EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE STANDARDS COMMITTEE
(EPReSC)

Report of the Ninth Meeting of EPReSC

3 December to 5 December 2019

International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna

Approved by the Tenth Meeting of EPReSC on XX-06-2020
The ninth meeting of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee (EPReSC) was conducted from 3 December to 5 December 2019 in Vienna. It was attended by 47 representatives from 31 Member States and 5 representatives from 5 International Organizations (IOs). Additionally, 7 representatives from 4 Member States and 3 IOs attended through the WebEx service.

**EP1: GENERAL**

**EP1.1: Opening remarks**

Ms. Buglova, Head of the Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC), welcomed the attendees. She highlighted the importance of the points to be discussed in the Agenda including feedback and discussion on the potential future safety standards on EPR and the new EPReSC roadmap of priorities. She also highlighted the importance of the discussion on the Safety Report on Attributing Effects and Inferring Risks from Radiation Exposure.

**EP1.2: EPReSC Chair remarks**

In her opening remarks, Ms. Heinrich welcomed both the new and returning members to this meeting. She highlighted that this work would not be possible without the diligent work of EPReSC members before, during, and after the meetings. She referred to relevant activities that require members involvement between meeting such as the creation of working groups and questionnaires to bring together points for discussion. She highlighted the importance of the discussion on EPReSC roadmap, emphasizing that while EPR series document are useful they are not safety standards documents. Regarding draft Safety Standards (SS) to be discussed in EPReSC-9 for approval, Ms. Heinrich emphasized the number of standards at Steps 3, 7, and 11 that would be discussed during the meeting.

**EP1.3: Logistics and administration**

Mr. De La Vega, EPReSC Scientific Secretary, presented the logistics and administrative arrangements, noting that some representatives from Member States (MS) and International Organizations (IO) would be attending via WebEx, and that the meeting would be recorded.

**EP1.4: Adoption of the Agenda of the ninth EPReSC meeting**

A review of the Agenda yielded a comment from Slovakia asking that a discussion on IRIX standards be added. Ms. Heinrich agreed that it would be added to the Agenda, in an Any Other Business point as to EP9.3. The Agenda was approved with this only addition.
EP1.5: Approval of the Report of the eighth EPReSC meeting and Joint Session with RASSC

The draft report of the last EPReSC-8 meeting was presented for approval. Comments to the initial draft were received from EPReSC representatives of Iran and Turkey and included in this draft EPReSC-8 Report as they were editorial, except for one comment which was beyond the content of the report. No additional comments were received, and the EPReSC-8 Report was approved.

Ms. Heinrich noted that the Agenda of the meeting does not always proceed in order, and the focus is on the availability of presenters and sometimes on unique synergistic opportunities between topics.

EP2: REVIEW OF IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS (Under the lead of other SSCs)

EP2.1: DS468 – Remediation Strategy and Process for Areas Affected by Past Activities or Events

Ms. Yankovich delivered a presentation on this draft safety guide (SG) on behalf of Ms. Roberts and herself, which was presented at Step 11. She summarized the key dates for the revision of the existing SG and the justification for the revision WS-G-3.1. This justification included both harmonization and response to MS requests for guidance on remediation and radiation protection. The new material included the end point criteria necessary for remediation and examples from the Fukushima-Daiichi event. She explained the comments received from the MSs have been resolved and with only 2% of comments rejected. The remaining 98% were either accepted or accepted with modification.

Ms. Heinrich requested to know if technical editing of the draft had been completed. Ms. Yankovich responded that technical editing hadn’t been done and would be done before submission to the CSS.

ENISS commented that the document would be interesting for regulators and Member States (MS) governments. ENISS asked if the document was for historical events or was useful for future events. Ms. Yankovich replied that the focus was on existing exposure situations, sites affected by past practices/emergencies, either those coming from past events or the ones stemming from future events. The Fukushima-Daiichi event is consistently used throughout the document, so that it is a way to provide guidance for future remediation activities. ENISS commented that the title should be changed to clarify that.

The UK commented on the various places where the document can interface with current Safety Guides and asked what missing information that is not contained in safety standards does this document provide. He highlighted that when comparing it with GSR Part 7 and GSG-2.1, the gap that this document is addressing isn’t clear. Ms. Yankovich clarified that this document foresees shifting from emergency transition
phase to existing exposure situation in line with GSG-11. Most of the document is focused on the existing exposure situation itself and has a limited interface with the transition phase of the emergency. For example, remediation may have been done for legacy situations that happened in the past where no or limited regulations existed. This specific type of situations falls outside GSR Part 7 and GSG-11 scope. This document covers a large variation of existing exposure situations, and Member States wanted this guidance in order to make decisions based on clear criteria and a stepwise process.

Australia commented that the stepwise process and flowchart was useful for justifying and optimizing remediation goals and it could have some possible applications as it relates to emergency planning and preparedness. Ms. Yankovich appreciated these comments and agreed. Ms. Heinrich commented that during the response to an emergency, steps may be taken to help remediation efforts, while maybe not in a stepwise approach, it is still valuable.

EPReSC APPROVED the document at step 11 for submission to the CSS for approval.

**EP2.2: DS509 – Revision by Amendment of NS-G-4.1.to 4.6, SSG 10 & SSG-37**

Mr. Sears delivered a presentation on DS509 including details on how it is a revision of 8 safety guides that addresses new safety requirements (SSR-3) including Design Extension Conditions and addresses the interface between safety and security. The revision of these documents will ensure consistency with other safety standards. The scope of these guides remains essentially unchanged with the addition to all guides’ scope of guidance covering facilities with subcritical assemblies. The DPP was approved in April 2018, and final drafts were developed over several consultancy meetings. 14 members from EPReSC provided comments and most comments were either accepted or accepted with modification, and there are no unresolved comments. These comments were valuable in improving the quality of the drafts.

EPReSC APPROVED the documents at Step 7 for submission to Member State comments.

**EP2.3: DS516 – Criticality Safety in the Handling of Fissile Material**

Mr. Rovny presented on this draft safety guide and noted the reasons for the revision as well as the changes, which includes both harmonization with SSR-4 requirements and specific guidance on verification and validation of computational models. There was focus on incorporating experience from Member States. There was a total of 109 comments from Member States with only 9 rejected. There were no comments from EPReSC on the draft.

Iran asked if the terminology on security was quite different compared to the one from safety, and how to deal with this. The presenter referred to the use of the safety
glossary and the draft security glossary. Ms. Heinrich noted that the IEC was involved in the development of the chapter on EPR for this document.

EPRSC APPROVED the document at Step 7 for submission to Member State comments.

**EP2.4: DS521 DPP – Radiation Protection Programmes for the Transport of Radioactive Material (Revision of TS-G-1.3)**

Mr. Reber presented the DPP and noted that the DPP had been revised with the involvement of the IEC after the rejection of the document in June of 2019 in both RASSC and EPReSC. In the current version of the DPP, 12 comments were reviewed in line with a TRANSSC working group. The current form of the DPP has been approved by both RASSC and TRANSSC. The chapters on emergency situations were added and the annex on radiation protection and emergency response instructions was also introduced. There were no questions raised. Ms. Heinrich thanked Mr. Reber for the modifications related to EPR topics.

EPRSC APPROVED the proposed DPP at Step 3 for submission to CSS for endorsement.

**EP3: REVIEW OF AND INFORMATION ON IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS (Developed under the lead of EPRSC)**


Mr. Whittingham provided a brief overview of the changes in DS469 since EPReSC-8. No relevant changes took place during the silence procedure for EPReSC and TRASSC after the technical editing of the draft. The update included the status of the document from TRANSSC. There were no further comments from EPReSC, but comments were raised during last TRANSSC meeting from both Japan and France and are currently being addressed. Mr. Whittingham mentioned that these comments were mostly editorial and would be addressed at Step 12.

Ms. Heinrich opened the floor for questions or comments. Overall, she concluded that there were no changes in EPRESC approval of the document and noted that resolution of comments from France and Japan would be addressed at Step 12.

