EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE STANDARDS COMMITTEE
(EPReSC)

Report of the Seventh Meeting of EPR eSC

30 October to 1 November 2018

International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna

Approved by the Eighth Meeting of EPR eSC on 25-06-2019
INTRODUCTION

The seventh meeting of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee (EPReSC) was conducted from 30 October to 1 November 2018 in Vienna. It was attended by 36 representatives from 30 Member States (MS) and 4 representatives from 4 International Organizations (IOs). Additionally, 8 representatives from MS and 1 member from IO attended through WebEx service.

EP1: GENERAL

EP1.1: Opening remarks

Mr De la Vega welcomed the attendees on behalf of Ms. Buglova, Head of the Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) who was unable to attend this second meeting of the second term of EPReSC. He highlighted the importance of the points to be discussed in the Agenda and wished a fruitful meeting to all participants.

EP1.2: Chairperson’s remarks

In her opening remarks, Ms Heinrich recalled two important events related to emergency preparedness and response (EPR) having taken place after EPReSC-6: the ninth Competent Authorities Meeting (CAM) under the Conventions of Early Notification and Assistance in case of Nuclear or Radiological Emergencies, where a session was devoted to the work done by EPReSC and the achievements attained; and the International Symposium on Communicating Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies to the Public, taking place between 1 and 5 October. She highlighted the high attendance (more than 400) to the Symposium, the excellent discussions held, the original participative format of many sessions and the important conclusions drawn, that will be reflected in the Symposium report currently being prepared and expected to be published in early 2019. In this regard, she reminded one relevant point of the Agenda, regarding the scheduled discussions on DS475, the draft Safety Standard on Arrangements for Public Communications in Preparedness and Response to Nuclear or Radiological Emergencies. Also, she highlighted the importance of other point of the Agenda regarding discussions stemming from the review of the Safety Fundamentals (SF-1) and recommendation on possible revision of the publication.

EP1.3: Logistics and administration

Mr De la Vega, EPReSC Scientific Secretary, presented the logistics and administrative arrangements. Afterwards the participants introduced themselves.

EP1.4: Adoption of the agenda of the sixth EPReSC meeting

Ms. Heinrich summarized the main points of the draft: discussion of different draft Safety Standards (SSs) information about IEC activities planned to develop new
guidance in (EPR Series documents) and different drafts in advanced state of completion, discussion on outcomes from review and possible revision of SF-1 and presentation on EPR national arrangements in Bulgaria and Sudan.

A new point (2.5, DS497 Revision of 7 closely interrelated SGs: NS-G-2.2 to 2.8 & NS-G-2) was suggested by Mr. De la Vega to be added since it had been included in the Draft for Comment Folder of SSCs web site and had been overlooked in the compilation of items for the Agenda. The agenda was approved with this modification.

**EP1.5: Approval of the report of the fourth EPreSC meeting**

The draft minutes of the last EPreSC-6 meeting and Joint Meeting with NSGC were presented for approval, noting that some comments to the initial draft had been received from different EPreSC members and included in this draft EPreSC-6 report. Israel raised one additional editorial comment and Finland did the same regarding the minutes of the Joint Meeting with NSGC. Both comments were accepted and with inclusion of those changes both the EPreSC-6 Report and the Joint Meeting with NSGC Report were approved.

**EP1.6: Update on activities stemming from the 43rd meeting of the CSS**

Mr Delattre presented the activities implemented after CSS 43 met last April. In this case and unlike other Safety Standards Committees (SSCs) EPreSC-7 was being held before the 2018 CSS autumn meeting (CSS-44) and no CSS meeting had taken place after EPreSC-6. Mr. Delattre informed on the new SSs published after CSS-43 and the current situation of development of SSs, including revision of existing ones and new SSs being developed. In total, there are 125 SSs published and 50 SSs under revision/new SSs being developed. These figures are basically stable with small fluctuations. Also, he presented the evolution of the time needed to develop a Safety Standard from approval of Document Preparation Profile (DPP) to final publication. This time had been substantially reduced in the recent times in the time necessary for draft SSs to move in the last steps towards publications. This improvement was related to the changes made to SPESS B process. He also informed that the Consultancy decided in CSS-43 to develop a Safety Report addressing different practical aspects related to attributability of effects and inference of risk from radiation exposure had been delayed for different problems and was expected to take place beginning 2019.

Australia asked about this specific circumstance of having EPreSC meeting before autumn meeting of CSS. Ms. Heinrich clarified that normal sequence was the opposite, this is, having first the meeting of CSS and then the SSCs. But alterations may take place because room availability. In any case, there are pros and cons for both sequences, regarding the interactions between SSCs and CSS.

**EP1.7: Update on the NSS-OUI Platform**
Mr. Delattre gave a presentation summarizing the purpose of this platform which is expected to play a key role in ensuring that SSs are reviewed and revised based on a systematic process to collect feedback. He informed as well about the information already available in the platform, emphasizing that currently all General and Specific SSs are available and are full text searchable. Most of the Nuclear Security Guidance documents were also available except a few that are at the end of the revision process. The central feedback mechanism contained in the platform is fully operational and he noted that it’s important that SSCs members use this system to provide feedback that could be periodically complied and reviewed to contribute to the decision on the need of revision of published SSs. Though the use of metadata this feedback could be related to other topics that may be impacted by a specific feedback or comment. He reminded that for being able to provide this online feedback, all SSCs members need to provide a Nucleus ID, and related name and email, and encouraged members to provide this information.

Mr. De la Vega asked whether there was a target periodicity for compilation and analysis of feedback received in the platform for the different SSs. Ms. Delattre replied that no decision had been made in this regard, however in his view a periodicity of two years could be reasonable.

UAE asked how the system would provide feedback to the users including the comments in the system, who was supposed to sort out the comments received, and if any feedback was supposed to be received from the system. The presenter replied that the system by itself was not going to provide any feedback to the users but would allow for compiling information and comments from different users. This information would be analyzed periodically, and a decision be made on what to do for every SS. This process itself is still being defined. UAE asked about the work to be done in the Agency with comments received and the advantages of this process. The presenter prompted Ms. Karseka-Yanev, from Safety Standards and Security Guidance Development Section to answer this query. She indicated that the main benefits were the integration of all existing Safety Standards and Nuclear Security Guidance in a common platform and the possibility of providing comments online by the users. The Technical Officers of the different documents could work on the comments and suggest the need of amendment or revision of a document. Mr. Delattre provided a hands-on demonstration of the capabilities of the system and this comment tool of the platform.

Brazil asked about the case where a SS has been superseded by a new one and if the information and comments on the old version is preserved. Mr. Delattre provide a practical demonstration based on the specific case of SSG-50 that superseded NS-G-2.11. The system keeps also the text of the superseded version, indicating in the heading that it has been withdrawn.

Canada asked whether there was the intent of using this platform for provision of comments from SSCs members. Mr. Delattre replied that the system is ready for that role, but no decision has been made yet on how to use this feature of the system.
Possibly a pilot experience with the development of selected SSs could be launched to identify the feasibility of the process and possible issues that need to be tackled.

