, that criteria are fulfilled



# Timeframe Considerations

**Timeframes, especially for the “phased approach should:**

- Provide adequate time for planning and execution of decommissioning activities
- Take into account any separation of phases
- Have clearly defined start and end points for each phase
- Include periods of monitoring and institutional control

**Timeframes may influence the safety!**



# Timeframes

## Examples from DeSa Test Cases

### **NPP Test Case**

- Whole NPP to be taken out of regulatory control after 7 years from start of decommissioning
- Unrestricted use of the buildings after 5 years from start of decommissioning
- Dismantling of 2 systems in total of 18 months

### **Research Reactor Test Case**

- Total duration of 18 months
- 4 “work packages” arranged in sequential order



# End-states and End points

- Intended **end-state** of the overall decommissioning process and **end points** of individual phases are important to planning decommissioning safety assessments
  - end-point of one phase = initial state for following phase
  - detailed physical, chemical and radiological conditions will need to be described for end-points of each phase
- As a rule of thumb – **end points** should be stable from a safety point of view
- Typically, the justification of the **end-state** is subject to the decommissioning plan and its review



# End-states and end points

## Examples from DeSa Test Cases

### **NPP Test Case End-state:**

(End point = removal of 2 systems)

- removal of the reactor nuclear and auxiliary systems
- Buildings below release values, relevant for release from regulatory control
- On-site buffer storage for radioactive waste until a final depository is available

### **Research Reactor Test Case End-State (=end point):**

- Complete dismantling of the research reactor and the auxiliary systems from reactor hall
- Decontamination of the reactor hall and release for unrestricted use from regulatory control
- As far as necessary, partial removal of the wooden floor



# Using Requirements and Criteria

- Summarize and refer to safety requirements and criteria to be met
- Represent the „measuring scale“ for the comparison of the safety assessment results and thus for the acceptability of the decommissioning activities
- Link requirements and criteria to the safety assessment outputs to facilitate later comparison
- Safety requirements and criteria may contain:
  - Dose limits for workers and the public under normal operation or under accident conditions
  - Waste acceptance criteria
  - Transport criteria



# Requirements and Criteria

## Examples from DeSa Test Cases

### **NPP Test Case**

- Workforce dose criteria (e.g dose limits)
- Public dose criteria
- Accident criteria (e.g. defence-in-depth criteria resulting in requirements on safety measures)
- Clearance criteria (surface, activity concentration, site)
- Waste classification (management) criteria
- Conventional safety/risk management criteria

### **Research Reactor Test Case**

- Dose limits and constraints for normal operation on effective dose (workers, public) and hand dose (workers only)
- Dose limits for accident situations
- Clearance levels for the reactor hall
- Transport criteria





# Assessment Outputs

**Outputs of a safety assessment must correspond to its purpose and the associated regulatory requirements and criteria, e.g.**

- expressed in effective dose or risk, or percentages of relevant limits or control values
- used to determine which of the outputs should be subject to optimisation (ALARA)

**Therefore, the operational limits, conditions and controls applied during the decommissioning process need to be specified & agreed in advance with management and regulatory authorities**



# Assessment Output

## Examples from DeSa Test Cases

### **NPP Test Case provides**

- Estimate of the effective dose to workers and members of the public from normal decommissioning operation and from fault conditions from work on the 2 systems
- Operational limits and conditions
- Recommendations for improvements to achieve ALARA
- Safety measures

### **Research Reactor Test Case**

- Estimates of effective dose and hand dose to workers and to members of the public for normal decommissioning activities and from hypothetical incidents and accidents
- Identifies non radiological hazards



# Safety Assessment Approach

## Approaches:

- deterministic – the normal practice
- probabilistic – to complement deterministic results
  - e.g. for fault sequences with conditional likelihood

## Methods:

- broad spectrum of methods available
- dose calculation to workers via est. dose-rates, times
- dose calculation to environment / man via complex environmental pathways

**Selection needs to take into account dynamic change of the state of the facility**



# Safety Assessment Approach

## Examples from DeSa Test Cases

### **NPP Test Case**

- DeSa Safety Assessment Methodology
- HAZOP methodology for hazard identification

### **Research Reactor Test Case**

- DeSa Safety Assessment Methodology
- “Check list” and “What-if technique?” approaches for hazard and scenario identification



# Using Existing Safety Assessments

**Parts of existing safety assessment for the operational phase of the facility may be used as basis for the decommissioning safety assessment**

**Important to recognize that decommissioning is fundamentally different from operation of the facility**

- source terms may have changed (e.g. By decay)
- engineered barriers may become ineffective
- systems are opened
- new equipment is introduced – e.g. flammables
- radioactivity is mobilised by D&D activities

**Simplifying assumptions may also be possible**



# Safety Management Measures

**Safety management systems are used to assure compliance with regulatory requirements & criteria and the terms and conditions of the license**

**Safety management systems include components as:**

- task-level procedures,
- change control procedures,
- work control procedures,
- personal protective equipment,
- training and testing programmes,
- radiation protection programmes,
- occupational safety programmes,
- emergency preparedness programmes



# Safety Management Measures

## Examples from DeSa Test Cases

**NPP Test Case** - Management system includes

- Organizational structure with clear responsibilities and authorities
- Change control procedures
- Maintenance and testing procedures
- ...

**Research Reactor Test Case** - management system to

- Ensure that work is carried out in accordance with the regulatory framework of the country, the operator's policies and procedures
- Ensure that staff and contractors involved are appropriately qualified and experienced



# Summary/Conclusions

- Assessment framework is the part within the safety assessment methodology to define all conditions relevant to assessing the safety of the proposed decommissioning activities
- Application of the Graded Approach is facilitated by use of a (consistent) framework
- Examples from DeSa NPP and RR work illustrate typical content of the assessment framework