**EP4: REVIEW OF AND INFORMATION ON DRAFT NUCLEAR SECURITY GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS**

Ms. Mc Quaid provided an update on NST016 and its necessity due to the fact that currently there is no technical guidance on detection at borders. The document falls under both NSS20 and NSS21 with a special focus on Materials Out of Regulatory Control. The document was approved by INSAG in 2011, and it now includes guidance from NST49, NST08, and NSS03. The guidance provides different types of detection activities whether monitoring people, vehicles or packages and provides common approaches for actions to be adopted. The roles and responsibilities, the concept of operations, and the monitoring network are all discussed in the document. This document will focus on both designated and undesignated points of entry and addresses the special considerations with each situation. Most comments were accepted from Member State review, with only a few rejected comments which were outside the scope of the document. This document has important interface other security guidance documents, and in some cases specific items will not be covered in detail in NST016. No action is being requested from EPReSC, since the document was presented just for information purposes. It was recently approved by NSGC for submission to Publication Committee.

Ms. Heinrich thanked Ms. Mc Quaid for her continued efforts on progress on this document. No questions were posed by EPReSC members.

EP5: EPR Series AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS UNDER DEVELOPMENT

EP5.1: Plans for Development of EPR Series Documents for 2020/21

Mr. De La Vega provided information on publications at all levels, including those in the publication process, undergoing development, and documents intended to be developed. The publication process is ongoing for many documents, while others are expected to be completed by the end of 2020.

Japan commented that the titles of many of these new guidance EPR series are similar. He suggested that it would be better to prioritize work and develop fewer documents. Japan asked if the IEC allowed Member States to comment on these series. Mr. De La Vega replied that EPReSC member can express their interest and can appoint an expert to attend the consultancies on a cost-free basis for the Agency. He stressed that EPR series are documents from the Secretariat, and don’t require approval, however, the feedback and priorities from Member States is highly valuable for the development of these documents, even if it is not a requirement of the SPESS process.

Australia commented that they appreciate the EPR series being developed currently and believes that protection strategy may be considered for elevation to a standard or other level, as other documents are more procedural when compared with protection strategy. Mr. De La Vega replied that in one of the previous discussions on the EPReSC Roadmap this point was discussed, and it was decided to start with an EPR Series document since Protection Strategy is a novel requirement with very limited available experience within Member States upon which to draw.
The UK asked if there was a central mechanism for Member States to be made aware of progress of the EPR documents being developed, etc. such as the system used for standards. Mr. de L Vega replied that information is available on website for consultancies and events, EPReSC members are automatically updated one development of a draft starts and can request updates at any time. There are also periodic updates on the website and given at EPReSC meetings. Also plans for development of EPR Series by the IEC are discussed every year in EPReSC.

Canada asked about plans for EPR series to be developed and if there were any other topics that are being discussed prior to developing the plans. Mr. De La Vega replied that EPRIMS is strongly used alongside other information sources, such as information gleaned in training events and workshops. In this process it’s crucial to have suggestions from Member States for topics that they are interested in.

Finland commented that they have participated in the development of EPR series documents and noted that the IAEA organizes many workshops. Often, these workshops are mechanisms to collect feedback from participants to directly go into the document. Finland asked if this would be the case for the EPR series on SMRs so Member States could share their ideas. Mr. De La Vega replied that there hasn’t been any EPR document shared completely with Member States for their feedback as this is only a requirement of safety standards. However, feedback received from MSs on these documents is strongly pursued by the IEC, either during their development through participation in Consultancies, presentations to EPReSC, etc. or during pilot training events for training materials related to EPR series, where feedback is requested from participants.

Japan asked what the mechanism is for countries to view the drafts of ongoing publications. Mr. De La Vega replied that EPR documents are shared once published, however, if there are some delays in publication process, advanced publication such as electronic publications is being considered. IAEA does not share documents before approval outside of pilot events and workshops.

Ms. Buglova outlined the process of how topics are selected. The first step is to review the safety fundamentals which are the basis for safety requirements. To better understand these requirements safety guides and EPR series are created. Input on what is needed as guidance comes from questionnaires and proposals from Member States, among other sources. EPR documents have different stages of development based on their type and the pace for their production. However, the standard is to hold consultancies and pilot workshops and MSs are informed on these meetings. The MSs feedback gained from consultancies and pilot workshops guides the conclusion of the documents and training materials.

Sweden asked if there is a list of potential candidates for EPR series documents to be developed i.e., potential EPR series documents planned for the next few years. Mr. De La Vega replied that longer term plans are difficult to develop in a realistic fashion considering drafting delays and specially delays caused by the publication process.
Plans for EPR Series publications are developed on an annual basis, based on previous plan, its evolution, new feedback received from MSs.

Ms. Heinrich summarized noting that EPRSc members want more involvement in the future in the development of plans and documents in the EPR series.

ENISS clarified that there are two processes: one for EPR series and one for safety standards. He suggested that clarifying how EPR documents are developed and where they are in the process would be useful. Mr. De La Vega replied that documents in queue for publication are handled entirely by the IAEA’s Publications Committee. This Committee reviews and provides suggestions to ensure that the style is consistent with all other publications. Time to publication is increasing owing to different reasons, which causes concern, but the process hasn’t been changed as it is the standard Agency process. ENISS asked where the EPR documents are in the publication process. Mr. De La Vega replied that these documents are in the first stage in the queue, meaning that they have not reached technical editing. Mr. Delattre commented that there have been some changes to the publication process for Safety Standards including CSS and Publication Committee approving documents at the same time. This new process was not applicable for EPR Series or other technical guidance documents. The Publications Committee is shared by all Departments and in the recent times can take up to one year before an editor sees a document, and then the process for completing the edits may require more iterations. Requests have been made to the Secretariat to fix the issue of this increase in the time between Publications Committee approval and effective publication of the documents.

Canada commented that EPRSc could be consulted for EPR, as agreed to in EPRESC-6, and this could ease the publication process. Mr. De La Vega agreed that this may be useful.

Australia commented that Member States want to know the plan in advance, and then they can help shape the solution for publication issues, including other priorities for the IEC. Mr. De La Vega agreed and added that it would be helpful to discuss practical solutions this.

**EPS2: New EPR Series Dose Assessment**

Mr. Motomitsu presented on the DPP of the new EPR series document which will provide technical advice on dose assessment in emergencies. The document will be based in part on an update of the materials included in TECDOC 1162 and EPR-Medical 2005. In addition, complete guidance on the different techniques and methodologies for dose assessment in emergencies will be included. The document will address both retrospective and prospective doses. The document will not include aspects related to specific preparedness aspects such as hazard assessment.
Australia provided a suggestion on closely monitoring the development of DS505 (environmental monitoring) and any potential linkage with emergency exposure situations and this EPR series document.

Iran noted that one of the target audiences are radiological assessors. According to the IAEA safety glossary, radiological assessors are responsible for emergency workers, but clarification is needed on who’s responsible for dose assessment of the public. The presenter thanked this suggestion that will be addressed in the publication.


Ms. Assi delivered a presentation on EPR-Method, which is planned to bring it into line with GSR Part 7, and to include other relevant changes since 2003. There was recent consultancy meeting on the revision of the document, and as such several changes have been implemented in the content including the update of guidance, the removal of obsolete guidance, and the standardization of the document with GSR Part 7. Concerning Nuclear Security, there is a strong emphasis on an integrated approach to emergencies, irrespective of the initiator of the emergency. More consultancies will take place through Q1 and Q2 of 2020.

Australia asked how we could be sure that the EPR-Method document includes all the IAEA Member State Requirements for EPR and Security. Ms. Assi replied that this document is being completed in close cooperation with the Nuclear Security Division and a Technical Officer from that Division is working together with the IEC.

The UK asked how the process was being managed to ensure that multiple documents would be consistent with other EPR guidance and to avoid duplication. Ms. Assi replied that it is a challenge, and that information is carefully incorporated into EPR-Method from other publications. The involvement of other IEC staff will help ensure consistency. Mr. De La Vega provided clarification that the audiences are different for EPR-Method and GSG-2.1. EPR-Method guidance is provided for Member States with less established EPR programs. GSG-2.1 emphasizes the content, whereas EPR-Method emphasizes the process and detail. Consistency is still important, but the documents don’t target the same audience.