Sudan asked about consideration of different languages in the NS-OUI Platform. Mr. Delattre clarified that the currently available version used English, but noted that the platform points to all published versions of SSs, thus every SS could be found in the different languages in which it had been published. Sudan asked about the use of the system for translation and search. The presenter replied that this was a very complex point, however different possibilities were being considered with IT counterparts regarding improvements in the search engine.

Israel asked about the current status in the use of the platform. Mr. Delattre explained that the system was basically fully operational and moving towards full fledged capability for its use.

**EP2: REVIEW OF IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS (Under the lead of other SSCs)**

**EP 2.1: DS489 – Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel**

Mr. Guskov delivered a presentation on this draft SS, which was presented at Step 11. He summarized the reasons for the revision of the existing Safety Guide based on the Fukushima Daiichi Accident experience and outlined the document scope and content. He explained the comments received from the MSs at Step 9, the comments received from different SSCs, and how they were addressed.

Ms Heinrich clarified that this draft was being discussed before technical editing and before other Committees could raise additional comments.

Australia asked about paragraph 6.97 that included new text and asked for clarification about the previous text. The presenter clarified that the previous text received a comment from the IEC and the new text addressed this comment as agreed with the IEC officer raising the comment. USA indicated that the new text was satisfactory from their perspective.

Belgium asked about what was meant with the expression “Operating Procedures”. The presenter indicated that this was a general term based on the Safety Glossary definition. Belgium asked for further clarification on the different between Operating Procedures and Accident Management Procedures. Mr. Delattre responded elaborating on the definitions of Emergency Operating Procedures and Severe Accident Management Guidelines in the Safety Glossary.

UAEA asked about whether significant changes were expected in the text during technical editing process. The presenter indicated that no major changes were expected during that process.
Ms. Heinrich proposed approval of the draft conditional to outcomes of the review of other SSCs and technical editing. After completing those steps, a term for review and consideration of possible relevant changes affecting the draft would be opened for EPReSC. This was accepted by EPReSC, and the draft approved under the referred condition.

**EP2.2: DS 516DPP – Criticality Safety in the Handling of Fissile Material**

Ms. Nepeypivo gave a presentation on this draft DPP, which is a revision by amendment of SSG-27 to cope with the recent changes in different requirements applicable (namely SSR-4 and 6 and GSR Part 4, 6 and 7) to the handling of fissile material. The recent changes affect 6 Specific Safety Guides (SSGs) related to this activity, which had been grouped in three different topical sets for purposes of conducting this revision. DS516 included all the topics concerning criticality safety in all facilities handling fissile materials. The presenter summarized the comments received to the DPP from SSCs members and the proposed resolution.

There were no questions and the draft DPP was approved.

**EP2.3: DS517 DPP – Revision of 3 Specific SGs on Fuel Cycle Facilities as a set of Pubs SSG-5, 6 and 7**

Ms. Nepeypivo delivered a presentation summarizing the purpose, scope and content of this DPP, summarizing the scope, content and expected drafting process of the resulting SS. It was included in the same process of revision by amendment, owing to new Specific and General Safety Requirements, as the previous DS516-DPP. She clarified that this DPP focuses on revising SSG affecting uranium conversion and enrichment facilities, uranium fuel fabrication facilities and uranium and mixed oxides fuel fabrication facilities. She summarized the comments received to the DPP from SSCs members and the proposed resolution.

There were no questions and the draft DPP was approved.

**EP2.4: DS518 DPP – Revision of 2 Specific SG on Fuel Cycle Facilities as a set of Pubs SSG-42 & 43**

Ms. Nepeypivo gave a presentation summarizing the purpose, scope and content of this DPP, which was included in the same set presented under items 2.3 and 2.4 above. She stated that this DPP is related to safety of fuel reprocessing facilities and fuel research and development facilities which are currently addressed by SSG-42 and 43. The structure of the existing Safety Guides was expected to remain basically unchanged. She summarized the comments received to the DPP from SSCs members and the proposed resolution.
Australia asked about the expected scope in EPR and consideration of GSR Part 7 Requirements. The presenter clarified that GSR Part 7 was a publication included among the references in this DPP and that proper consideration would be given to EPR requirements.

Israel asked about the lack of consideration of security-initiated events in the document. The presenter indicated that this aspect had been considered under the safety/security interface, even though no specific section was devoted to security-initiated events.

There were no other comments and the draft DPP was approved.

**EP2.5: DS497 – Revision of 7 closely interrelated SGs: NS-G-2.2 to 2.8 & NS-G-2.**

Mr. Cavellec delivered a presentation on this draft, which was presented at Step 7. He explained that initially 8 Safety Guides were included in the scope of the draft, but finally upon decision of NUSSC in its 43rd meeting one Safety Guide (NS-G-2.7) was removed from the scope, since the topic addressed had been included in a recently issued Safety Guide. Two comments were received from EPreSC members and they had been accepted.

Ms. Heinrich expressed her satisfaction with the comments being accepted and suggested approval of the draft conditioned to open an additional three-week term for review by EPreSC to be able to consider whether changes stemming from discussions of other SSCs whose meetings will be held in the coming weeks have impacted EPR related topics. This was accepted, and the draft approved with this condition.

**EP3: REVIEW OF IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS (Developed under the lead of EPreSC)**

**EP3.1: DS475 – Arrangements for Public Communication in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency**

Mr. Kaiser presented the draft document which was at Step 11. He summarized the main objectives and scope of this draft Safety Guide aimed at providing guidance on implementation of Requirements 10 and 13 of GSR Part 7 and 43 of GSR Part 3. He summarized the different milestones as well in the path of this draft up to Step 11. He provided a summary of comments received from Member States (MS) at Step 9 and the comments received from SSCs members and discussed how the comments were addressed. He specifically informed on comments for which an alternative solution was implemented and those that were rejected. He clarified that technical editing of the document was pending and additional changes should be expected after approval by SSCs, indicating what kind of changes should be expected. Finally, he referred to
one of the conclusions of the recent Symposium on Communicating Nuclear or Radiological Emergencies to the Public, which requested publication of this draft as expeditiously as possible.

Australia expressed their satisfaction with how comments were addressed.

Sweden indicated that one comment regarding para. 3.184 had been accepted, but one very similar to paragraph 3.185 was not included in the Table listing resolution of comments. The presenter replied that he would check that point and take appropriate action to fix that issue.

Russian Federation referred to a comment submitted by them at Step 8, about the description of the scope of the document, suggesting that it should be clarified that it related only to emergencies related to peaceful uses of nuclear and radioactive applications. The comment hadn’t been accepted but they thought that the scope should be modified as indicated in that comment. Russian Federation clarified that the need for clarifying the above point was related also to the phrase included in para. 1.3, 1.9 where it was explained that the Safety Guide addressed “emergencies irrespective of its origin”. Ms. Heinrich suggested that this could be clarified in one of the foot notes. Mr Delattre confirmed that reference could be made to the scope of SF-1, which is clearly related to peaceful uses of nuclear or radioactive applications. Mr. Kaiser replied that he would check this point and come back to them to reach an agreement before the meeting was dismissed.

