IAEA Recommendations on Safety Assessment for Decommissioning of Facilities Using Radioactive Material



Ernst Warnecke, IAEA-NSRW

Research Reactors Decommissioning Demonstration Project (R²D²P)

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


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Hierarchy of Legal Framework / IAEA Safety Standards



Overall Approach to Safety Assessment 1

- Avoid accidents / incidents
- Mitigate consequences should accidents happen
- Demonstrate compliance with safety requirements
- Derive limits, conditions, requirements (outcome)
- Start with screening assessments
- Identify and assess in detail critical / most relevant scenarios

Reminder:

- Safety assessment is an essential part of a decommissioning plan, i.e. an overall plan or the plan for an individual decommissioning step/stage
- Essential prerequisite for a license application



Overall Approach to Safety Assessment 2

- Safety assessment is necessary BEFORE an activity is carried out; it does not need a full set of real / factual data → work with best estimates → revise when new data become available
- Safety assessment includes nuclear and nonnuclear hazards
- Nuclear hazards have the potential of doing harm
- Non-nuclear hazards do harm (e.g. injuries, death)
- The presentation is focused on nuclear hazards

→ If necessary, request help and support from IAEA



Safety Assessment Objectives

- To support
 - The selection of a decommissioning strategy
 - The development of a decommissioning plan
 - → Safety assessment is part of a decommissioning plan
 - Associated specific decommissioning activities
- Determine whether:
 - Exposures to the public and to workers are below limits and ALARA -as low as reasonably achievable
 - Risks due to accidents and / or normal operations are reduced accordingly
 - Radioactive waste generation is minimised

Safety Assessment for Decommissioning 1

- Overall assessments for the whole facility / activity
- Assessments for a decommissioning step / stage
- At facilities with a phased (step-by-step) approach
 - Define the phases, the nature of the decommissioning activities and the associated hazards which may differ between phases / step / stage
 - A graded approach should be applied to each decommissioning phase
- Give consideration to both: individual doses (occupational and public) and the collective dose

Safety Assessment for Decommissioning 2

- Use a systematic methodology
 - To demonstrate compliance with criteria
 - To build confidence with 'stakeholders' (regulatory body, public etc.)
- Review of assessment
 - Operator internal (independent)
 - Regulatory body; for approval according to the national legal framework
- Review and revise to keep it up-to-date, e.g.
 - When new data become available
 - If surprises have been found
 - If modifications of the plan are suggested



Safety Assessment for Decommissioning 3

- In the absence of national requirements for the release of sites develop such requirements by safety assessment
- Demonstrate that exposures after site release will be below 0.3 mSv per year and ALARA
- Materials management should be addressed
 - Radioactive waste
 - Cleared material
 - Destination for waste and materials
 - Other hazardous material

Graded Approach

- Grading shall not compromise safety
- Commensurate with:
 - Complexity of type of facility
 - Decommissioning activities/associated hazards
 - Inventory
 - Physical state of the facility
 - Quality of data
 - Resources (human, financial) etc.
- All phases / steps of decommissioning
 - Need a safety assessment
 - Regulators review the safety assessment

Safety Functions and SSCs 1

- Safety functions and associated SSCs (Systems Structures and Components) should be identified for:
 - Planned decommissioning activities
 - Accident conditions
- Safety functions
 - Existing and temporary situations
 - Change of safety functions
 - Identification and justification

Safety Functions and SSCs 2

WS-G-5.2 "Safety Assessment for Decommissioning"

- Safety assessment should be used to evaluate
 - Suitability
 - Sufficiency
 - Reliability

of these safety functions (e.g. containment) for the duration of decommissioning, including deferrals

- Deferred dismantling strategy
 - Preference to passive systems, devices and approaches
 - Minimal reliance on active systems, human intervention or monitoring



Defence in Depth

- Sometimes called 'Multi-barrier' approach
- Safety assessment should:
 - (a) Identify necessary
 - Preventative
 - Protective
 - Mitigating measures
 - (b) Justify that these measures will be suitable and sufficient to ensure safety during decommissioning

Management System

- Management system for decommissioning safety assessment:
 - Performance of assessment
 - Interface with other related facilities and activities
 - Graded approach
 - Responsibilities
 - Qualification
 - Contractors
 - Training
 - Procedures (e.g. independent review)
 - Record and archiving
 - Involvement of Regulatory Body et Comic Energy Agency

Staffing and Training 1

- Be reflected in the safety assessment e.g.:
 - Through consideration of increased initiating events due to human errors
 - Need for measures to prevent or mitigate the associated consequences
- Balance between human-based and engineered measures
- Rigour of training commensurate with complexity of decommissioning project

Staffing and Training 2

- Decommissioning safety assessment needs a qualified and experienced multi-disciplinary expert team with expertise covering all relevant areas:
 - Knowledge of the facility (operational history)
 - Decommissioning technologies
 - Waste management
 - Radiation protection
 - Industrial safety
 - Hazard analysis
 - Engineering analysis
 - Specific areas: criticality, hydrogeology, modelling



Safety Assessment Outcome 1


- Document how regulatory requirements / criteria are met
- Evaluate the nature, magnitude and likelihood of hazards and their radiological consequences to workers, public and the environment under normal conditions and during accidents
- Quantify the systematic and progressive reduction in radiological hazards
- Identify the safety measures, limits, conditions, requirements ...
- Demonstrate safety after license termination
- Demonstrate that any institutional control will not impose undue burdens on future generations



Safety Assessment Outcome 2

- Provide input to on-site and off-site emergency planning and safety management arrangements
- Provide input to the training needs for decommissioning and qualification of staff