UAE asked about the change of terminology and whether the title of the publication would change as GSR Part 7 includes the change from threat to hazard. Ms. Assi replied that the terminology has changed and that GSR Part 7 is in line with both the IAEA Safety Glossary and the draft Security Glossary. The same title will be kept with the understanding that EPR-Method will still cover more security guidance now. UAE followed-up that they simply wanted to confirm that the guidance for security related aspects in EPR will be fully consistent with overall EPR guidance, as there could be difficulties from national perspective in some MS. The presenter replied that this will
be ensured through the cooperation with security experts both from the Agency and external.

ENISS commented that in the UK operations had integrated security and safety responses, and that when a security event is identified, security forces act. The difficulty arises when you are unsure if there is a nuclear security event to respond to, until you eliminate that option. Security still has a function to carry out when it’s stays in the prevention mode ENISS asked if it was possible to have an organizational diagram that feeds into the document. Ms. Assi replied that integration of safety and security is difficult. When security events happen and it is unclear there is some release, who takes lead is an important question to be answered. The goal is to have one organizational diagram between that integrates emergency response irrespective of the initiator.

Australia agreed with the point raised by UAE, in that the title may warrant a change as it is an interface document. Australia also asked if a mechanism exists that this EPR guidance can be implemented in practical terms in the future. Ms. Assi replied that the title relates to EPR, meaning that it does not only cover nuclear safety related emergencies, but emergencies triggered by nuclear security events as well. It makes more sense to have the document as an EPR series document. All EPR series publication are in line with GSR Part 7, and more security aspects will be reflected there. Australia stated that they would like to talk about this more during the Roadmap. Ms. Heinrich remarked that the titles can be modernized, and that she appreciates all the contributions in this discussion.

UK asked how EPRESC could be more involved with EPR series guidance. They were interested to join the consultancies on topics relevant to them. The presenter appreciated this willingness. As included in EPRESC operating Guidelines, the commencement of the drafting process is announced to EPRESC members enough in advance to the first Consultancy to start the drafting process, so that any interested MS may appoint experts to participate in the Consultancies.

**EP5.4: Update on the Revision of EPR-Exercise – 2005**

Mr. De La Vega presented on the behalf of Mr. Daniels. The scope of the revision is to bring the document into line with current concepts and safety standards. There has been some development with exercises involving security aspects, among others. The focus of the document is mostly on full-scale exercises, which can then be made smaller in scope using a graded approach. Next steps will include any comments made during EPRESC before the final consultancy, then it will undergo IEC internal review before submission to the Publications Committee likely by end of Q2 2020.

Canada noted that this is the second EPR document discussed that has a significant security aspect and would like to talk about this interface more during the roadmap discussion. Mr. De La Vega agreed that this document includes some nuclear security aspects and that this is worth to be further discussed. However, he clarified that the
focus on nuclear safety and security interface is not a specific responsibility of the IEC. To better elaborate on this interface, more general guidance will be developed and adopted into lower level documents. He noted that EPR-Method, First Responders, etc. were developed before the relevance of nuclear security events for EPR was fully realized. He clarified that the IEC develops guidance based on needs or direct request from Member States and the goal of the EPR Series is to focus on the technical aspects, for this case, on the preparation, conduct, and evaluation of exercises.

Ms. Heinrich mentioned that being emergency responders, we prepare for all manner of emergencies, typically without labels or definitive information on the initiating events. Addressing the security aspects in the lower level of more-technical documents such as EPR Series is practical and more thorough. MS points on discussion of the interface between EPR-security should go directly in the roadmap in order to fully address this important area.

United Kingdom asked how the safety element is captured in low-level documents, and the impact it may have on GS-G-2.1. Mr. De La Vega replied that the security component as it relates to safety will be addressed in GSG-2.1. GSG-2.1 will include mainly general guidance based on the important work done at the department level on the safety-security interface. Regarding the security component in the EPR-Exercise document, it’s not addressed from the viewpoint of nuclear security response, but rather from the general emergency response, the safety of responders and the public. We are not addressing fully integrated safety/security exercises in this document as it is a relatively new concept. We don’t foresee any inconsistency with how we are approaching security exercises in EPR-Exercise with more general guidance such as GS-G-2.1.

Israel commented that security is a new trigger for an emergency, but that it isn’t the main point. While security may open opportunities for new accidents, emergency response will be responsible for dealing with this new trigger and new emergency event paths. Mr. De La Vega agreed with Israel’s point, and stressed that under each of the GSR Part 7 Emergency Preparedness Categories, nuclear security events can occur in Categories 1 through 5. What matters is the impact of these nuclear security or safety related events, and the deployment of adequate emergency response to protect the public.

ENISS asked for the reference number of this document. Mr. De La Vega clarified that this document is EPR Series so there is no reference number. ENISS then commented about the sensitivity of these integrated safety/security exercises, and stressed the importance of the integration of staff, and awareness of people on-site, and the cooperation of security and safety staff. Joint exercises always unfold so that the security plan is successful, as it may raise concerns if it is unsuccessful. Mr. De La Vega replied that this document will not address nuclear security response, but the safety consequences of nuclear security events.
UAE asked if the updated EPR-Exercise would cover the objectives of exercises and asked how it compared to the US regulations NUREG-4564 on frequency and overall cycles of exercises including detailed intervals. Question included asking how the IAEA will define the objectives of exercises and how they fit into an exercise programme. Mr. De La Vega replied that the document is meant to consider the objectives of exercises, and their integration in an emergency exercise programme. IAEA has developed a comprehensive approach for this exercise programme, to be shared with Member States.

China asked about the new technologies for conduct of exercises and whether they will be included in this new EPR series document. The question included reference to new technologies in this document, and how the EPR-Exercise would deal with new technologies. Mr. De La Vega replied that the document would address this topic in a specific appendix, based on information coming from consultancies and home-based assignments. This part was pending of being fully developed in the document.

**EP5.5: Update on New EPR Series “Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency” (Revision and merging of “Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency” (EPR-Public Communication), 2012 and “Method for Developing a Communication Strategy and Plan for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency” (EPR-Public Communication Plan), 2015**

Mr. Kaiser spoke about the ongoing creation of guidance at both safety guides and EPR series levels. GSG-14 will focus on the best practices since the Fukushima-Daiichi emergency regarding public communication in emergencies. The goal is for it to reach publication in 2020. This Safety Guide in Public Communication is specially needed because in many cases, public communications teams must bring in internal support from inexperienced individuals. This document will focus on support for both real and perceived emergencies, and public communications strategies for empathetic responses. The action guides to be used as a part of this new document are focused on practical aspects rather than theoretical ones.

Ms. Heinrich stated that this publication would be useful not only for people working in public affairs but also for those who might find themselves supporting the public affairs professionals. United Kingdom asked when each of the drafts would be available. Mr. Kaiser replied that the goal is to have them available in mid-2020.

**EP5.6: Update on Coordinated Research Project (CRP): ‘Effective use of dose projection tools in the preparedness and response to nuclear and radiological emergencies’**

Mr. Vilar Welter presented on the CRP for dose projection tools. In the past, there have been different approaches among Member States and in many cases inadequate use of these dose projection tools may lead to inadequate implementation of protective actions. This CPR expects to contribute to establish consensus in Member States regarding use of such tools in emergency preparedness and response. During
the preparedness stage the tools are essential and vital to make necessary
arrangements. In the case of the response stage, they have limitations that require
careful use. The goal is to focus on experience from past emergencies, and specific
research objectives as set out in the first Research Coordination Meeting to be held in
January 2020. The outputs are expected to be completed in 2022.

Canada commented that they submitted a research proposal, but that they didn’t hear
back yet. Canada also asked if this CRP would impact the EPR dose assessment
publication. Mr. Vilar Welter replied that he will follow up on the coordinated
Research Agreement with Canada to ensure inclusion in the CRP. He expressed his
views that the findings of this CRP may have an impact on the dose assessment
publication and believed this impact likely would be limited to specific uses.