Japan asked whether a plan existed to include in the document the feedback coming out from the Symposium recently held. The presenter indicated that it was planned to include in detail the feedback from this Symposium in the technical guidance (revision of existing EPR Series documents on public communication in emergencies) that was planned to be developed after publication of this Safety Guide.

Brazil asked the possibility of a government sending messages that are not consistent with the criteria defined for a communication policy or altering their technical content. Ms. Heinrich indicated that this was one of the points discussed in the recent Symposium about communication during nuclear or radiological emergencies, to be discussed under Agenda item 6.2.

Finland asked about possible changes in the text arising from the technical editing process and how EPRsC would deal with them. Ms. Heinrich responded that the technical editing process would yield the final text. Once produced, that text would undergo a silence procedure whereby SSCs members could accept this final draft or request amendments to the edits introduced. Mr. Delattre clarified the process after

1 Different discussions were held between EPRsC Chair, the Technical Officer and other Secretariat staff with Russian Federation representatives at different moments of the meeting to address this point. Finally, one agreement was reached consisting of the inclusion in para. 1.16 of the requested clarification.
SSCs approval stating that new text resulting from the technical editing process and additional edits could stem from Publications Committee review, which takes place before final approval by CSS.

Australia recalled the case of DS474, where some changes took place during technical editing step altering some important paragraphs and noted that it's worth reviewing in detail the text coming out from this editing process. Ms Heinrich concurred to this comment.

Finland indicated that Figure 1 before para. 1.121 would likely be revised and it would be important to carefully look at this point. Mr. Kaiser clarified that this figure should be revised, since it was important to clarify that communication efforts should continue during the response phase and not only based strictly on the materials developed during preparedness stage. In his view, if this point were not properly understood, effectiveness of communication could be impacted. Finland highlighted this point and asked about possibility of raising comments. The presenter indicated that all the comments raised during the meeting would be considered.

Ms. Heinrich concluded the discussion by proposing conditional approval of the draft, subject to two conditions: opening of an additional term for comments for EPReSC members after technical editing and agreement on the comment raised by Russian Federation, if possible before the end of the meeting. With these conditions the draft was approved.

**EP4: REVIEW OF AND INFORMATION ON DRAFT NUCLEAR SECURITY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS**

**EP4.1: NST050 – Preparation, Conduct and Evaluation of Exercises Involving Detection of Materials Out of Regulatory Control**

Ms. Nikolari delivered a presentation on this draft, brought for information since it was a Technical Guidance document not requiring clearance by SSCs. She explained the timeline for developing the manuscript, the scope and target audience, which included emergency response organizations. She summarized the different comments as well received from NSGC members and how they had been addressed. She explained that this document had been presented to NS Department Coordination Committee, summarizing the comments received from IEC that had been addressed and the document approved.

ENISS asked what reasons led to the development of the document. The presenter indicated that a significant number of exercises on detection of Materials out of Regulatory Control (MORC) were being held and the need arose to provide guidance to developers in order to ensure consistent approaches. Ms. Heinrich added that, in addition, the document could provide benefits for countries starting the conduct of these exercises.
Australia asked about the tools used for evaluation of exercises and in particular if these tools could be used for exercises developed at the international level. The presenter replied that the tools considered in the document were focused on the scope, scenario and play of the exercises and not specifically meant for international exercises.

Sudan asked about whether emergency response organizations had been involved in the drafting process of the document. The presenter clarified that the development of the document had taken place from the MORC perspective and not from the perspective of specific organizations that would be participating in the exercises.

**EP4.2: NST 016 – Detection at National Borders of Nuclear or Radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control**

Ms. McQuaid presentation this Technical Guidance document also brought to EPReSC for information. She explained the need for this document, and its scope, objectives and gave an overview of the content. She summarized the course of the document across its different steps in the drafting process.

The target audience for this document is expected to include the different authorities related to transport, border control, law enforcement agencies and regulatory body.

There were no questions nor comments.

**EP5: EPR Series AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS UNDER DEVELOPMENT**

**EP5.1: IEC Plans for development of EPR Series Documents in 2019/20**

Mr. De la Vega delivered a presentation on the IEC plans for developing technical guidance (EOPR Series documents). EPReSC Guidelines encourages the sharing of this relevant information on the development by the IEC of EPR technical guidance (EPR Series documents) with EPReSC. The presenter reminded first the process for the development of EPR Series publication and the normal timeline for the different steps. He provided an overview of the intense efforts by the IEC to produce guidance documents in 2018 and noted the timelines when different documents have been moved to publication or were close to be completed and submitted for publication. In total, in 2018 six documents (EPR Series, Service Series, Safety Report Series) had been or were expected to be approved by Publications Committee and 7 more were expected to be approved in the first months of 2019. He then explained the plans for development of new/revising existing EPR Series documents in 2019 and 2020, with a total of three documents expected to be revised and 4 new ones developed.

Finland asked about the new EPR Series Public Communication. The presenter informed that it would be developed based on the two guidance documents for Public Communication (EPR-Public Communication 2012 and EPR-Public Communication
Plan 2015), providing updated guidance based on DS475, and the materials stemming from the Symposium.


Mr Kutkov gave a presentation on the status of this document, which is the revision of TECDOC 1092 of the same title. He summarized the objectives and scope of the report. He also provided information on relevant aspects of its content, such as the monitoring strategy as defined in the document and the document’s structure. Finally, he informed about the current status of the document, which was expected to be submitted for approval by IAEA Publications Committee likely by beginning 3rd quarter of 2019.

Australia asked about the Technical Meeting scheduled beginning December to provide feedback to current content of DS505 “Source monitoring, environmental monitoring and individual monitoring”. The presenter explained that no relevant changes were expected to take place to Chapter 7 of this draft which deals with radiation monitoring during emergencies. Mr De la Vega clarified as well that the kind of guidance included in this EPR Series was different than the one contained in DS505. The draft SS was focused on providing guidance on how to implement the requirements of GSR Part 7 related to monitoring during emergencies. The EPR Series was devoted to providing detailed operational guidance and procedures on how to implement radiation monitoring during emergencies.

Russian Federation asked about the considerations for determining the source based on radiation monitoring. The presenter explained that radiation monitoring is basically aimed at supporting decision making. Determining the source term is not the main objective of radiation monitoring and is not specifically addressed in the document.

Japan asked how monitoring is defined in the document. The presenter clarified that the document addresses all different types of monitoring, such as environmental, source and individual monitoring. The priorities among these kinds of monitoring may shift during the different phases of the emergency.

Canada asked how to link monitoring results with atmospheric dispersion modelling. Regarding this point, the presenter explained that atmospheric dispersion models have a lot of uncertainties and IAEA doesn’t support its use for decision-making in the emergency phase at fixed installations. Dispersion models are used for deriving Operational Intervention Levels (OILs) at the preparedness stage. Ms. Heinrich indicated that in the USA dispersion modelling is used to support both preparedness and the decision making process in an emergency.
Canada asked about the possible use of monitoring to inform source term assessment. The presenter indicated that there are different ways for doing that and referred to the different models used by the IEC for this purpose and the experience of Fukushima where different dispersion predictions were used by different organizations.

