PSA applications

PSA-based evaluation and rating of operational events
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OBJECTIVES: WHY DO WE WANT TO USE PSA FOR THIS PURPOSE?

- To gain insights in NPP weaknesses in relation to the occurred situation

- To obtain a measure of the event severity

- To validate and backfit the PSA models
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

- **CDF**: Core Damage Frequency
- **CCDP**: Conditional Core Damage Probability
- **IE**: Initiating Event
- **HRA**: Human Reliability Analysis
- **ASP**: US-NRC project on Accident Sequence Precursor analysis
- **LER**: Licensee Event Report
- **IRS**: IAEA Incident Reporting System
- **INES**: International Nuclear Event Scale
Analysis of precursors using probabilistic approaches
- Started in 1979 at the Oak Ridge Laboratory
- Applicable to USA commercial plants
- Use of generic & simplified BWR and PWR PSA models
- Used to evaluate safety significance of the events reported through the LER programme:
  - Calculation of CCDP due to each event
  - CCDP was used as a means of ranking events
Important benefits:

- ASP showed that PSA-based methods are a good approach for evaluation and ranking of events.
- ASP showed that PSA-based evaluation of events is a good approach for making PSA more complete and realistic (Search for events not or poorly predicted in the PSA).

Limitations:

- Use of generic models
- Use of simplified models
• Several national projects have developed since the mid-eighties

• i.e. German Precursor Study (1985): To validate German Risk Study using the operational experience of the Biblis NPP: CDFoperexp < CDFrisk study.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

OTHER NATIONAL PROJECTS: GERMANY, SWEDEN, FINLAND, FRANCE (Cont.)

- References:
IAEA-TECDOC-611: "Use of plant specific PSA to evaluate incidents at nuclear power plants" (1991)

- Initiated in the framework of the IAEA-IRS project: optimising experience feedback requires selection of events with higher safety significance
- Purpose: To characterise the relative importance of incidents
- Starting point: Use of plant-specific PSA in order to:
  - allow better understanding of NPP vulnerabilities
  - check the PSA model for appropriateness and completeness
PROCEDURES FOR EVENT EVALUATION USING PSA METHODOLOGY

- Selection of incidents for analysis
- Understanding of the incident and its safety implications
- Establishment of the relationship between the incident and the PSA model
- Modification of the models to reflect the incident
- Calculation of new PSA results
- Analysis of the results
Selection of incidents for analysis

Initial qualitative screening to select those of most value to the analysis:

- Any incident which degrades safety functions is a candidate for selection: Incidents that involve safety function failure or degradation
- Any incident which results in unexpected or significant challenges to the safety functions is a candidate for selection: Initiating events and precursors to initiating events
- Events occurring at a frequency greater than the estimated frequency for the PSA
- Multiple failures or degradations
- Events that are not well modelled in the PSA
Understanding of the incident and its safety implications

- It requires knowledge of the NPP design and operation in order to determine if the incident impacted or had the potential to impact a safety function
- It requires knowledge of the contents of the PSA to determine if the potential impacts are within the scope or resolution of the PSA models
Establishment of the relationship between the incident and the PSA model

To determine:

- Accident sequences involved
- Fault trees and basic events that model the components and operator actions concerned
- Which recovery actions could be claimed and which are impossible
Modification of the models to reflect the incident i.e.:

- Restoring accident sequences that were originally truncated out in the final results
- Changing basic event probabilities
- Evaluating new human error rates
Calculation of new PSA results

Calculation of the new results conditional on the existence of the incident:

- Events that could have lead to an initiating event but no IE occurred
- Initiating events
- Events that jeopardise NPP response to an initiating event but no IE occurred
Analysis of the results

- Comparison of new and existing results
- Determination of the new dominant contributors
- Determination of the new importance of the remaining systems, components and operator actions to prevent core damage
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PROCEDURES FOR EVENT EVALUATION USING PSA
DETAILED PROCEDURE

- Review of the incident
- Identification of all the event tree sequences affected by the incident
- Review of the identified sequences and cut-sets to determine if the affected systems and basic events were not truncated in the original results
- Determination of the best estimate failure probabilities for all basic events impacted by the incident
- Calculation of the new accident sequence conditional probability
- Determination of the recovery actions to be applied to the cut-sets
- Calculation of importance measures for the new results
- Performance of the required sensitivity analyses
- Documentation of the analysis
PROCEDURES FOR EVENT EVALUATION USING PSA
DETAILED PROCEDURE (Cont.)

- **Review of the incident**
  - Identify the chronology of events
  - Identify all equipment failures, degradations and unavailabilities
  - Note all operator actions taken, specially those not covered by procedures and training
  - Review related problems and conditions that occurred a period before and after the event
PROCEDURES FOR EVENT EVALUATION USING PSA
DETAILED PROCEDURE (Cont.)