South Africa asked about the tools, and which ones would specifically be used during
the CRP as there so many different ones available. South Africa also asked about the
publication of results of the CRP. Mr. Vilar Welter replied that each participating
entity will make their own decision on tools to be used in the research. Regarding the
second question, the presenter replied that in CRPs the Agency doesn’t set the scope
or methodology of the research to be conducted, instead, the Agency facilitates
coordination, information sharing and discussions. The results will be published in a
TECDOC specifically devoted to that at the end of the CRP. South Africa then asked if
the specific research could be shared or just the results Mr. Vilar Welter replied that
only the results may be shared. Mr. De La Vega followed up that there are limits to
disclosure of information, but that all results of the CRP will be publicly available as
agreed to in the terms of the CRP.

Russia commented that their proposal has been sent late but would like to include
their own proposal. Mr. Vilar Welter apologized for not including the proposal and
specified that proposals receive after deadline are also processed and will be accepted
for participation in the CRP.

UAE commented that some Member States refrain from using the tools, and that this
should be taken into consideration by researchers, as the use of tools during response
may confuse response actions. Mr. Vilar Welter replied that the use of tools, especially
in the urgent protective actions phase of response, involves acknowledge of their
limitations in this regard, as indicated in GSR Part 7. Better understanding of these
limitations in the frame of this CRP will improve ability of Member States to make
their decisions.

Belarus commented that some Member States may have numerous tools in use. Belarus
proposed the listing of tools, and the decision on which were better for
certain situations and the inclusion of popular tools and asked whether there are
plans for testing and comparing tools. Mr. Vilar Welter replied that there is no
intention of comparing tools. Whenever benchmarking is noted, the intent is to see
how real data can be used. The improved usage of tools is the goal but no ranking of
tools will be done in the frame of this CRP.
China asked about the differences between agreement proposals and contract proposals. Mr. Vilar Welter replied that the difference is that contracts have financial support of the IAEA (relatively small, not to support the whole research), whereas agreements have no financial support at all. While there is no limitation on the number of agreements, there are limitations on contracts due to limited funds.

Israel asked about the recommendation of data to be included in the benchmark, and whether source terms, metrological data, and others would be included. Mr. Vilar Welter replied that at this stage it is difficult to state what the scope will be. This will be discussed in the first Research Coordination Meeting to be held in January 2020.

ENISS asked about consensus on how to use tools, and whether it would lead to the proliferation of dose assessment needs and outcomes. Also, he asked about the scope of the expected consensus and about what forms of quality output from the tools are pursued. Mr. Vilar Welter replied this type of information should be developed in the CRP with contribution from all participating institutions. The information from the CRP will improve IAEA Secretariat’s Guidance.

Pakistan asked if all data would be coming from the IAEA. Mr. Vilar Welter replied that the expectation is to use real data from past emergencies. However, the IAEA does not own this data, and institutes may be able to share it internally, but it is the decision of the data owner.

Belgium commented that they have data they are already working with and stressed that sharing of data from different participating organizations could cause some complications in both political and legal aspects. Mr. Vilar Welter replied that these legal and political considerations will need to be considered.

**EP5.7: Update on Coordinated Research Project: ‘Effective Emergency Public Communication in a Misinformation Environment’**

Mr. Kaiser presented on the scope and findings of the CRP at this stage. EPR capacity must address the malicious use of AI-supported digital misinformation. The Safety Standards and Guides, specifically GSR Part 7 and GSG-14 will address incorrect and misleading information, especially as it relates to mitigating the non-radiological consequences of an emergency, which can take the form of wrong or delayed response, increased fears caused misinformation. Some examples of this misinformation include “deep fakes”, as have been used with Nixon’s speech, and changing it with machine learning. The ethical framework of this research project will be presented to the Chief of Ethics before invitation letters are sent to researchers. The project hopes to allow platform operators, the capability of algorithmic response, removing misinformation from search results, and taking ads away, especially for authoritative information. Mr. Kaiser noted that research shows if a consumer can be shown that misinformation is inaccurate, the likelihood of its redistribution by recipients drops by 75 percent. The first Research Coordination Meeting (RCM) is expected to take place in mid-2020.
Finland asked for how many years did they anticipate it would take to have a new EPR document on these public communication aspects and whether the findings will be included into an EPR Series document. The findings will be important for all dealing with EPR matters and having EPReSC up to date about the achievements of the CRP would be important. Mr. Kaiser replied that decisions on how to disseminate findings from this CRP will take place at a later stage, considering that the initial duration is 3 years. To date, the CRP is pending of having 5 research agreements concluded. Afterwards, the 3-year time will start, with 1 RCM each year. EPReSC will be kept in the loop of all this information.

Canada asked if other international organizations are working on the same topic. Mr. Kaiser replied that WHO has been working on it but does not have a research group on these topics. Canada suggested that it would be advantageous to have WHO in the CRP due to their experience with writing papers on this topic for the Zika and Ebola past outbreaks.

Japan commented about the removal of misinformation and on what new tools will be developed as part of this research. Also he asked about examples of misinformation in an emergency. Mr. Kaiser replied that the product of the CRP would be papers that describe existing or possible future tools that can be deployed to mitigate effects of misinformation during emergency response. As an example, he referred to an agreement between WHO and social media platforms allowing platforms to achieve certain goals on behalf of WHO efforts. Another example could be an algorithm that regulators would utilize and deploy in order to hide and remove certain misinformation. He provided an example of potential use of this kind of algorithm: if recipient receives apparently authoritative about actions about Ebola or Zika falsely saying that certain kinds of protective actions were ineffective, hence trust of actions recommended by WHO would be undermined. When WHO field teams entered towns and villages people would refuse to be treated because they were led to believe that could not trust WHO. Believability factor of machine learning programs for disinformation now is about 60%.

EP6: STRATEGIC ISSUES AND OTHER TOPICS OF INTEREST

**EP6.1: Proposed revision of EPReSC Mid Term Plans for Development of Safety Standards and guidance in EPR (Roadmap)**

Mr. De La Vega presented on the current version of the EPReSC Roadmap, which includes the proposal for the long-term structure of safety standards in EPR. A first approach to the long term structure of safety standards in EPR was discussed in EPReSC-3, where further guidance on GSR Part 7 requirements was the focus as completion of new drafts (DS474, DS475 and DS469) being developed at that time, starting of revision of GS-G-2.1 and, later on, GSG-2 and development of additional GSG’s and SSG’s related to EP Categories. In EPReSC-5 it was decided to move ahead with the revision of GSG-2. While there is one GS published (GSG-11), one about to be
published (GSG-14) and one draft (DES469) close to start in the publication process, new topics for Safety Guides must be defined to address identified gaps and provide long term perspective to EPReSC. Another important goal of the Roadmap is to avoid duplication with defined topics for new SGs and the existing ones. The EPR series guidance is valuable guidance but has a scope focused on operational aspects, are not based on consensus, and are not directly the EPReSC mandate. The work done by the electronic Working Group (eWG) created in EPReSC 8 yielded two different views difficult to merge and be driven to consensus: first view included revision of GS-G-2.1 and GSG-2, and some cases no other topics were identified for the time being for new SGs, other identified protection strategy as a topic to be developed in a SG. The other view suggested that, in addition to GS-G-2.1 and GSG-2, and since some gaps are difficult to be addressed by just these two safety guides, more topics for new SGs should be identified. Within this second view, it was suggested the development of more SSGs focused on Emergency Preparedness Categories (EPC) I and IV, based on specific needs: in the case of EPC-1 facilities, which should be particularly useful for embarking countries, it could include more detailed guidance on hazard assessment, optimization of protection strategies, guidance on on-site/offsite coordination and waste management; in addition, a SG could be created for EPC-4, as there is very little guidance on events stemming from malicious use of materials, increase of radiation levels of unknown origin, among other topics. A SG for EPC-5 was also suggested but as a secondary priority. In addition, a suggestion was raised about a new GSG emergency management systems.

Spain asked how the prioritization of these documents would be decided by EPReSC. Mr. De La Vega replied that it is up to the Committee to provide proposals for requirements and long-term structure, before submitting to the CSS, which needs to approve these new proposals. Spain asked about the input for the prioritization of the EPC SGs. Mr. De La Vega replied that there are no set checklists for priorities, and information on gaps on EPR guidance could be identified in discussions through EPReSC, data on EPRIMS, and inputs the IAEA gets from technical meetings and training events, among others. Ms. Heinrich followed-up that this is just a proposal for EPReSC to respond to.