Brazil commented that the problem with the process for determining source term is related to feeding radiation monitoring results to appropriate dispersion models.

**EP5.3: EPR Combined Emergencies – Challenges to nuclear and radiological emergency preparedness and response from other incidents or emergencies**

Mr. De la Vega delivered a presentation on this draft document in the EPR Series that was in the final stage of its development and had been presented to previous EPReSC meetings at earlier stages of development. He explained the background and scope of the publication and the structure and key aspects of its content. He also explained the way the different challenges that could be raised by different emergencies happening in combination with nuclear or radiological emergencies.

There were no questions.

**EP5.4: Revision of EPR Onsite – Considerations for the development of Onsite Emergency Plans for NPP**

Mr. De la Vega gave a presentation on this draft EPR Series that was in the final stage of its development and had been presented as well to a previous EPReSC meeting at an earlier stage of development. He described the objectives, scope and main aspects of the content of this EPR Series document, which was expected to deliver valuable support to MS operating organizations of NPPs and nuclear regulators about the content of On-site Emergency Plans and how to ensure alignment with applicable GSR Part 7 requirements.

South Africa asked about consideration of On-site Emergency Plans for Emergency Preparedness (EP) Category II facilities. The presenter clarified that, at a certain stage of development of the document, it was envisaged to address EP Category II facilities, but this idea was abandoned owing to the complications associated to adequately address both categories in the same document. He clarified as well that currently there are no plans in the IEC to develop guidance on On-site Emergency Plans for EP Category II facilities.

ENISS asked about guidance for hazard assessments regarding the topics addressed in the EPR Series Combined Emergencies. The presenter replied that there was no specific guidance on hazard assessments, but there should be emergency actions levels or observable conditions associated to events triggered by combined emergencies that could trigger a General Emergency. This was addressed in the document.
Ms. Nestoroska Madjunarova addressed the audience with a presentation on this EPR Series document. She explained the objective of the document and the GSR Part 7 requirements it covered. She also explained the different steps taken for drafting the document, since it was presented to EPreSC-4 at the initial stages of development. She provided details on the final structure of the document, outlining the content on the different topics addressed for both preparedness and response stages. She provided insights on the different options to include the protection strategy in the EPR national plans. Finally, she informed about the development of training materials and plans to hold pilot workshop and the publication of the document, expected for 2019.

UAE commented that they have decided to develop the concept of the protection strategy as a framework for response, and that specific values to be used for the different protective actions are included in lower level documents such as regulations, offsite and onsite plans, etc. The presenter indicated that the final approach to be adapted depends on national framework and circumstances. In addition to specific values for protective actions, it should be taken into account the need for justification and optimization of the different protection strategies.

Sudan asked about how to enforce the implementation of protection strategy from national to operator level. The presenter replied that, in her view, enforcement could not be the right word. Stakeholder involvement, through consultation process and associated activities (such as national workshops) are of paramount importance to engage the different parties, including operators, rather than enforcement. Sudan also asked about involvement of the operators in the development and implementation of protection strategy. The presenter replied that a single organization was not able to develop the protection strategy. Involvement and coordination of different concerned organizations should be pursued.

Canada referred to section 3 of the document, addressing the basis for the development of the protection strategy, and asked if the section would also provide guidance related to hazard assessment. The presenter confirmed that some guidance on this topic would be provided, but additional guidance in this regard would be provided in the revised GS-G-2.1.

Israel asked whether combined emergencies happening simultaneously with nuclear or radiological emergencies were considered in the document. The presenter replied that no direct reference to this concept was included in the document. She noted that combined emergencies should be addressed in the development of national plans, because the planning is strongly influenced by the different additional hazards existing in each country that could influence response to nuclear or radiological hazards.
Spain asked whether the concept of harmonization of EPR arrangements at regional or international level was addressed in the document. The presenter replied that in the development of protection strategy harmonization of arrangements would be required as would involving neighbors as they were relevant concerned parties.

**EP 5.6: Update on Revision of INES Manual**

Mr. Kaiser delivered a presentation on this Agenda item, which also had been presented to EPReSC-5. He summarized the objective and scope of the revision, focused on incorporation of changes based on the experience gained and feedback received since 2008, and outlined the different steps taken to date. In April 2015 a Technical Meeting (TM) had been organized to receive feedback from MS to a preliminary draft. After addressing the feedback stemming from this TM, the revised draft was submitted for comments to National INES Coordinators. A total of 324 comments had been received from Coordinators of 19 MS, the INES Advisory Committee, and ENISS. After completing the process to fully address these comments, the document was expected to undergo technical editing process and then submitted to approval for publication, likely in the first half of 2019.

There were no questions.

**EP 6: STRATEGIC ISSUES AND OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST**

**EP6.1 Report of the WG on actions to be taken by EPReSC regarding UNSCEAR Report:**

This Agenda item included two different topics:

- Review of Safety Fundamentals
- Review of currently into force or being developed SS in EPR

Ms. Heinrich open this part of the Agenda recalling the actions tasked by CSS to SSCs in its 42nd and 43rd meetings. In particular, she recalled that CSS-42 requested three actions: review of Safety Fundamentals (SF-1) based on the aspects identified in a Consultancy held upon the decision of CSS-42; development of a Safety Report to provide guidance on the applications of concepts of attribution of effects and inference of risks from radiation exposure and use of collective dose for notional comparison purposes; and review of existing and ongoing SSs against the content of UNSCEAR 2012 report. To develop a proposal to EPReSC on the first and third topics, an internal Working Group (WG) had been created to develop proposal to the Committee. For the first topic, a survey had been submitted to EPReSC members and observers last July. A total of 25 replies had been received to this survey.
Mr. Ahier delivered a presentation on the analysis conducted by the WG to the responses received to the survey and the main points that were derived regarding review and possible revision of SF-1. He described the content of the survey which was focused on getting feedback from respondents on the usefulness to and use by MS of SF-1 and possible points needing clarification or revision. Overall, the valuation of the SF-1 was quite positive, highlighting its usefulness for improving sustainable nuclear and radiation safety networks. Regarding the need of revision of SF-1, about 56% of the respondents were in favor of undertaking this revision, while 44% were against. However, regarding topics suggested for revision, suggestions were formulated by respondents supporting both positions. The main concerns identified related to excessive focus on planned exposure situations and nuclear power plants (NPP), in particular, improving the wording to be less prescriptive while being sufficiently conservative; ensuring consistency with GSR Part 3 and GSR Part 7 (in particular, improved terminology and consideration of relevant aspects like public communication, stakeholder involvement, international cooperation, etc.). Concerns were expressed regarding Principle 9, which was formulated in a way not consistent with relevant aspects of GSR Part 7, such as the need for considering low probability events. It was finally highlighted the fact that while revision of SF-1 was supported by the majority of the respondents, consensus was far from existing on this point.

