



# **ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITIES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SCRAP METAL IN BRAZIL**

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International Conference on Control and Management of Inadvertent Radioactive Material in Scrap Metal  
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# Overview

- ▣ Introduction
- ▣ Synopsis of the main recommendations on source control and scrap metal
- ▣ Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control and scrap metal
- ▣ Goiania's aftermath and lessons learned
- ▣ Brazil's outlook on scrap metal
- ▣ Conclusion e Final Remarks



# Introduction

- We have to live together with metal scraps, since it is important to our economy:
- Some data and figures to consider (benefits):
  - Metal scraps are the most convenient raw material on casting – minor losses in the process quality
  - Metals are 100% recyclable
    - **One ton of aluminium scraps save 5 ton of bauxite**
  - Recycling iron and steel scrap comprises half of the industry's revenue
  - Power economy of 95% on metal recycling when compared to conventional industrial processing

# Introduction

- On the other hand, we should deal with scrap metal with care:
- Some data to consider (drawbacks):
  - Orphan sources and contaminated material
  - Most of metals are extremely valuable
  - Recycling iron and steel should be managed very cautiously (facilities under regulatory control)
  - A clearance policy must be considered






# Introduction

- The debate is more encompassing than scrap metal, passing by orphan sources, leading to the main issue: source control
- September 11, 2001: a turning point
  - Before September 11, the main concern: accidents involving radioactive sources
  - After September 11, the main concern: terrorist actions using radioactive sources
  - Changes on national, regional and international recommendations to cope with this new scenarios

# Synopsis of the main recommendations on international, regional and national levels





- ▣ Recommendations on source control
- ▣ Recommendations on orphan, disused and spent sources
- ▣ Recommendations on scrap metal



# Synopsis of the main recommendations on international, regional and national levels


## ▣ Source Control

- Legislation & Regulation
- Regulatory Structure
- Notification/Authorization
- Inspection & Enforcement
- Commerce of Sources
- Safety and Security Culture



# Synopsis of the main recommendations on international, regional and national levels

- Orphan, Spent and Disused Sources
  - Preventive Measures
  - Collecting
  - Interim Storage
  - Waste Management
  - Disposal
  - Decommissioning
  - Illicit trafficking












# Synopsis of the main recommendations on international, regional and national levels

## ■ Scrap Metal

- Preventive Measures
- Orphan Sources
- Contaminated Material
  - NORM/TENORM
- Monitoring Systems
- Recycling
- Clearance
- Stakeholders Involvement




# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- Overview on the National Commission of Nuclear Energy: legislation, structure and main actions
- Licensing of radioactive facilities and controlling of radioactive sources
- Managing of radioactive waste and of orphan sources
- Preparedness and response to radiological emergencies
- Patrolling over illicit trafficking involving radioactive material




# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control



- ▣ Overview on the National Commission of Nuclear Energy: **Structure of CNEN**

# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control



- ▣ Overview on the National Commission of Nuclear Energy: **Structure of CNEN**

# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- ▣ Overview on the National Commission of Nuclear Energy: **Brazilian Legislation**
  - The main Laws and Decrees concerning CNEN's actions and responsibilities
    - ▣ Law 4118/62 (Creation of CNEN)
    - ▣ Laws 6189/74 and 7781/89 (Attributions of CNEN)
    - ▣ Decree 5667/06 (Structure of CNEN)



Ministério da  
Ciência e Tecnologia



# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- ▣ Overview on the National Commission of Nuclear Energy: **CNEN Regulation**
  - The main Norms elaborated by CNEN:
    - ▣ Six major groups classified by subject
      - Group 1: Nuclear Facilities
      - Group 2: Physical Protection
      - **Group 3: Radiation Protection (3.01; 3.02; 3.06)**
      - Group 4: Nuclear Materials, Minerals and Ores
      - Group 5: Transport
      - **Group 6: Radioactive Facilities (6.02; 6.04; 6.05)**



# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- ▣ Overview on the National Commission of Nuclear Energy: **Main actions and responsibilities**
  - Research and development concerning nuclear technologies and correlated areas
  - Institutes and Supporting Regional Centers
    - ▣ The main intermediate repositories in national level to radioactive waste and orphan sources



# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control


## ▣ Institutes and Supporting Regional Centers





# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control


- ▣ Overview on the National Commission of Nuclear Energy: **Main actions and responsibilities**
  - Licensing, control, safeguards, waste management, emergency preparedness and response
  - Main departments concerned to Directorate of Radiation and Nuclear Safety (DRS)



# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- ▣ **Licensing of radioactive facilities and control of radioactive sources**
  - General-Coordination of Medical and Industrial Facilities - CGMI's Structure (two technical divisions)

## Estrutura da Coordenação de Instalações Radiativas



# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- ▣ **Licensing of radioactive facilities and control of radioactive sources (CGMI)**
  - ▣ More stringent licensing over practices and sources of major risk: IAEA categories 1 and 2, and sometimes 3

Industrial  
Irradiation



Industrial  
Gammagraphy




Well  
Logging




# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

## Industrial Gammagraphy On Site



# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

## ▣ Radiotherapy Facilities Distribution



# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- **Licensing of radioactive facilities and control of radioactive sources (CGMI)**
  - Controlling of commerce of radioactive sources: domestic and foreign trading
    - Domestic trading of radioactive sources by permission
      - CNEN applied forms and requirements for productions and transfers in the country
    - Foreign trading of radioactive sources by permission
      - CNEN applied forms and requirements for imports and exports
      - Involvement of other institutions
      - Integrated System of Foreign Trade (SISCOMEX)

# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- **Integrated System of Foreign Trade**

Secretaria da Receita Federal  
Secretaria de Comércio Exterior  
Banco Central do Brasil



**SISCOMEX**  **IMPORTAÇÃO**

Um Produto desenvolvido pelo Serpro

COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR  
DIRETORIA DE RADIOPROTEÇÃO E SEGURANÇA NUCLEAR  
SUPERINTENDÊNCIA DE LICENCIAMENTO E CONTROLE  
COORDENAÇÃO DE INSTALAÇÕES RADIAVAS  
Rua General Severina, 90 - Botafogo - Rio de Janeiro - RJ  
CEP: 22294-900 - Tel. (021) 546-2337 Fax: (021) 546-2494  
http://www.cnen.gov.br

SOLICITAÇÃO DE LICENÇA DE IMPORTAÇÃO PARA MATERIAL RADIAATIVO E/OU EQUIPAMENTO GERADOR DE RADIAÇÃO IONIZANTE - SIAIC/IRAP

1 - DADOS DO IMPORTADOR

Nome social: \_\_\_\_\_ Inscrição: \_\_\_\_\_  
CNPJ: \_\_\_\_\_ UF: \_\_\_\_\_

2 - DADOS DO UTILIZADOR

Nome social: \_\_\_\_\_ Inscrição: \_\_\_\_\_  
CNPJ: \_\_\_\_\_ UF: \_\_\_\_\_

Endereço: \_\_\_\_\_  
Cidade: \_\_\_\_\_

3 - PRODUTO

QUANT	ATAV	ATAV	RAO	PRODUTO	VALOR	VALOR
UNID	UNID	TOT			UNITARIO	TOTAL
(INT)	(EXT)	(PROD)				

4 - ASSINATURAS E DATAS

IMPORTADOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATA: \_\_\_\_\_ UTILIZADOR: \_\_\_\_\_ DATA: \_\_\_\_\_

CMEN: \_\_\_\_\_ DATA: \_\_\_\_\_  DEFERIDA  USO DA CMEN  INDEFERIDA  REJULGADA

Comentário: \_\_\_\_\_

COMISSÃO NACIONAL DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR  
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REQUISIÇÃO PARA LICENCIAMENTO DE EQUIPAMENTO RADIAATIVO E/OU MATERIAL RADIAATIVO

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Comentário: \_\_\_\_\_


# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- **Managing of radioactive waste and collecting of orphan sources (DIREJ)**
  - Historical participation on collecting radioactive waste and orphan sources (not anymore)
    - This responsibility belongs today to the institutes and the supporting regional centers
  - Implementation on a data base on these collectings of sources and wastes
  - Licensing of waste and orphan sources repositories (final and intermediate)
  - Supporting on NORM (oil E&P and mines)



# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- ▣ **Preparedness and response to radiological emergencies (DIEME)**
  - Rescue of abandoned, lost and stolen sources and contaminated material
  - Decontamination of facilities and recovering of affected areas due to accidents involving liberation of radioactive products



# Regulatory structure in Brazil concerning source control

- **Patrolling over illicit trafficking involving radioactive material (COSAP)**

- Point of contact of Brazil before IAEA concerning the International Traffic Database (ITDb)
- Work together in regional level with other countries of MERCOSUL on prevention, detection and response to illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material
- Work together in national level with other departments of CNEN and security forces, intelligence agencies and border control authorities

# Goiania's aftermath and lessons learned

- **A brief overview on the Goiania's accident**
  - **It involved scrap metal dealers**
  - 4 people died, 249 people contaminated, 112.000 monitored
  - 5000 m<sup>2</sup> of highly contaminated sites
  - 3500 m<sup>3</sup> of total volume of waste removed
  - 15% fall on the GDP of Goiás State
  - Social, emotional, psychological and economical consequences



# Goiania's aftermath and lessons learned

The background image shows a yellow excavator at a construction or demolition site. In the foreground, a person wearing a full white protective suit and a mask is walking towards the left. The scene is outdoors with some greenery and a brick wall in the background.

- **Lessons Learned**

- Extra care on the decommissioning of facilities
- Sources control in a national level
  - Data base of radioactive facilities and sources (SIR)
  - Inspection and audits with frequency according to the risk of practices and sources (SS 120)
- Stricter licensing procedures on sources and practices of major risk categories
- Collecting of disused sources that might be substituted for:
  - new technologies (Ra-226 needles and Cs-137 tubes brachithery sources)
  - more secure practices (Cs-137 teletherapy sources)
  - non justified practices (Am-241 foils of lightning preventers)


# Goiania's aftermath and lessons learned

- Data System of Radioactive Facilities**

INDÚSTRIA		
<b>centro oeste</b>	medidores nucleares	1
	medidores nucleares fixos	31
	medidores nucleares móveis	1
	polimerização	1
	técnicas analíticas	15
<b>nordeste</b>	esterilização por radiação gama	1
	medidores nucleares	4
	medidores nucleares fixos	110
	medidores nucleares móveis	9
	perfilagem de poços	11
	radiografia industrial	9
	técnicas analíticas	13
<b>norte</b>	irradiação de alimentos	1
	medidores nucleares fixos	37
	medidores nucleares móveis	1
	perfilagem de poços	2
	técnicas analíticas	12
<b>sudeste</b>	esterilização por radiação gama	8
	irradiação de alimentos	2
	medidores nucleares	3
	medidores nucleares fixos	443
	medidores nucleares móveis	28
	perfilagem de poços	12
	polimerização	10
	radiografia industrial	159
	soldagem	1
	técnicas analíticas	159
	traçadores radioativos industriais	4
<b>sul</b>	medidores nucleares fixos	144
	medidores nucleares móveis	2
	polimerização	2
	prospecção mineral	1
	radiografia industrial	22
	técnicas analíticas	14
total indústria		1273



INDÚSTRIA		
<b>centro oeste</b>	medidores nucleares fixos	109
	medidores nucleares móveis	1
	técnicas analíticas	19
<b>nordeste</b>	medidores nucleares	1
	medidores nucleares fixos	373
	medidores nucleares móveis	18
	perfilagem de poços	110
	radiografia industrial	6
	técnicas analíticas	28
<b>norte</b>	irradiação de alimentos	22
	medidores nucleares fixos	191
	perfilagem de poços	6
	técnicas analíticas	20
<b>sudeste</b>	esterilização por radiação gama	664
	irradiação de alimentos	1
	medidores nucleares	1
	medidores nucleares fixos	2252
	medidores nucleares móveis	114
	perfilagem de poços	301
	polimerização	2
	radiografia industrial	295
	soldagem	1
	técnicas analíticas	227
	traçadores radioativos industriais	12
<b>sul</b>	medidores nucleares fixos	545
	medidores nucleares móveis	4
	polimerização	1
	prospecção mineral	1
	radiografia industrial	13
	técnicas analíticas	16
total indústria		5354