Ms. Heinrich thanked members of the electronic working group, which showed there was no clear consensus, showing the complexities in defining criteria for moving forwards. These proposals show how much work has been done. The purpose of this discussion is to be provocative and act as newcomers asking questions and how these new SGs can be best used. Ms. Heinrich commented that we need to think creatively to help prepare the next generation of emergency managers, including a strategy for the next 5 years. This roadmap is a plan for us but is still flexible and we should follow up and update as needed. Having the plan is important with the understanding it can be adjusted along the way. She emphasized that EPR series documents provide good and useful information but do not duplicate nor fulfill the important role of safety standards, over which EPReSC has responsibility.
Japan commented that their findings were different to the presented analysis. Japan and the UK have the same opinion with difficulties in analysing the document. Japan asked for the current status of the development of GS-G-2.1. With little known about this, it is hard to be specific for future necessary SGs. EPR series are at the same level TECDOCS and the representative proposed to upgrade some EPR series to SG such as protection strategy. Some members of the eWG commented that they appreciate the role of the IAEA and the IEC. However, they feel that their views are not fully represented. Some standards are not needed in the view of some members of the eWG, while some standards are certainly necessary. In addition, some potential topics are good candidates for EPR series guidance. The goal is to have enough information for the EPR eSC to reach an informed conclusion.

Egypt supports the proposed Safety Guide for EPC-1 and asked if there was a way to start the document earlier. Ms. Heinrich clarified that the proposal at the moment is whether to create the SG and appreciated Egypt’s point of view that the SG is needed.

China commented that hazard assessment should be considered for an SG due to the complexity of the process for being performed.

Canada asked for more clarity on the process that the eWG adopted to determine gaps. Mr. De La Vega replied that there was a complete set of criteria used in a qualitative fashion to determine gaps. Also, the process incorporated information on the current expectations of the scope regarding coverage of GSR Part 7 requirements and of the revision of GS-G-2.1 and current GSG-2.

Iran commented that hazard assessment could be covered in appropriate SSGs.

Ms. Buglova stated that EPR eSC needs to hear from states on what topics are missing in the current SG structure and what are considered more important. We can use working group results as a starting point, with the understanding that it is difficult to provide more feedback while GS-G-2.1 and GSG-2 are in revision. There is a clear view on what is being defined in these documents including the linkage of several criteria.

We need to think about changes to SG as already known. TECDOCs share similarities with EPR, including the fact that you can adjust their scope with more flexibility. TECDOC 4172 contained all information before the creation of the EPR series. Feedback from the use of EPR Series may help to identify which topics need to be introduced in SGs and which can be converted into SGs.

Pakistan commented that they need a document with guidance on protection strategy and that this document should have Member State consensus.

UK asked about how the priorities were developed and commented that decisions on policy and basic principles were taken with the focus of improving EPR in the future. It’s difficult to develop guidance for gaps without a holistic view. The eWG discussed the role of EPR eSC in EPR Series, with the understanding that EPR eSC review and approval functions do not apply to EPR Series. If EPR eSC could see a complete list of
EPR Series publications and provide feedback and if there was a map of these EPR series documents it would be easier to understand gaps for Safety Guides. Ms. Heinrich commented that the map of EPR Series publications does not extend that far in the future, unlike standards documents. EPR Series are conceived and implemented quickly. While EPR series publications are not in our EPReSC mandate, and work with EPR Series guidance is not specifically identified in our operating guidelines, the committee can provide valuable feedback. Mr. De La Vega commented that EPR Series documents are based on identification of where guidance could be helpful and developed reasonably quickly. SG’s and other documents based on consensus are more complex to develop, because instead of individual experts, all MSs representatives’ viewpoints should be considered and consensus reached.

Ireland commented that it would be useful for new EPreSC members to have a map, as there are a lot of documents. Having a ‘guide to the guides’ would make finding information easier. Protection strategy is a fundamental concept about which MS would need more guidance and is a perfect candidate for an SG. Worker protection could fit in GSG-2. Most countries need detailed technical guidance and therefore should use EPR series publications. The process for EPreSC providing feedback on documents is complex, for instance surveys don’t work well because you get a minority of views. Setting up short workshops might be better going forward as it distils more views to what resources are available and what are necessary to develop in the field of EPR.

Sweden supported many of the comments made but believes an SG is not needed for emergency workers as we don’t know everything that will be in it. While we understand the difference between EPR and safety standards, we want to be more involved in analysis of gaps such as in the area of protection strategy. EPR series are useful for helping countries with the details. Ms. Heinrich clarified that currently EPreSC provides feedback to plans for development of EPR Series and about the scope and development of the document being drafted.

Slovakia asked if the IEC has a careful plan of the workload requirements to develop new guidance and asked if these new guides could cause further issues. Slovakia and other countries need time to digest an analysis of existing EPR series publications and these publications are coming too fast. Slovakia commented that development of EPR series documents should be limited to one annually. Commenting specifically on the proposed safety guides, EPC-1 embarking countries may benefit from this SG but other countries may as well due to new designs and SMRs. EPC-4 affects many countries that in many cases need more guidance, however it was not sure whether the SSG would provide sufficient technical details.

Canada supported Sweden’s viewpoint on EPR series vs. standards and discussed if within EPreSC there should be a focus on which EPR series documents are candidates for standards. For the roadmap it will be difficult to determine which requirements need further guidance. A better scope of current publications is needed. Canada supports a standard on protection strategy and noted that the safety-security
interface was not flagged by working group as candidate for SG. While this topic is new, the practicalities have not been fully incorporated in guidance and we would support a priority on safety-security interface. In addition, a guidance document to all the EPR guidance available would be useful.

Finland commented that protecting the public via a protection strategy is vital and should be upgraded to a SG. Noting the findings from the EPREV technical meeting, topics such as waste management need more guidance. An important requirement is mitigating non-radiological consequences since it covers an important amount of GSR Part 7 Requirements that are pending of further guidance. Emergencies can have a global impact, so we encourage to develop an EPR series document on non-radiological consequences. Finland agrees with Slovakia on an EPR series publication for emergency planning zones for SMRs and added that safety-security interface should be considered.

UAE asked if there has ever been a survey done on the effectiveness of current guidance. Governments typically don’t look at EPR guidance. The addition of a topical guide on severe accident management program and the coordination between emergencies and safety would be useful.

Spain supported both Sweden and Canada on the safety-security interface guide. The continue identification of gaps requires more research and optimization for EPR series consideration.

Australia supported views on EPR series role, and future growth as a strategic committee. Australia supports a guide on safety-security interface in EPR and believe emergency worker safety is a good candidate for an EPR series document.

ENISS commented that the integration of EPR and safety is an important issue and noted that as of now, there isn’t any other resource for emergency guidance other than IAEA publications. It is expected that IAEA SG’s are followed. While this difference is understood by EPR series, it may not be as understood externally. There must be a way to form a compromise through EPR Series vs. Standards. ENISS asked if EPR workshops and training courses are held with the usage of EPR Series documents primarily and if so, EPReSC needs to be more supportive of these publications. If EPReSC can’t support them, it looks bad. The Roadmap is very insular on standards. He suggested to look at other areas are affecting the roadmap. EPR series documents are great but it does look like the Publication Committee is hampering the release of them. Mr. De La Vega replied that there exits lots of EPR Series and Safety Standards documents, sometimes with some kind of interface. The process is well known for both types of publications. Member States have ownership of standards, while EPR is for guidance on specific technical topics developed by the Secretariat. Workshops and training address individual topics of EPR, sometimes based on EPR Series, sometimes on Safety Standards. The resources of the Secretariat are limited. The consensus on protection strategy is good, but the EPR series on this
topic is almost complete. He supported the view that is better to allow for feedback on this document instead going straight to upgrade it to SG.

Japan commented that they support secretariat proposal on EPC-1 and EPC-4, but we need more guidance and a clear map of current EPR guidance. The protection strategy workshops are useful for developing EPR arrangements for NPPs but are more difficult to implement at radiation therapy units. Additional safety standards are needed for these facilities and a more graded approach needs to be addressed in the implementation of EPR arrangements.