Israel asked whether the changes suggested to SF-1 were related to changes to the Principles or to clarifications in their supporting narratives. Ms. Heinrich indicated that the changes were mainly related to ensure consistency of SF-1 with GSR part 3 and GSR Part 7, UNSCEAR 2012 and ICRP 103. Changes were likely to affect the narrative. Israel asked about the possible need to add new principles or simple clarifications to the existing ones. Mr. Delattre indicated that this was a difficult question at this stage, considering the relevant potential implications. CSS didn't provide any specific hint in this regard.

Mr. Delattre understood that the presentation had provided information mainly related to the rationale underlying the position of 56% supporting revision but questioned about the supporting arguments of the remainder 44%. Mr. Ahier replied that, based on the responses received, the main argument in favor not to revise was related to concerns for possible weakening of the safety framework resulting from a revision of SF-1 without clear previous consensus. On the other hand, it was also clear to the respondents that SF-1 didn’t impede proper implementation of GSR Part 3 or 7 requirements. Most of the proposals received in favor of revision were aiming at an improvement of the international safety framework.

Ms. Nestoroska Madjunarova underlined the fact that some respondents that were not supporting the revision of SF-1 still identified and suggested relevant topics for a possible revision.
Belgium indicated that they didn’t consider the revision of SF-1 to be urgently needed. They would support revision if it was ensured that the outcome of the process would be a real improvement of the international safety framework, which was not guaranteed at this moment.

Germany indicated that in their view SF-1 was a high-level document and the practical aspects be included in lower level Safety Standards. Ms. Heinrich agreed with this view.

Finland indicated that it would be more appropriate to update SF-1 rather than just review the document. This update would be for consistency with GSR Part 3 and 7 requirements and other relevant documents, such as ICRP recommendations. This update would be in the best interest of the consistency of the whole system.

Sweden agreed that there were reasons to support SF-1 revision, but this revision was not urgent and should consist mostly on an update of the document to avoid inconsistencies and to make the document more concise and shorter.

Australia supported this view of shorter document and suggested as well that the number of principles could also be modified in this process noting that there is no “magic number” of requirements. The update should strive to improve terminology and consistency with latest developments.

Mr. Delattre emphasized the fact that developing a new version of SF-1 would take time and be resource consuming. In revising such an important document, high quality should be ensured, with an absence of inconsistencies.

UK indicated that they support an update of the document to fix inconsistencies with requirements such as GSR Part 3 or 7. It would be also important to ensure that the document was kept as a high-level document.

Portugal perceived a clear need for an update of the document. Also, the idea of making it an even higher-level document was positively valued, but it should be ensured that clear links with lower level documents were maintained.

Ms. Heinrich wrapped up the opinions raised during the discussion, summarizing that many members advocated for an update of the document to improve consistency with the requirements and ICRP recommendations. However, she emphasized that there was no consensus in the Committee.

FAO indicated that the procedure for this update should be carefully considered, taking into account the relevance of the document. Ms. Heinrich agreed that a certain
threshold of issues needing to be addressed in SF-1 would need to be met to warrant revision of the document, and this should be addressed by the CSS, taking into account feedback from all the SSCs. Mr. Delattre indicated that review of this document was not an issue. The problem is the decision on a revision and the scope of this revision, which should be defined in a DPP. This was not an easy process. Co-sponsors of SF-1 should be clearly involved in the process as well.

UAE agreed that, in this case, inconsistencies between SF-1 and safety requirements issued after its publication provided good grounds for revision. Sweden added also the existence of inconsistencies with most recent ICRP recommendations, which were published one year after SF-1. The revision could help to improve in this aspect as well. Belgium indicated that in particular inconsistencies with GSR Part 7 would be worthwhile to fix but raised doubts about the final outcome of a revision process and whether the effort would be worthwhile in the end. Canada indicated that goals of EPR are defined differently in SF-1 and in GSR Part 7.

Ms. Heinrich closed the debate, summarizing that there was no consensus, but the majority support an update of SF-1, mainly aimed at fixing inconsistencies with later developments and keeping it as a high-level document. She emphasized the lack of consensus and the doubts raised by some members about the final outcome of the process.

Regarding the second part of this item (review of currently into force or being developed SS in EPR against UNSCEAR 2012 report), Ms. Nestoroska Madjunarova gave a presentation summarizing the work done by the WG, based on a draft proposal prepared by the Secretariat. She summarized the mandate from the CSS for the analysis to be conducted and the SS in EPR affected which include two in force (GSR Part 7, GSG-2), one being revised (GS-G-2.1), one recently published (GSG-11) and two being developed (DS475 and DS469). For the analysis to assess the impact of the UNSCEAR 2012 report on the SS, the different topics addressed in these documents were depicted in three main topical points: protection strategy for a nuclear or radiological emergency; EPR arrangements at the preparedness stage; and communication of radiation risks at preparedness and response stages. With this methodology, she summarized the conclusions of the analysis conducted:

- Generic criteria provide basis for taking actions at different levels (precautionary, urgent and early) that are aligned with the criteria indicated in UNSCEAR regarding the dose ranges where deterministic effects may be attributed and radiation risks may be inferred.
- GSR Part 7 and GSG-11 address protection to be provided at doses lower than internationally agreed generic criteria. In this case, emphasis is put on justification and optimization to ensure that protective actions do more good than harm.
- Protection strategy as defined in GSR Part 7 include relevant precautions to ensure justification and optimization of disruptive protective actions, such as
evacuation, relocation or sheltering. Protection strategy is implemented safely and effectively in an emergency response through execution of pre-established (at the preparedness stage) emergency arrangements.

- Criteria for medical follow up or counselling are consistent with UNSCEAR guidance.
- Concept of collective dose is not used for decision-making on public protective actions in a nuclear or radiological emergency within the EPR Safety Standards. Any other use of collective dose in this context would therefore have no other impact than purely notional, as indicated in UNSCEAR Report.
- The revision of GS-G-2.1 (DS504) provides opportunity to strengthen the guidance when providing specific guidance on effective EPR that is commensurate with the associated health risks.
- The elements defined in GSR Part 7 for communication of radiation risks are aligned with UNSCEAR 2012 and require the use of a system to put radiation risks in perspective that is consistent with the different dose ranges defined in UNSCEAR report for attribution of health effects and inference of risks from radiation.
- DS475 was expressly reviewed during its drafting process to reinforce alignment with the main concepts indicated in UNSCEAR related to risk communication.
- DS469 addresses mostly operational aspects that are not expected to be impacted by the concepts described in UNSCEAR report.

As a summary of the presentation, it could be concluded that GSR Part 7, GSG-2 and GSG-11 are aligned with the provisions contained in UNSCEAR Report. Regarding DS469, no impact is expected due to its content. In the case of GS-G-2.1, the opportunity to strengthen the description of certain concepts and improve terminology in light of UNSCEAR report has been identified and will be addressed in the currently ongoing revision process.

