

DISCLAIMER

The information contained in this document cannot be changed or modified in any way and should serve only the purpose of promoting exchange of experience, knowledge dissemination and training in nuclear safety.

The information presented does not necessarily reflect the views of the IAEA or the governments of IAEA Member States and as such is not an official record.

The IAEA makes no warranties, either express or implied, concerning the accuracy, completeness, reliability, or suitability of the information. Neither does it warrant that use of the information is free of any claims of copyright infringement.

The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgment by the IAEA as to the legal status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries. The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA

DS 424 Actions

Regional Workshop on Establishing a Nuclear Safety Infrastructure for a National Nuclear Power Programme

29 November – 10 October 2010

**Joseph C. Braun
Argonne National Laboratory**

GSR Part 1

- **Requirement 12: Interfaces of safety with nuclear security and with the State system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material**
- **The government shall ensure that, within the governmental and legal framework, adequate infrastructural arrangements are established for interfaces of safety with arrangements for nuclear security and with the State system of accounting for, and control of, nuclear material.**



DS 424 Actions

Phase 1

Action 193

- The government should foster both safety culture and security culture, taking into account their commonalities and differences.
- *A safety culture and a security culture that govern the attitudes and behavior of individuals should be developed within the management system.*
- *Safety culture and security culture are based on similar notions. However, there are also some notions that are unique to security culture, such as deterrence and confidentiality.*

DS 424 Actions

Phase 2

Action 194

- All the relevant organizations should coordinate safety and security aspects from the early stages of development, establishing maximum synergy and, where necessary, integration.

Action 195

- The government should define the responsibilities of the operating organization and other competent authorities in relation to security.



DS 424 Actions

Phase 2

Action 196

- The government should develop mechanisms to communicate appropriate information to the public regarding safety and nuclear security.
- *The State should take appropriate steps within the governmental, legislative and regulatory framework to establish and ensure the proper implementation of the State's nuclear security regime, including the assignment of regulatory tasks to one or more competent authorities. The government should ensure effective overall cooperation and relevant information sharing between the competent authorities and other parts of the government responsible for security matters. This should include sharing of the relevant information in accordance with national arrangements.*



DS 424 Actions

Phase 3

Action 197

- The regulatory body (possibly consisting of several authorities) should ensure that security regulations do not compromise safety and that safety regulations do not compromise security.

Action 198

The operating organization should prepare a physical protection programme and should submit it to the regulatory body as appropriate.

DS 424 Actions

Action 199

- All the relevant organizations should ensure that emergency preparedness and response plans in the fields of safety and nuclear security are complementary, coherent and well coordinated among the entities involved.

Action 200

- The operating organization and the regulatory body should continue to promote safety culture and nuclear security culture in their respective organizations.



DS 424 Actions

Action 200 (cont.)

- *The operating organization should provide a physical protection programme that prevents or deters unauthorized access, intrusion, theft, direct attack and internal or external sabotage of systems important to safety and nuclear materials. The programme should include clear plans and procedures to provide physical protection of the site by means of vehicle entrance and exit control, vehicle parking and traffic control and personnel access control.*



DS 424 Actions

Action 200 (cont.)

- *Major decisions regarding safety enhancements and security enhancements require the consultation of each discipline on a continuous basis. For example, enhancements such as barriers, locks and fences that are designed to improve physical security may have the unintended consequence of delaying or preventing plant operators from taking actions to safely shut down and cool down the reactor.*