Ms. Heinrich summarized that the revision of GSG-2 and GS-G-2.1 is the top priority and in the process of revising these, EPReSC believes that we would get clarity to what we might need to add to the Roadmap. The identified additional activities include the suggestion of interest in development of additional SGs. EPReSC wishes to be more involved in identification of EPR subjects and more informed in discussions on the front end of activities. There exists enthusiasm for development of a protection strategy safety standard from many people. There is an interesting point from Mr. Delattre La Vega regarding documents that will be published soon. Ms. Heinrich commented on how the development of a protection strategy in EPR Series took some time. Actual mechanics of converting this document need more discussions and conclusive decisions for implementing this change. A map of guidance and index of current EPR documentation would be of value and would be an important tool to better identify gaps and possible overlaps in guidance. There exists enthusiasm for investigating further the safety-security interface and for producing guidance on the impact of this point in EPR. Considerations for future focus include waste management for emergencies, mitigating non-radiological consequences, and optimization of the hazard assessment. There was no support for developing a safety standard on the emergency management system. There were mixed views to develop safety standards on EPC-1 and EPC-4. The roadmap needs to be updated with a clear plan for the next 5 years and should be revisited as necessary in future EPReSC meetings to identify what else to add. The Roadmap is a flexible document. There is a lot of work to do revising GSG-2 and GSG-2.1. With the additional information to be provided, we will be in better position to discuss in a strategic manner what we need to further develop in terms of Guidance.

Mr. Delattre commented that the identification of gaps and decisions on how to address gaps is one critical part of any proposal to create new publications. He suggested using the revision of GSG-2.1 and GSG-2 to close some of these gaps and to not wait for a finalized Roadmap that will take some time to be developed. He pointed out as well the usefulness of NSS-OUI Platform in support of identification of gaps and overlaps in Safety Standards and technical guidance. Regarding Safety –security interface, he considered that this should be addressed in revision of GS-G-2.1. Mr. Delattre also commented about radioactive waste during emergencies and commented that this may be covered under the RASSC Committee.
EP6.2: GSG-2 Review. Results of the survey to EPReSC members. Discussion on need for its revision and possible scope

Mr. Breitinger presented on the GSG-2 review and important changes to be brought to the attention of EPReSC, including the overall scope. GSG-2 is anticipating the new framework for emergency response from ICRP 103 and 109 publications. He highlighted that there are new concepts for GSG-2 which override those topics in GS-R-2, including the concept of protection strategy and criteria for emergency workers. While these concepts were later included in GSR Part 7, the bridge for them was GSG-2. The questionnaire extended to EPReSC included questions about which parts were most useful including OILs and Generic Criteria. The full report of this questionnaire is available on the EPReSC portal. The most requested guidance included plain language guidance on optimization and protection of emergency workers and helpers. The Roadmap could be relevant to understanding which topics should be covered in GSG-2, versus covered in other documents. He ended by proposing that a draft DPP be submitted to EPReSC for approval at the next round of Safety Standards Committee (SSC) meetings.

Ms. Heinrich noted that the last slide speaks about the DPP and suggested that everyone has the opportunity to contribute to this DPP. She asked about the timeline of approval and next chance to see the document. Mr. De La Vega replied that 2 months in advance of the next EPReSC the DPP must be posted to SSC common space for comments. So that meant that DPP should be available for submission to Coordination Committee meeting (Step 2) by the end of March. The timeline is tight, but preliminary draft DPP could be shared by mid-March with EPReSC for a short period for comments.

Mr. Delattre recommended the inclusion of RASSC in this DPP review.

Australia commented on the topics for discussion and stated that the roadmap will dictate what is covered in this document to successfully fill gaps, and to identify other gaps to address with new S’s. Mr. De La Vega replied that the content of the Roadmap could in turn influence the document.

Japan commented on the guidance on restricting the use of certain equipment and vehicles. GSR Part 7 includes generic criteria on this in one of its Appendices, but no further guidance has been provided. Mr. De La Vega replied that GSR Part 7 includes guidance but that this is only based on dose. There is further room for improvement of this guidance. For example, information on calculating operational values that would involve exceedance of this generic criteria is needed.

Ms. Heinrich commented that discussions in the IEC will be confirmative and important when reviewing this DPP by EPReSC members so that when it comes to approval in next round of SSCs the draft is mature enough and aligned with EPReSC views and concerns. This is not a quick process.
**EP6.3: Update on the drafting process of the Safety Report on Attributing Effects and Inferring Risks from Radiation Exposure**

Ms. Asfaw presented on the current progress of the Safety Report, including recent activities involving experts volunteering from all the different Safety Standards Committees. Input is expected from these volunteers by the end of 2019 and the Secretariat will put together an initial draft. Target publication date is the end of 2020.

Ms. Heinrich thanked both Canada and Japan for being volunteers in the development of this document. She mentioned that she hopes it is available online for these status updates to the committees and CSS.

**EP6.4: Discussion on EPReSC proposals for Main Topics of Interest for next CSS Term**

Mr. Delattre addressed the Committee on the upcoming meeting of the CSS in two weeks, which will be the last meeting of the current CSS. An End of Term report should be produced regarding CSS activities in this 6th term, summarizing main achievements and activities during this 4-year term of CSS (8 total meetings), and recommendations stemming from this period. CSS would be happy to hear proposals from SSCs on any topic which could be cross-cutting. Proposal could still be submitted. The timely publication of documents and improvements to the process is one of the points that has been raised by different are welcome.

Ms. Heinrich commented that the SSCs proposals could feed into the priorities of the next term of the CSS. Ms. Heinrich agreed that the timely publication of documents is a major challenge. She also suggested two other topics for consideration: addressing in more depth the safety-security interface, including its impact on safety standards; and effective communication of risk related to radiation exposure. Both are concepts that should be approached in a new way taking into account recent experiences and developments.

**EP6.5: Using the Social Media Simulator**

Mr. Kaiser opened the presentation with the importance of social media during a response. The upcoming GSG-14 includes a direct recommendation for strategies and clear guidelines for how to communicate with the public on social media. The International Symposium on Communicating Nuclear and Radiological Emergencies to the Public demonstrated the importance of social media in crisis communication. The direct presidential recommendation from this symposium was to incorporate social media simulators in both training and realistic exercise development for Member States. Training has been undertaken by the Agency and the testing of this was partially done in a ConvEx-2g which took place in 2019 with Ireland. A major finding was involving the technical team with the public communication efforts. In the simulator currently, different accounts can be created, and over 400 tweets can be planned and run through to increase intensity. The ConvEx-2g opened
opportunities for improving both organizational response and the features of the simulator. A train-the-trainer workshop is being developed for regional involvement in the use of social media simulators. A DPP will be created for an EPR series publication to focus on communication and social media.

Ms. Heinrich asked about the amount of labour it takes from the IEC side to create exercises, and whether would there be an issue if many countries request assistance of an exercise. Mr. Kaiser replied that now there is one scenario with tweets that can be replicated quickly and adapted to more specific scenarios.

Canada asked if the use of the simulator would always require the support of the IEC. Mr. Kaiser replied that ideally, it won’t always need assistance from the IEC, however, it currently is good to do it in tandem with the IEC to ensure the social media portion of the exercise works well.

Australia commented that they would share the presentation with their communications team and the potential for application of such a tool. Mr. Kaiser agreed that there was a great deal of potential for this tool.

China asked about the types of live media are employed in the simulator. Mr. Kaiser stressed that the video was pre-manufactured. No ongoing live broadcast is currently possible with the simulator. The platform is not yet ready for video-streaming. All media is simulated but appears to be live broadcast.

