# **Synthesis of questionnaire survey**



Anne Kerhoas IAEA/NSNI



- **1. General features**
- 2. Questions
- **3. Member States**
- 4. Questionnaire synthesis



### **General features**

- Scope : national regulatory approaches used in the oversight of safety culture
- Coordination : the IAEA used as a basis the questionnaire prepared by OECD/NEA and addressed to OECD Member States last May in preparation for the 10th International Nuclear Regulatory Inspection Workshop organized by OECD/NEA



# **12 questions**

**Q1**-Are there any **regulatory requirements** related to safety culture in your organization? Yes / No

Q2-If yes, describe the regulatory requirements.

Q3-In the absence of regulatory requirements, how does your regulatory body **convey its expectations** regarding the importance of safety culture for nuclear safety and the promotion of safety culture, (e.g. the content of a safety culture programme and the need to be proactive) to operators/licensees?

**Q4**-How does your organization **oversee compliance** with its safety culture expectations for operators/licensees (e.g. routine inspections, special inspections, inspection criteria) in the absence of regulatory requirements?

**Q5**-How does your oversight programme **convey** to operators/licensees that the organization's expectations for the implementation of a safety culture **programme have or have not been met** (e.g. management meetings, documentation of inspection findings, enforcement or regulatory actions)?

Q6-How does your organization train its staff in the oversight of safety culture (e.g. does it use experts educated in this area, and/or does it train its inspectors)?

# **12 questions-Cont.**

**Q7**-How does your organization **avoid subjectivity and maintain consistency** when overseeing safety culture?

**Q8**-How does your organization fairly **communicate findings** in the area of safety culture **to external stakeholders** (e.g. other operator/licensees and the general public) to ensure that its findings are not mischaracterized or taken out of context?

**Q9**-How does your organization assess **the effect of safety culture on decision making process of operators/licensees** (e.g. performing maintenance or equipment testing in a plant configuration that meets technical specifications and regulatory requirements but reduces the margin of safety)?

**Q10**-What have been the **outcomes and findings associated with your oversight** of the safety culture of operators/licensees?

**Q11**-What **problems or difficulties** did you recognize in dealing with safety culture oversight?

**Q12**-What would you like to **learn** about the oversight of safety culture at the **technical meeting**?



# List of Member States who answered

- Belgium
- Bulgaria
- Canada
- Finland
- France
- India
- Indonesia
- Italie-Enel
- Lithuania



- Mexico
- Pakistan
- Romania
- Slovenia
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- UK
- Ukrainia
- USA

# Questions 1 & 2-Trend



- About 50 % MS mentioned having no regulatory requirements related to SC
- When existing, requirements are addressed at the law level for example, in Government Decree on the Safety of nuclear power plants, in Nuclear Energy Act, in ordinance on nuclear energy.
- Reference to IAEA GS-R-3, in particular, requirement 2.5 " the management system shall be used to promote and support a strong SC..."



## **Question3-Trend**



- Interventions at the senior management level, using meetings and discussions
- Annual inspection reports
- Guidance documents approach
- Seminars and conferences
- SC working group together with operators/licensees



## **Question4-Trend**



- Incorporating inspections against SC expectations into routine inspections.
- Overseeing SC through the licensee SC selfassessment
- Targeted SC reviews, triggered by findings or by incidents
- Analysis of safety relevant events
- The process for consolidation of data gathered during those inspections is not really described in the answers.

# **Question4-Trend-The topics reviewed**

- Low threshold and blame free reporting culture,
- Sufficiency of resources and appropriate qualification of staff,
- Quality of safety reviews in modification process,
- Knowledge of work processes and compliance with procedures,
- Definition of responsibilities,
- Questioning attitudes of plant staff,
- General attitudes towards the regulator,
- Housekeeping and material conditions of plant,
- Effectiveness of problem identification,

- Evaluation and resolution,
- Sub-contracting processes,
- Quality of written documents,
- Workload,
- Safety leadership,
- Managing critical people in the organization,
- Proactive tools (e.g. pre-job briefings, operational decision making),
- Self/independent assessments

# **Question5-Trend**

#### Means

- Reports on a yearly basis
- Meetings at the senior management level

#### Content

- Findings and corrective actions
- Good practice and areas for improvement warranting further discussion.
- Not standing alone artifact but discussed together with other technical and safety related issues.





## **Question6-Trend**



- MS trained their inspectors in SC
- SC is integrated in regular training inspector curriculum
- Newcomers can benefit from training on SC
- Knowledge of SC is conveyed through attendance to international workshops or internal seminars
- SC specialists covering background such as psychology and sociology.
- The answers provided us with very limited information regarding the content of the SC training developed



## **Question7-Trend**



- Several data collection techniques
- Facts are collected
- Pair and/or team opinion
- **Design oversight principles** (1) transparent; 2) understandable; 3) objective; 4) predictable; and both 5) risk-informed and 6) performance-based.)
- Generic questionnaire
- Training



### **Question8-Trend**



- The trend is **YES**
- General statements on safety culture like ,,this plant has a good safety culture" are avoided





- Part of our technical inspection
- Not analyzed



# **Question10-Trend**



### A global picture on safety culture Some findings

- Licensee's approach to the self-assessment of safety culture,
- Difficulties to give priority to safety in certain real-time decisionmaking situations
- The work pressure in achieving production targets/ keeping to the schedule of outages could be a major cause affecting safety culture.
- Changes in NPP organization structure and personnel in order to archive the NPP decommissioning goals.
- Openness to the RB is selective
- Initiating a self-reflection process with the licensees is of a considerable value IAEA

# **Question11-Trend**



### • Lack of :

- ✓ a common understanding of the concept of safety culture
- social and psychological background of the inspectors
  clear and measurable criteria for SC evaluation and assessment
- Diversity of facility types



### **THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION**

