

**OPENING REMARKS FOR TM/WS ON TOPICAL ISSUES ON  
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT: MANAGING THE  
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR  
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS**


**VIENNA**

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**DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY**



**INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY**

Good morning ladies and gentlemen, distinguished delegates, my dear colleagues.

I would like also to welcome you to the 6<sup>th</sup> annual workshop on nuclear power infrastructure. My introductory remarks will mainly address the activities of the Agency in response to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan and the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety.

In the early 2011, we were looking at the significant improvement in the safety performance of the nuclear industry since the Chernobyl disaster 25 years earlier.

The accident at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was a wakeup call: it reminded all of us that nuclear accidents CAN happen, and indeed WILL happen.

It has badly shaken public confidence in the capacity of nuclear industry and of governments to protect people and the environment against ionising radiations and to ensure nuclear safety. Our common goal is to make such accidents a much more remote possibility, and to make sure that all tools to minimize their consequences, to respond effectively and timely, and to inform the global community in the most transparent manner, are available, are ready, are tested.

I have been told that in Chinese there are two characters to cover the concept of crisis: one means danger, the other means opportunity. We all know that challenges help in bringing the best in human and organizations.

On March 11, less than an hour after the earthquake struck off the east coast of Japan, and following notification from our International Seismic Safety Centre (ISSC), the Agency's Incident and Emergency System (IES) was activated. Within the next hour, the Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) had established initial communication with Japan's official contact point and later published its first status summary report on the Emergency Notification and Assistance Convention (ENAC) website. From then on, these status reports on plant and radiological conditions at Fukushima Daiichi site were distributed twice daily to Member States. These reports and subsequent technical

analysis constituted the main basis for the Member State briefings and press briefings that were initiated by the Agency on 14 March 2011 and held daily. The IEC stayed in 24/7 mode for the longest period ever: until the third of May.

In view of the accident's progression, the Agency established a number of teams under the DG, myself, and several Directors, to evaluate key issues relating to the accident, to coordinate the Agency's response, and to provide accurate and timely information to Member States, the media and the public.

The Agency's laboratories also became involved early on. The Agency's Terrestrial Environment Laboratory in Seibersdorf, provided analysis, information and methodological advice to laboratories from the ALMERA network comprising at present 122 laboratories from 77 States. These in turn carried out spectroscopic measurements on nearly 100 samples taken in Japan during the various Agency missions. The Agency's marine environment laboratories in Monaco reviewed information regarding impacts to marine life and seafood resulting from the thousands of tonnes of radioactively contaminated water used to cool reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP that had been released directly into the ocean

In our first involvement, we conducted seven monitoring missions, focused on environment, sea and food monitoring. We then sent an international Fact finding mission in May to identify initial lessons to be learned from the accident and share this information across the world nuclear community. The results of this mission were shared and discussed with Japanese experts and reported to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety held at Agency Headquarters in Vienna, Austria from 20 to 24 June 2011.

This Ministerial Conference requested Director General to draft Action Plan, building on the Declaration of Ministerial Conference and conclusions and recommendations of the three Working Sessions.

On 22 September 2011, at the 55<sup>th</sup> Agency's General Conference, our 151 Member States endorsed unanimously the IAEA Nuclear Safety Action Plan.

The Action Plan is not just for the 2000 or so IAEA staff, it is aimed at the global

nuclear community. That means Member States, International organizations, it also means YOU.

The Action Plan will strengthen the global nuclear safety framework only with the commitment of all stakeholders. This is particularly true and important for nuclear safety in all States that already have or that are embarking on a nuclear power programme.

One of the twelve actions of the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety is about how to strengthen and maintain capacity building, for Member States with nuclear power programmes, and for newcomers. Another Action is devoted to facilitating the development of the infrastructure necessary for Member States embarking on nuclear power programmes. This is typically a new opportunity to ensure that the relevant lessons from Fukushima Daiichi are properly addressed in our capacity building and infrastructure development activities. It also directs us to further strengthen and promote the use of the Agency Peer review services.

The IAEA peer review missions are at the very heart of the Action Plan. I have in mind those oriented towards regulators, safe design, siting and operation of NPPs or Emergency Preparedness and Response. But I also mean the Integrated Nuclear Infrastructure Review missions. In this respect, Fukushima had also additional “collateral benefits”. Alexander and myself, when we arrived in the Agency, not so long ago, we were unhappy with poor cooperation between our Departments and we decided to organise a joint seminar towards of March. It never happened, but we no longer need it. We have worked together for so many months, and we know that you cannot separate safety and technology.

I shall now give you some more information on Capacity building and Infrastructure development.

We have developed for many years and supported knowledge networks like the Asian Nuclear Safety Network and the Ibero America Foro. We are continuing towards new networks (e.g., in Africa and Arab world). We also have activities geared towards safety knowledge management. These are basic components of capacity building. For these actions, the Agency addresses national, regional, and international levels and the

specific roles of the governments and national institutions in achieving capacity building.

On infrastructure, the Agency issued a specific safety guide on establishing safety infrastructure. This SSG-16 contains a series of actions consistent with the three phases in the milestones for the gradual application of the IAEA safety standards. A similar document is being prepared for the implementation of security guidelines.

I could continue to mention the intense activity for addressing lessons from Fukushima in all our Safety Standards, but I shall only mention a recent achievement, cross cutting through all aspects of nuclear safety: the revision of the Basic Safety Standards.

To conclude, I would like to wish you all a successful meeting, and assuring you of the continued commitment of the IAEA to facilitate a sustainable, safe and secure use of nuclear energy.