# Goiania's aftermath and lessons learned

- Some good practices worth to mentioning:
  - **Implementation of a system of identification of radioactive sources in national level (SINAER), consisting of two basic parts:**
    - a book with illustration of sources and practices, the main radioisotopes involved and the data related, as well as the necessary safety and security instructions
    - a grouping of volunteers, experts on nuclear matters, spread throughout Brazil strategically, to cover all the regions of the country, in order to orientate the actions to collect occasional sources that might have been lost, abandoned or stolen and notify CNEN for the final actions as needed

# Goiania's aftermath and lessons learned

## Integrated System for Investigation of Radiological Events



# Goiania's aftermath and lessons learned


- **Some good practices worth to mentioning:**
  - **Elaboration of a booklet in order to orientate the contracting of services of industrial radiography concerning safety and security measures**
    - Distributed among the main contractor of these services in the country so as to guarantee these services to be done safely and securely, and all the measures to protect the workers involved, the public and the environment to be taken, as well as foster a safety and security culture throughout all the main stakeholders in this area, especially the industries which are non users of radioactive sources
    - Among the big contractors, we have to make a special mention to PETROBRAS, which was a great contributor to these project, and actually jointed CNEN to make it real



# Goiania's aftermath and lessons learned

- ▣ Practical Guide on Radiological Safety for the contracting of Industrial Radiography Services

Guia Prático em Segurança Radiológica  
para contratação de Serviços de  
Radiografia Industrial



# Brazil's outlook on scrap metal

A photograph showing a person in a white protective suit and mask working with scrap metal. The person is standing next to a large pile of scrap metal covered with a black tarp. A yellow excavator is visible in the background, and the scene appears to be an outdoor scrap metal processing or recycling site.

1. **Promote a debate among all departments of CNEN directly or indirectly related to source control and scrap metal**
  - a) Identify actions of each department
  - b) Verify possible double efforts
  - c) Implement necessary changes
  - d) Propose a joint action of departments
  - e) Elaborate a Plan of Action

# Brazil's outlook on scrap metal

A photograph showing a person in a white protective suit and mask working with scrap metal. The person is standing next to a large pile of scrap metal covered with a black tarp. A yellow excavator is visible in the background, and the scene is outdoors with some greenery and buildings in the distance.

2. **Identify potential partnerships through governmental institutions and society**
  - a) Special Secretariats on the Ministries
  - b) Association of steel and metal industries
  - c) Association of recycling industries
  - d) Union of workers in these businesses
  - e) Elaborate a strategy to involve these parties in a joint action with CNEN

# Conclusion and Final Remarks

A yellow excavator is the central focus of the background image, positioned in an outdoor setting that appears to be a construction or industrial site. The excavator's arm and bucket are visible, and it is surrounded by some greenery and a brick wall. A person wearing a white protective suit and mask is standing near the base of the excavator, possibly engaged in some form of inspection or maintenance work. The overall scene suggests a focus on industrial operations and safety.

1. Despite the fact Brazil still do not have an effective control on scrap metal, there is a national structure encompassing licensing and control of sources and practices, reducing the probabilities of occurrences of orphan sources and, consequently, scrap metal.

# Conclusion and Final Remarks

The background image shows a yellow excavator in a field. A person wearing a white protective suit and a mask is standing near the excavator, possibly performing maintenance or a safety check. The scene is outdoors with some vegetation and a building visible in the distance.

- II. There is a background legislation and regulation supporting all these actions concerning licensing and control of sources and related practices, complying with international recommendations.

# Conclusion and Final Remarks

The background image shows a yellow excavator with its arm raised, positioned in an outdoor area. A person wearing a full white protective suit is standing near the base of the excavator, possibly handling materials. The scene is set against a backdrop of a brick wall and some greenery.

**III. There are already individual actions of departments of CNEN related to the control of scrap metal, which need to be put together in a joint action.**

# Conclusion and Final Remarks



- IV. There might be partners on governmental institutions and society to joint the actions carried out by CNEN concerning the control of scrap metal and related recycling industries.

## Conclusion and Final Remarks

- v. Putting all these efforts together, along with the existing structure of legislation, regulation and effective actions of a national regulatory authority, we firmly believe that Brazil will be able to build its own Protocol in a few years, as some countries have been doing.





# Questions?