Australia observed that based on this review the impact of UNSCEAR report on EPR SSs was limited and asked about the conclusions drawn from the review done by other SSCs. The presenter indicated that, up to her current knowledge, this was pending to be done by other SSCs, which were meeting after EPRReSC-7. Ms. Heinrich confirmed this statement. Regarding impact of UNSCEAR report in SS, in addition to EPRReSC only NUSSC has developed a report about review of SF-1, but not based in so comprehensive materials as the work done by EPRReSC.

Canada referred to the Safety Report to be prepared by mandate of CSS about, among other topics, the use of collective dose. The terminology to be used to refer to stochastic effects should be carefully addressed. The presenter agreed with this view but clarified that the language used in GSR Part 7 in this regard doesn't include inconsistencies with concepts described in the UNSCEAR report related to stochastic
effects. In future revision of GSG-2 more clarifications could be included in addressing this aspect.

Ms. Heinrich summarized the discussions of the two aspects included in this Agenda item:

− The reports presented by the WG on both aspects were approved and would be submitted to CSS and presented at CSS43 on behalf EPReSC. They would be posted as well to the EPReSC web space.
- Regarding revision of SF-1, the conclusion was no consensus was reached but a majority of EPReSC supports updating SF-1 mainly to improve consistency with safety requirements developed after SF-1 and ICRP recommendations.
- Regarding specific SSs, opportunities for improvement in light of the content of UNSCEAR 2012 report had been identified in the revision (ongoing) of GS-G-2.1, but no impact had been identified for other existing or under development SSs in EPR.

Finally, Ms. Heinrich encouraged EPReSC members to submit any other comments that could be helpful to better support EPReSC position in the presentation to be delivered to CSS-43 on the above topics.

**EP 6.2: Communication related topics: Information on outcomes of International Symposium on Public Communication during Emergencies**

Mr. Kaiser gave a presentation informing on the discussions held in the recent Symposium on Public Communication during Emergencies and main conclusions drawn from this event. He summarized the attendance, content and main conclusions of the event, which was highly valued by the attendees and considered an important landmark to better understand the context of public communication during emergencies and improve this communication. He summarized the main recommendations stemming from the event, identifying important aspects for enhancing public communication in emergencies including exercising frequently with communicators, improving guidance on plain language and including innovative communication channels (such as social media) among the relevant aspects to consider. The Symposium also urged swift publication of IAEA guidance in this field, in particular, DS475. These conclusions were to be captured in a Symposium report that was being prepared.

Australia asked about the social media simulator that IAEA was considering for possible use. The presenter informed that this simulator (MIMIC) was being procured. The simulator would provide for realistic simulation of social media environment and will be usable in smart phones or in laptops.
UAE commented that communication is business for communicators, but in the case of nuclear or radiological emergencies interaction with technical staff it was relevant to provide factually correct messages. He asked how to address the problem of ensuring appropriate interaction among communicator and technical experts and to avoid inconsistencies? The presenter replied that coordination was important and it is difficult to address this issue and avoid inconsistent messages. The target audience and the points to make should be clearly identified at the preparedness stage. He also emphasized the importance of credibility, which could be strengthened if public trust is gained in daily routine interactions.

Canada asked about planned actions to implement the recommendations from the Symposium. The presenter replied that the Symposium Organizing Committee had met recently to identify and prioritize possible actions. More information on these points was expected to be available soon. Ms. Heinrich pointed out that in the Symposium Report these points would be addressed.

Brazil referred to the specific example of Angra do Reis NPP site. There were intense and fruitful interactions at the preparedness stage with local authorities and population, which allowed for good communication with local communities. But at the level of the whole country the situation was different and negative messages were much more present in the media. The presenter indicated that, in any case, this was a good example of engagement of local stakeholders, which is a prerequisite for successful communication. But there were other challenges in interacting with general public who could have different views and subject to much more influence from general media. Brazil referred as well to the example of Goiania were many important lessons were learned regarding public communication in emergencies.

Sudan asked about the on-site workers, who could play a role in explaining the protective actions implemented to protect the public. The presenter indicated that this could be helpful, but in any case, development of clear, simple and factually based messages supported with appropriate graphic information was of paramount importance. The plain language materials developed in advance are key for successful communication.

**EP 6.3: Updates on activities to support the implementation of GSR Part 7**

Ms. Nestoroska Madjunarova delivered a presentation summarizing the main activities recently implemented by the IAEA to support raising awareness and implementation of GSR Part 7 Requirements. These activities are implemented mainly through different trainings and workshops organized at both regional levels and mostly based on standard IAEA developed training materials. Also, topical webinars were implemented to raise awareness and discuss specific topics.
Ms. Heinrich asked about how Webinars were advertised. The presenter clarified that they are announced in USIE, IAEA web site and, for joint events, also in the web site of the partner organization.

ENISS asked about whether events specifically designed for operating organizations were envisaged. The presenter replied that the target audience was mostly depending on the topics addressed and the stakeholders more likely to deal with those topics. Mr. De la Vega clarified that one event mainly devoted to operators was to be organized in the first half of 2019, based on the training materials developed in support the new EPR Series On-site NPP Emergency Plans.

Brazil asked for the training materials to be distributed to participants. The presenter clarified that published training materials were available for download at the IAEA web site. For training materials that haven’t been published yet, normally a hard copy is provided to participants.

South Africa asked about activities related to EPR implemented in the frame of Technical Cooperation Program. The presenter explained that, in the frame of Technical Cooperation projects with regional scope, normally training activities were organized based on the latest EPR guidance or in standard materials for returning events such as the school of Radiation Emergencies Management. Training activities implemented at the national level were more based on specific needs and demands of the countries, but always based on IAEA guidance.

Mr. De la Vega provided more detailed information on the Joint Workshop with the European Commission expected to be organized for the beginning December in the upcoming weeks in Luxembourg to discuss EPR requirements in the European Union Basic Safety Standards Directive and GSR Part 7 requirements.

**EP 6.4: Update on EPRIMS status and related activities**

Mr. Breitinger gave a presentation summarizing the current status of the platform, with the recent launch of a new version (EPRIMS 2.0) of the platform offering new features and better interface with users. He informed about the increase in the data uploaded to the system by MS, the new feature of Member State profile (which was publicly available for all users) and the support provided to EPRIMS users to better understand the new version. He finally provided some overall statistics and trends that could be drawn from the platform, which now contains an important amount of information on national EPR arrangements of many countries.
Canada asked about availability to users of statistical information drawn from the platform. The presenter explained that currently this information was only available for the Secretariat, but plans existed for having it shared with MS on a regular basis.

**EP 7: PRESENTATIONS BY MEMBER STATES**

**EP 7.1: Presentation on EPR arrangements in Bulgaria**

Ms. Simeonova delivered a presentation summarizing the EPR arrangements in place in Bulgaria. She outlined the existing nuclear and radiological hazards existing in Bulgaria, highlighting the existence of one operating NPP and another NPP in a neighboring country (Romania) close to the border involving Emergency Preparedness Category V hazards. She described the Emergency Planning Zones and Distances defined and the protective actions planned to be implemented in case of nuclear emergency. She described the legislative framework for EPR, the different players involved in the national EPR system, the provisions for coordination and the different Emergency Plans for nuclear emergencies. Finally, she described the provisions for implementing the response at different levels and the different resources deployed.