**EP6.6: Updates on activities to support the implementation of GSR Part 7**

Mr. Anderson presented on the previously implemented and planned activities in direct support of GSR Part 7. This included a focus on EPREV Missions, including an upcoming one in Hungary. This also included the School of Radiation Emergency Management (SREM), of which 3 versions took place in 2020. He highlighted other already delivered and planned events: the pilot training course on On-Site Emergency Plans for NPP will have a follow-up in Austria in mid-2020; pilot training courses to be held on the new EPR Series Combined Emergencies; the School of Drafting Regulations in EPR which had its pilot event last October; and regional training recently held on developing a protection strategy. In addition, topical web-based seminars or webinars are planned, which will hopefully be implemented jointly with co-sponsors of GSR Part 7. There are plans to hold one webinar on Emergencies Triggered by Nuclear Security Events.

Ms. Heinrich asked about the 20 years of EPREV Technical Meeting and any insights which Mr. Anderson could share. Mr. Anderson referred to Mr. De La Vega who specified that it was a productive meeting, with some new agreed opportunities for improvement of the EPREV service. The final report of the meeting is still pending.

Spain asked if there was plans already in motion for the interface between GSR Part 7 and the EC Directive on EPR. Mr. De La Vega specified that the IAEA will make a
proposal to the EC about possible follow-up event on this topic and discussion of technical aspects of implementation of EC Directive on EPR and GSR Part 7. The goal is to have something defined in 2020 to be implemented in 2021 on this topic. EC commented that they would support further development of the event and will take comments from Member States on what the discussion should cover.

Spain asked about the School of Drafting Regulations, and whether it was only for onsite plans. Mr. De La Vega confirmed that the pilot event was focused on EPR regulations for operators. He also explained that regulations related to offsite plans and response organizations would be developed next year.

UAE asked if these events will be published online for next year Mr. Anderson replied that he is unsure how far ahead, the calendar of events is posted online. Mr. De La Vega replied that all events are in the system once they are approved. Anything not in the system is pending approval.

Pakistan asked if the materials delivered in the School of Drafting Regulations were publicly available. Mr. De la Vega clarified that this was not the case since they are pending of being approved for publication.

South Africa asked when meeting plans are completed, can information be given to EPReSC. Mr. De La Vega replied that they could try but there were some complexities.

Ms. Heinrich than requested if a quarterly basis of events could be shared with EPReSC. Mr. De La Vega replied that this may be viable, and the IEC would take initiative in this regard.

**EP6.7: Update on EPRIMS status and related activities**

Mr. De La Vega gave a presentation summarizing the status of the EPRIMS platform, with the recent improvements to the system in terms of user experience and information contained in the platform. He informed about the increase in the data uploaded to the system by Member States, the increased usage of the public member state profiles and additionally published modules. He provided information on the webinars held since the launch of EPRIMS 2.0. EPRIMS has been valuable for both EPREV missions, expert missions, and technical cooperation project cycles starting in 2020. Analysing the trends, from all EPCs perspective all regions have rated modules 18, 5, and 12 as their lowest performers. These trends only for EPC 1 and 4 for showed the lowest rating for the above referred modules with the addition of module 26 as another low status. Mr. De La Vega closed with the point that only average data is used, and not individual country data.

Canada commented that it is interesting to see how EPRIMS usage increases. Canada commented further that there is no specific requirement on GSR Part 7 for safety-security interface and about whether, in this situation, EPRIMS can compile useful information on this topic. De La Vega replied that safety-security interface is a difficult
question. While it is a cross-cutting issue, EPRIMS doesn’t provide any specific information on the subject. Member States that are sharing information on their EPR arrangements primarily and may provide some details on the security interface, however not sufficient in many cases. This could be useful to consider for future releases of EPRIMS.

Ms. Heinrich closed with appreciation for the non-usage in this trend analysis of individual Member State data in EPRIMS.

EP6.8: Update on Activities related to SMRs and TNPP

Mr. Anderson provided an update on TNPP and SMRs, including the 2017 technical meeting on Next-Generation Reactors and EPR. The conclusions include that GSR Part 7 requirements are valid for the newest reactors, and consideration on the extent of off-site EPR required will depend on the hazard assessment and the EPC on which each new reactor fits, based on this hazard assessment. The CRP on SMR EPZ will continue through 2020. He informed as well about a Consultancy held in July 2019 CM to get information from technology developers on relevant Safety & Security related aspects, including EPR. The discussion focused on impact of GSR Part 7 requirements for TNPP, including any special considerations for docket/stationary operations of TNPPs. There is a planned technical meeting in 2020 at the IAEA where it’s expected to further dig in EPR considerations regarding new reactors design, as follow-up of the 2017 Technical Meeting.

Russia commented that in the current EPR guidance the design is not considered and whether this approach valid for SMRs. Mr. De La Vega replied that the hazard assessment should include design considerations and be conducted in line with GSR Part 7. He referred as well to the plans to develop an EPR Series document on Emergency Planning Zones and Distances for SMRs, based on the conclusions of the ongoing CRP addressing this topic. Regarding TNPP, in docked situation they could be addressed in a similar manner to SMRs, but the transport operation mode of these reactors raises new issues for being addressed.

UK asked what happens when a TNPP is in transit and whether there are specific transport regulations for this related to GSR Part 7. Mr. De La Vega replied that if the TNPP is moved in national waters, it is under national regulations. If the TNPP is moving through international waters, it is subject to the framework of the IMO, whose current regulations don’t include TNPP in their scope.

ENISS asked if the design for SMR should account for EPR, considering the high level of safety that they are expected to guarantee. Mr. De La Vega replied that this was discussed in the TM of 2017. For any facility, including nuclear facilities such as SMR, should develop a hazard assessment that will provide the basis to determine the necessary EPR arrangements, as applicable, based on graded approach (EPCs) as defined in GSR Part 7.
Ireland presented on its national EPR arrangements as they relate to both nuclear and radiological emergencies. The Environmental Protection Agency of Ireland is responsible for the preparation for a nuclear emergency and its potential impact. Ireland is a major exporter, so ensuring a strong program is in place is imperative to the national economy, with the knowledge that importers still require guarantees for Irish food after the Chernobyl Disaster. In planning for emergencies, a systematic approach is used which includes: Hazard Analysis, Mitigation, Planning, Coordinated Response, and Recovery. EPA is concerned with a variety of hazards of both radiological and nuclear type. For nuclear emergencies the focus of the hazard assessment has been on Sellafield. With over two decades of weather data, it is foreseen that the release may not affect Ireland. However, under worst case weather conditions, the contribution pathways would include ingestion primarily. This would stem directly from contamination of food, and assuming worst case scenario (peak summer, protective actions taken) the consequences, and hence necessary protective actions, would strongly depend on the duration of release. These protective actions would include sheltering and ITB 6 hours before release. The estimates on economic consequences range from 4 billion Euros to 160 billion Euros. An all-hazard approach is used within the national framework for emergencies. At a national level, all information will pass through the National Emergency Coordination Group. An important note by the EPA is that stakeholder involvement and interest is low in preparedness, but during response they can have a very large and vocal group of stakeholders. The goal is to identify and engage these stakeholders in preparedness, which includes a variety of organizations forming a panel. These panels have identified many important linkages for preparedness. An important note is the surveys which Ireland has conducted, which states that medical professionals and neighbours and friends are most trusted to give information in a nuclear emergency. Relatively low on the list is official state agencies that deal with radiation.

Finland asked if in the hazard identification there exists nuclear security related events and if the interface between safety and security was tested. Ireland replied that they do include nuclear security events, and security exercises have been done for licensees with a high assessed risk or hazard.

Israel asked if EPA has teams which monitor the site in an emergency. Ireland replied that they have an automated network, whereby the emergency EPA lab does analysis and the national civil defence helps collect samples and have mobile handheld equipment.

Japan asked about Ireland’s experience using the Social Media Simulator. Ireland replied it was a very useful experience to simulate the pressure of social media and to make decisions and send out the messages to the correct people. The importance...
also lies in having a correct protocol, what to respond too, and how to determine what is misinformation. Persons responsible for public communication in Ireland didn’t have much practice in this simulator before this exercise and found it useful and also recommend it for usage in exercises.

Spain asked if the EPA specifically advises or makes recommendations to the public? Ireland replied that it is done through ministry of foreign affairs. We are an independent check and useful as a check for people asking questions. In large scale emergencies there is a call centre both for Irish citizens abroad and for citizens with family abroad.