Safety Assessment Methodology



Assessment Framework

- Context and relation to decommissioning plan
 - Scope
 - Objectives
 - Requirements and criteria
 - Timeframes
 - End state of decommissioning
 - End states of decommissioning phases/steps ...
 - Assessment outputs
 - Safety assessment approach
 - Existing safety assessments and experience
 - Involvement of interested parties
- Include normal operation and incidents / accidents



Description of Facility and Activities

- Facility and associated buildings: existing hazards
 - Site description and local infrastructure
 - Structures, systems and components
- Radioactive inventory, mechanical, physical, and chemical characteristics
- Existing and planned safety measures (as input)
- Common systems with other facilities
- Operational history
- Decommissioning plan (activities, sequence and techniques)
- Supporting facilities
- Before, during phases and after decommissioning



Hazard Identification and Screening 1

- Hazards
 - Radiological
 - Chemically toxic
 - Dangerous (e.g. asbestos)
 - Industrial / non-radiological hazards
 - Combined and additive effect
 - Initiating events, scenarios following such an event, (potential) consequences (radiological and non-radiological)

Hazard Identification and Screening 2


- Existing and potential hazards
- Induced:
 - External
 - Internal
 - Human
- Identification of hazards
 - To workers, public and environment

Hazard Identification and Screening 3

- Main steps:
 - Hazards and initiating event identification
 - Screening
 - Selection of critical / more relevant scenarios
 - Normal conditions (as planned)
 - Accidental conditions
- Various techniques
 - Check lists
 - Expert judgement, etc.
- Graded approach
 - Facility complexity, decommissioning phases International Atomic Energy Agency

Hazard Analysis 1

- Identify sources for radiological hazards
- Assess the magnitude of such hazards
- Check for scenarios that could lead to hazards
- Calculation of consequences (doses and risk)
- Verify and validate methods and models



Hazard Analysis 2

- Assumptions should be clearly justified
- Uncertainties should be assessed / determined
- Approach to the analysis should be selected
- Measures should be identified and put in place that would prevent or protect against accidents or mitigate their consequences

Engineering Analysis

- Physical, chemical, mechanical and radiological state of the facility after shutdown
- Extent of ageing of facility and safety systems
- Reliability of any existing engineered SSCs need to be in compliance with relevant current codes and standards
- Need for additional engineered SSCs to deliver safety functions
 - Necessary because existing SSCs are inadequate
 - Necessary as a result of proposed specific activities

Evaluation of Results and Identification of Safety Measures 1

- Comparison of results with safety criteria (dose or risk etc.), including uncertainties
- Uncertainty analysis should take due account of all known uncertainties, e.g.
 - quality, reliability information, e.g. assumptions real data
 - precision in the planning of cleanup activities
 - later stages / steps in a phased approach
- Sensitivity analysis
- Adequacy of safety measures
 - Engineering
 - Procedural



Evaluation of Results and Identification of Safety Measures 2

- Level of confidence
- Safety margins
- Confidence building in assessment and results
 - Management system / procedures, etc.
 - Qualified and trained staff
 - Independent review carried out by operator
 - Involvement of 'stakeholders'
 - Dialogue with regulators etc.
- Independent review of safety assessment with independent means by regulator




DeSa Project (2004-2007) 1

DeSa: Evaluation and <u>Demonstration of Safety for</u> Decommissioning of Facilities Using Radioactive Material



NPP



Research reactor



Pu - laboratory

- Objectives
 - Safety assessments for real facilities
 - Develop harmonized approach on safety assessment
 - Investigate practical applicability
 - Demonstrate and illustrate application of approaches
 - Investigate approaches for review International Atomic Energy Agency



DeSa Project (2004-2007) 2

Scope

- Safety assessment for decommissioning of facilities using radioactive material
- Not in the focus:
 - development of the Safety Assessment for decommissioning during life time of a facility and during progress of decommissioning work
 - Implementation of Safety Assessment results
 - These are some of the main issues for the new FaSa project

Outcome

- Important input to the finalization of WS-G-5.2
- Safety Report with 4 volumes to illustrate safety assessment and review methodology
- Network of experts in decommissioning

• Website:

http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/waste-safety/desa/start.asp?s=8&l=59



FaSa Project (2008-2011) 1

- Use of safety assessment in planning and implementation of decommissioning of facilities using radioactive material (FaSa)
- Objectives of FaSa (based on DeSa experiences)
- Provide practical and useful recommendations on the evolution and use of safety assessment in planning and execution of decommissioning with the aim of ensuring safe termination of practices
- More detailed recommendations on
 - Use of safety assessment methodology and safety assessment results and their evolution
 - Use of safety assessments in identification and practical implementation of safety control measures and of their evolution

FaSa Project (2008-2011) 2

- Application of the graded approach
- Further recommendations on methodologies and approaches for independent reviews for the operator and regulatory reviews of safety assessments and the implementation of their results

Scope of FaSa

- Focus on immediate and deferred dismantling of a large range of facilities with different complexities and hazards, endpoints and end states
- Explore interfaces between safety assessments for decommissioning and for waste management

• Website:

http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/waste-safety/fasa/default.asp?s=8&I=64



Summary

- Systematic analysis of the safety of a facility / activity
- Relevant input data (factual data or assumptions) are needed
- The better the data the better the safety assessm.
- Qualified, experienced, skilled experts are needed
- Important aspect of a license application as part of the decommissioning plan
- IAEA recommendations on safety assessment (see References)
- DeSa and FaSa Projects apply safety assessment and foster international co-operation
- IAEA provides continued assistance to Member States on the application of safety standards and the exchange of information

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- DeSa Project Reports (Password protected)

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