Finland asked about cross border cooperation with neighbors and arrangements in place on this aspect. The presenter explained that there was one agreement in place with Romania about transboundary cooperation. They were dealing with this topic in the frame of the so-called HERCA/WENRA approach, which provided the basis for transboundary cooperation on nuclear emergencies among European countries.

Brazil asked about joint exercises with neighbors and whether the radiation monitoring network in place was devoted only to Gamma radiation monitoring. The presenter replied that radiation monitoring network was operated by the Ministry of Environment and had capabilities for detection of the most common radionuclides present in nuclear emergencies, not only Gamma emitters. With Romania they conduct joint exercises periodically and she referred to one large joint exercise conducted one year ago.

UAE asked about the content of the medical regulations she had mentioned in the previous presentation. The presenter clarified that this regulation was dealing with ITB distribution.

Spain asked about participation of emergency workers in drills and exercises. The presenter indicated that one large exercise takes place every year with about 100 emergency workers and different authorities participating.

Canada asked about provisions on transition to recovery phase and whether there were plans developed and about ITB, specifically whether it was pre-distributed or not. The presenter clarified that there are provisions in the law regarding the
transition phase and distribution of responsibilities among different authorities. Detailed plans were pending and being prepared. Regarding ITB, the presenter informed that distribution in advance was done in the planning zones and this protective action was planned. For longer distances, there were provisions for distribution in case of necessity.

Ms. Heinrich asked about any age limits of ITB distribution, including only people younger than 45. The presenter replied that they explain this limit in leaflets distributed to the population of affected areas, but they receive many queries about this topic.

Australia asked about provisions regarding self-administration of ITB and how to raise awareness in the affected population for doing this properly. The presenter clarified that the Ministry of Interior has a program in place to inform the population about this. They involve also the Universities to provide support to this program.

Brazil asked about the influence of the diet in the need for administration of ITB. The presenter explained that the decision of ITB administration was up to the health authorities.

Mr. De la Vega asked about the authority in charge of decision making about protective actions in case of nuclear emergency. The presenter indicated that the Delegate of the Government in the region had the ultimate responsibility for decision making.

**EP 7.2: Presentation on EPR arrangements in Sudan**

Mr. Hamadalneel gave a presentation summarizing the EPR arrangements in Sudan. He described the main uses of nuclear and radiological applications, currently mainly related to different uses of radioactive sources. There were plans to build one NPP in the long-term, and a research reactor as well. He explained the legal framework for EPR in Sudan, the regulatory structure and the national civil defense framework. There was a draft National Plan for Radiation Emergencies in place, setting up the main provisions for preparedness for and response to these emergencies. This plan was ready for final discussion and approval by the Government. He finally explained provisions to develop self-assessment against GSR Part 7 in EPRIMS and the plans regarding EPR stemming from the INIR mission (Milestone 1) hosted in 2018. Sudan plans to invite an EPREV by 2019. Plans existed for Sudan being party of the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions. Finally, he summarized the main challenges and way forward regarding EPR.

Brazil asked for more details about the plans for introduction of nuclear power in Sudan and in the development of necessary technical capabilities in this regard for national experts. The presenter explained that current plans include the first NPP starting operation in 2031. They have plans to develop national technical capabilities in the different fields required by nuclear power, including EPR.
Ms. Heinrich asked about specific plans to integrate response to security events in EPR. The presenter clarified that they were currently developing the Design Basis Threat for setting up the national nuclear security system. Once this is developed, it would be properly integrated in the national EPR framework to ensure proper preparedness and response to this kind of emergencies.

Mr. De la Vega asked about the status of the National EPR Plan. The presenter indicated that the current draft plan (including Emergency Preparedness Categories EPC III and IV) had been developed based on the guidance provided by EPR Method (2003). Expanding this plan to include EPCI and II would be undertaken as the process embarking on nuclear power unfolds.

Australia asked about public acceptance of nuclear program and the potential sites being selected. The presenter clarified that consultation process for the NPP hadn’t started yet however for nuclear waste storage they are now in the process of deciding the site and the consultation process will start soon.

Sweden asked about Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ) issues and how this could affect siting of the NPP. The presenter replied that they are in the process to start developing regulations regarding EPR for NPP, but it will take time.

Ms. Heinrich asked about plans for introduction of Transportable NPP and timeline for this project. The presenter clarified that is just under consideration and no decision has been made at this stage. Brazil asked for the type of Transportable NPP they were considering. The presenter indicated that it was based on a design offered by Russian Federation.

South Africa asked about exchange of experience and cooperation with neighbouring countries. The presenter replied that they have good cooperation and exchange in the frame of Forum of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies of Africa (FNRBA) and Arabian National Nuclear Regulators forum (ANNuR).

At the end of the discussion of items 7.1 and 7.2, Ms. Heinrich asked for countries volunteering to present on national EPR arrangements for next EPReSC-8 meeting. Canada and USA volunteering for delivering presentations at EPReSC-8.

---

**EP-8: REPORTS FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**EP8.1: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO)**

Mr. Blackburn addressed the Committee about two projects within the Joint IAEA/FAO Division that also include cooperation with WHO. He referred to the statement posted by FAO at the EPReSC members space and to the joint work being conducted with IAEA and WHO. The first project was on developing a methodology
to derive values of activity limits for food (Bq/Kg) from the current generic criteria formulated as projected dose values. He referred to the recent joint Webinar with IAEA recently held. The second project was about sharing food monitoring data.

Canada asked about the issue of food exceeding radioactivity content limits in an emergency, which would then become radioactive waste and how to deal with this waste. Mr. Blackburn explained that there are different criteria that may influence the consideration of food as waste, such as the moment of issuance of the ban. Legally it was tricky to precisely define the moment when food becomes waste. Anyway, the level of activity was supposed to be low. Canada clarified that in Canada the definition of nuclear waste was up to the Government, but food is regulated by the provinces. Mr. Blackburn acknowledged that legally it could be complex.

Brazil asked about the hypothetical case where no radiologically clean food was available and what to do in that situation. Mr. Blackburn indicated that current criteria for food control in nuclear or radiological emergencies are based on a generic criterion of 10 mSv/y. Criteria for food trade in normal conditions are based on 1 mSv/y. It’s difficult to specifically suggest a solution, but it’s clear that people need to be fed and some kind of decision should be made in this case.

**EP 8.2: Report by ENISS**

Mr. Skegg delivered a presentation explaining ENISS objective, structure, membership and activities. He described the interactions with the IAEA and in particular with SSCs. He explained the main goals of ENISS regarding interaction in EPR topics and the expected outcome to better address challenges in EPR related to different fields. He highlighted the importance of having the nuclear industry, governments and regulators cooperating to properly address non-radiological impacts of nuclear emergencies and define consistent approaches for this.

Mr. De la Vega expressed his opinion that having the industry views was important for EPReSC and also for the development of technical guidance on different topics where these views could be of high usefulness to develop better guidance. The presenter concurred to this opinion.