- Identification of all the event tree sequences affected by the incident
  - The full event tree models should be used
  - The analyst must know which event tree headings include the equipment and operator actions involved in the event
  - The sequences of concern are those with a failure branch for at least one of the headings of concern
PROCEDURES FOR EVENT EVALUATION USING PSA
DETAILED PROCEDURE (Cont.)

- Review of the identified sequences and cut-sets to determine if the affected systems and basic events were not truncated in the original results
  - If the sequences or cut-sets of concern were not retained, they have to be generated. The cut-off criteria should be properly selected
Determination of the best estimate failure probabilities for all basic events impacted by the incident

- Failed components can be modelled as house events "1" to correctly generate the Boolean logic
- Unavailabilities: their duration must be taken into account:
  - Multiplying the IE frequency by the unavailability time (fraction of the year)
  - Introducing the real unavailability event (instead if a failed house event)
- Equipment or operator degradations: Detailed analyses may be required to calculate the new failure probabilities
PROCEDURES FOR EVENT EVALUATION USING PSA
DETAILED PROCEDURE (Cont.)

- Calculation of the new accident sequence conditional probability
  - Events that could have lead to an initiating event but no IE occurred: Development of new event trees may be required
  - Initiating events: calculation of the Conditional Core Damage Probability with the NPP boundary conditions at the time of the incident (based on the NPP status)
  - Events that jeopardise NPP response to an initiating event but no IE occurred: calculation of all Conditional Core Damage Probabilities for all IEs for which plant response could be degraded by the incident

WARNING: Impossible combinations
Determination of the recovery actions to be applied to the cut-sets

- Based on the events of the incident
- Available personnel should be considered
- The operating procedures should be taken into account
- Dedicated HRA may be required
- Recovery actions included in the original PSA should be reconsidered
Calculation of importance measures for the new results

- Fussell-Vesely
- Risk Reduction Worth
- Risk Achievement Worth
PROCEDURES FOR EVENT EVALUATION USING PSA

**DETAILED PROCEDURE (Cont.)**

- **Documentation of the analysis**
  - The documentation should be clear concise and traceable
  - All the steps of the process should be fully documented
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USE OF PSA FOR EVENT RATING

OBJECTIVE

- To develop a consistent measure of the relative safety significance of each event
USE OF PSA FOR EVENT RATING

WARNINGS

• The relative significance of an event might be different depending on the "risk index" used, i.e. Core Damage Frequency vs. Frequency of Large Release

• A PSA-based approach to rate events will not be useful for all the events that happen at the plant (i.e. radiation exposure, waste production). Care must be taken when comparing the safety significance of all NPP events that have safety implications
First proposal: Measures of importance

Events can be rated based on the importance or weight of the relevant cut-sets. The following approach could be followed:

- Modification of the event/s frequency/ies according to the observations
- Calculation of the new CDF due to the impacted sequences ($CDF_{c}$)
- Normalisation of the obtained $CDF_{c}$ with respect to the baseline CDF
Second proposal: PSA direct results

Operational events could be rated according to the Probability of Core Damage conditional to the occurrence of the event
Whatever risk-based method, existing or newly developed, is used for event rating:

- The measures developed should be comparable for all events analysed
- The measures should be calculated on a consistent basis
- The rating scale should be understood, by the analysts that perform the analyses and by the organisations who might receive rating reports and possibly base decisions on these

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The proposed risk-based approach for evaluation of operational events consists of the following steps:

- Qualitative estimations of conditional probability and consequence -> qualitative estimation of risk
- Comparison to risk criteria
- Semi-quantitative estimations of conditional probability and consequence -> semi-quantitative estimation of risk (using simplified models)
- Comparison to reference value
- Refinement of the risk estimate
- Cost-benefit analysis of possible system and procedure modifications
EXAMPLES OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES

PROBABILISTIC INCIDENT ANALYSIS (EDF, FRANCE)

Objective

Identification and analysis of all the incidents that might degenerate and result in core damage or radioactive release
Systematic selection of events

Qualitative criteria based on safety significance
EXAMPLES OF CURRENT ACTIVITIES
PROBABILITY INCIDENT ANALYSIS (EDF, FRANCE) (Cont.)

- Analysis
  
  Calculation of conditional probability of core meltdown
Definition of accident precursor

Is any incident whose conditional probability of core melt is greater than 1E-6 when all the parameters are adjusted.
Key points

- Promotion of a risk-analysis culture among operators
- Value of accident feedback
- Understanding of how serious it is and why it is serious
OTHER REFERENCES


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OTHER REFERENCES (Cont.)

- Boneham, P. “The benefits of using PSA to enhance the feedback of operational experience at Nuclear Power Plants”, COPSA’97, Edinburgh, U.K. October 97
- Hernández-Arteaga “Use of Laguna Verde PSA to Analyze the ECCS Strainer Blockage Issue” To be presented in the Technical Committee Meeting on “PSA Applications to improve NPP safety”, Madrid, Spain, 23-27 February, 1998