**EP 8.3: Report by NEA/OECD**

Ms. Guzman gave a presentation though WebEx Service on recent and ongoing NEA/OECD activities relevant to EPReSC. She explained the new structure of groups reporting to Committee on Radiological Protection and Public Health (CRPPH), including the Working Party on Nuclear Emergencies Matters (WPNEWM) and the different task and expert groups created under its frame. She also provided information on relevant upcoming training events and workshops related to EPR.
Ms. Heinrich asked whether there was access for MS to the documents related to the recent INEX-5 Exercise, including the objectives and scenario. The presenter clarified the possibility of access to different kind of materials.

Mr. De la Vega asked about the content of the International Radiation Protection School. The presenter summarized the content of the event and for more details referred to the link where all the details about the materials are included.

**EP8.4: Report by WNTI**

Mr. Nojima delivered a presentation summarizing the main activities of WNTI regarding EPR. He summarized the objectives of WNTI, which had just commemorated its 20th anniversary recently, its membership and its mission and objectives. He provided information on recent WNTI activities as well. He referred to challenges to be addressed in future activities, highlighting the importance of communication related topics and providing support on transport EPR to WNTI members. He informed on WNTI publications and its role in supporting international transport regulation. Finally, he provided information on upcoming events organized by WNTI related to EPR.

Belgium reminded all about the recent case of a transport container arriving to Europe with surface contamination slightly more than limits, asking about provisions to deal with similar cases. The presenter explained that in the referred case the container came from Japan, which might have specific national regulations valid for domestic transport. Belgium commented that problem could also lie precisely on lack of consistency of national regulations.

UAE asked about WNTI’s position on transportable NPP. The presenter indicated that they are currently working this topic out, but in any case, they would like to know about IAEA additional guidance on the topic. Mr. De la Vega explained that IAEA is currently working on this topic, however in the near term is difficult to define precise position and ultimately IMO should promote the revision, as adequate, of international transport regulations to take into account this new type of reactors. The presenter offered cooperation from WNTI in this endeavor.

**EP 8.5: Report by WHO**

Ms Carr addressed the Committee with a presentation on recent WHO changes and new strategic objectives defined by the organization and main WHO activities relevant to EPR. She described main contributions from Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network (REMPAN) and recent WHO publications on EPR and cosponsoring of different IAEA Safety Standards and other guidance. She informed as well about a joint WHO/NEA Project of non-radiological health effects of radiation emergencies. She provided information on different WHO activities on follow up of effects from past nuclear emergencies, with particular emphasis on thyroid screening activities after Fukushima. She also provided
information on WHO activities on bio-dosimetry. Finally, she updated the information on the implementation of International Health Regulations (IHR) and the tool for its verification, the Joint External Evaluation (JEE).

Mr. De la Vega asked about the situation of co-sponsorship by WHO of the revision of EPR Series Medical 2005, which was about to be completed. The presenter indicated that in a few weeks IAEA would receive news from WHO in this regard.

Ms. Heinrich asked about the new communication strategy being developed by WHO. The presenter confirmed that this new strategy was under development.

**EP 9: CLOSING OF THE MEETING**

**EP9.1: Review of EPReSC actions and actions arising from the sixth meeting of EPReSC**

Ms. Heinrich summarized the main agreements and actions stemming from the meeting, as described across this report, including:

- Draft SSs and DPPs approved for moving to the next step in the SPESS process, as indicated in the Agenda. Specifically, regarding DS475, after the technical editing process a term for new comments from EPReSC members would be opened under a silence procedure.
- Approval of the report prepared by the internal EPReSC WG on review of SF-1 and recommendations for its possible review, clarifying that there was majority opinion in favour of revision but without consensus in the Committee. The report would be submitted to CSS 44.
- Approval of the report prepared by the same WG on impact of the UNSCEAR Report on existing and under development SSs in EPR. The report would be submitted to CSS 44.
- Regarding presentations on MS EPR arrangements, Canada and USA volunteered to deliver a presentation in EPReSC-8.

**EP 9.3: Dates for future Meetings**

Mr de la Vega provided information on dates for future meetings:

- 8th EPReSC meeting from June 25th to 28th 2019. A joint session with RASSC would be scheduled during this meeting.
- 9th EPReSC meeting: tentative dates: preliminarily scheduled December 3rd to 5th 2019.

**EP9.4: Closing Remarks**
Ms. Heinrich thanked the participants for their important contributions provided during the meeting and the fruitful discussions held, in particular the outstanding work done on the review of SF-1 and the impact of UNSCEAR report in EPR SSs.
**List of Participants**

**Seventh Meeting of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Committee (EPReSC)**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1199</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Australia Mr Marcus Grzechnik
2. Belgium Mr Cristian Vandecastelee
3. Brazil Mr Elder Magalhaes De Souza
4. Brazil Mr Marcello Gomes Goncalves
5. Bulgaria Ms Lyudmila Simeonova
6. Canada Mr Christopher Cole
7. Canada Mr Brian Ahier
8. China Mr Xiujing LIN
9. China Mr Jiangang ZHANG
10. China Mr Yapeng YANG
11. Denmark Mr Jimmy Philip Thomsen
12. Egypt Ms Wafaa Fawzy Bakr
13. Finland Ms Hannele Aaltonen
14. Germany Mr Tobias Schlummer
15. India Mr Probal Chaudhury
16. India Mr Jaharlal Koley
17. Iran Mr Mahmoud Reza Mosaddegh
18. Ireland Mr Kevin Kelleher
19. Israel Mr Avraham Tshuva
20. Italy Mr Paolo Zeppa
21. Italy Ms Silvia Scarpato
22. Japan Mr Toshimitsu Homma
23. Japan Mr Kunihiko Motomitsu
24. Japan Mr Kazushi Fujikawa
25. Japan Mr Shogo Takahara
26. Japan Mr Hideo Usui
27. Poland Mr Maciej Drabent
28. Poland Mr Karol Lyskawinski
29. Portugal Mr Joao Oliveira Martins
30. Russian Federation Mr Albert Shapovalov
31. Russian Federation Mr Aleksander Victorovich Stovbur
32. Slovakia Mr Michal Makovnik
33. South Africa Mr Reuben Makgae
34. Spain Mr Jose Manuel Martin Calvarro
35. Sudan Ms Nahla Suleiman Fadlalla
36. Sudan Mr Mohammad Hamadalneel
37. Sweden Mr Peder Kock
38. Sweden Mr Jan Johansson
39. Switzerland Ms Anna Leonardi
40. United Arab Emirates Mr Fahad Mohamed Al Bloushi
41. United Kingdom Mr David Owen
42. United Kingdom Ms Hannah Varnes
43. United Kingdom Ms Henrietta Isaac
44. United States of America Ms Ann Heinrich
45. United States of America Mr Robert Clay Johnson
46. ENISS Mr John Skegg
47. WNTI Mr Nojima Hirotaka
48. OECD – NEA Ms Olvido Guzman
49. WHO Ms Zhanat A. Carr