Canada asked how they keep interest in nuclear topics for the communications team. Ireland replied that the main method is through exercises, especially real time exercises that show how much pressure people can be under during a nuclear or radiological emergency.

South Africa commented that they are interested in the study done with public trust, about how it was conducted and what the government did with these results. Presenter replied that the study was done in two different ways. It used to be done by telephone, with cold calling, now there is a representative panel conducting face to face interviews, until there is 1000 people interviewed. The panel identified who should be doing the messaging and encouraged use of medical professionals i.e., a chief medical officer or meteorologist to whom people trust more and can talk technically. Ireland commented that this study showed just how important it is to know what people’s misconceptions are and to tailor message accordingly.

**EP7.2: Presentation on decision making support process for public protective actions during nuclear emergencies developed in Sweden**

Sweden presented on their decision support diagrams for public protective actions during emergencies. The goal is to facilitate optimization during emergency response and to have nuclear emergencies fit within the general crises management system for a successful outcome. The Swedish system handles large uncertainties in balancing positive and negative consequence of protective actions. Protective actions are not always attainable based of the progression of an emergency. There is no detailed response plan to evacuate 7 km in Sweden (predetermined distances). Sheltering is facing the decision to implement, discontinue, or continue again (must do). The basic case analysed was a station blackout scenario, for which releases were calculated under different assumptions. Green bar illustrates the release when mitigation systems are working properly. Grey bar depicts release when mitigation systems are not working. Objectives for protective actions aim for sheltering and ITB 6 hours before release. In the above referred scenario, they analysed feasibility of protective actions to meet objectives and whether they are suitable to be implemented in each situation, depending on the timeline, extent of release and meteorological conditions. Duration of release always has an impact on the total area affected. It is also important for drinking water so as not to implement drinking water restrictions too early.
Ms. Heinrich emphasized the point raised that there is “no need to plan for protective actions that an incident commander simply will not take”. Sweden replies that incident commanders think very differently.

Israel commented that protective actions depends on release characteristics and you stated that during accident you don’t know the full source. This leads to the question on how then to decide this at the beginning of an accident. Presenter replied that one way to find out more is to ask if the filtering in containment is in operation or not, since this may have important influence on the amount of the release. Israel asked about the scenario where the accident is likely to bypass the filtration system. Presenter replied that if the filtering system is not working, then they make an estimation on current release characteristics. Israel then asked if monitoring takes place during the release. Presenter replied that yes, using the automated measuring monitoring stations, set 1 kilometre apart, the release is monitored as it happens. Israel asked whether these monitoring results help identify the characteristics or source strength of the release. Presenter replied that this monitoring information could be helpful in determining later stage actions and the source characteristics.

Iran asked why noble gases are considered if the amount of them has no impact on the decision. Presenter replied that if a general emergency is declared, off-site protective actions are taken, and these actions are based to an important extent on the release of noble gases. This system of response optimizes the Swedish conditions, with the understanding that not all countries would end up with the same protective actions taken as Sweden.

Japan asked if the percentage of core inventory corresponds to the percentages on the graph. Presenter replied that the worst-case scenario assumes close to 10% of core inventory of Cs-137 is released. However, filtering could reduce the release of Cs-137 down to 0.1% of core inventory. Noble gases typically will dominate the doses of unprotected people. Japan asked about the planning stage, and how emergency planning distances are estimated based on doses and if in this dose estimate evacuation times for members of the public are accounted for. Presenter replied that it would depend on whether evacuation is decided to be implemented as a protective action. Some time limits planned for evacuation include 4 hours to evacuate out to 5 km (12 hours to evacuate out to 25 km). Sweden believes these estimates are not effective for all countries or situations but believes it will be useful for their response. Japan commented that the time of release and evacuation is very important for overall dose.

Iran asked if protective actions in the early phase are decided according to the emergency classification declared at the NPP. Presenter commented that these protective actions are based on the assessment of the emergency at different stages. There is a time for estimating the consequences based on assessment of the release before protective actions are taken after the urgent response phase.
UAE presented on their current preparedness and response plans for a nuclear emergency at their newly completed Barakah NPP. The capital Abu Dhabi is 280 km away from the NPP. The cross-cooperation with the IAEA in terms of nuclear security and safety was highlighted throughout. There exists legal framework for UAE including a federal law for establishing nuclear emergency law by the nuclear administration, under the National Emergency, Crisis and Disasters Management Authority (NCEMA). While each local Emirati state has their own plan, they all fit the national framework of the emergency system. The framework is in place for both off-site and on-site response, and which entities will be responsible for this. In the field of EPR, there have been various activities including a 2015 UAE EPREV and a follow-up EPREV in 2019, where UAE has continually sought to improve current EPR capabilities. In addition, UAE has participated in a ConvEx-2e with the IAEA-IEC in November of 2019. UAE is planning to host the ConvEx-3 in 2021 and has conducted the first international meeting with IACRNE and the IAEA representatives. UAE participated in the discussion of scenarios, and decided that in Q3 or Q4 of 2021, is when the exercise can take place. The next coordination meeting will take place in June of 2020. The Najwah Energy Company is committed to the safety of its employees with its focus on the community surrounding the plant and the on-site plans. Benchmarks have been done on EPR topics, alongside visits of other facilities. In Nawah, over 15 different nationalities are represented. Lessons identified from Fukushima have been a focus for UAE, and their focus has been on a practical emergency response plan, including 2 drills per year, and over 6 table tops. The off-site plan is managed by the NCEMA as a major component of their emergency preparedness program. Ms. Heinrich stated that she was impressed with the infrastructure and exercises which have already taken place in the EPR program. Germany asked about the location of power plant and the desert surrounding the NPP. Presenter answered that the NPP is 300 km away from the capital city and has no population except for workers at the site which is around 300-600. Germany then asked about the environment and effects of potential contamination, in particular if a severe accident occurs and contamination has been deposited on sandy ground, in this case contamination would behave differently than if deposits take place in fixed ground. With sandy grounds contamination could be mobile depending on wind conditions. Presenter stated that the protective actions recommendation in the case of a sandstorm would be evaluated further based on radiation monitoring results. UAE has 3 contamination monitoring units that are mobile. The NPP is surrounded by stationary monitoring stations, with the regulator having their own monitoring stations. A joint emergency response monitoring (JERM) team would be activated after notification of any emergency. Germany asked if after couple of days the stationary contamination could become mobile because of sand that can move. That could lead into permanently changing contamination situation. In the desert nobody is affected but with a sandstorm contamination could be brought to the city. UAE
replied that a desert storm was considered in the environmental analysis. Hotspot can vary depending on weather. That’s responsibility of the JERM team. They identify the hotspot and they apply measures as needed.

ENISS commented on the impressive nuclear build program and asked about the number of reactors at the Barakah site. He also asked about whether further nuclear build was envisaged after completion of Barakah. Presenter explained that 4 NPPs are nearing completion at this site but is not sure if this is the end of building. All the units are of Advanced Pressurized Reactor (APR) design-1400 which is latest technology. Once all 4 are operational the UAE government will decide what the next steps are. There is some inherent delay in program, but it has not stopped because of financial or political issue but because of safety issues.

**EP8: REPORTS FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**EP8.1: Report from the European Commission**

Mr. Patel presented on the current status of the EC as it relates to nuclear and radiological EPR. The current 5-year term of EC commissioners has ended. The change of representatives allowed a holistic look at achievements and shortcomings. The priority of the new commission is to cut CO2 emissions, decarbonizing energy. Nuclear energy is essential to this need but requires a long-term strategy to deal with waste. The Commission will deal with common interest areas such as safety, non-proliferation, waste, etc. including how EU members comply with EU Directives. The Commission will help carry forward actions noted by member states on the EPR part of the Directive. He suggested to present at next EPRReSC meetings on the new tools set up by the EC to support the above mentioned aims, including possibility of new joint work with the IAEA. The presenter emphasized the views of EC about the need to increase cooperation with embarking countries for emergency preparedness, specifically with Asian countries. He referred as well to EU and Iranian cooperation such as civil protection, information exchange and visits to labs in Luxembourg.

Mr. De La Vega asked for a presentation from the EC about new tools they plan to use regarding cooperation, and specially related to EPR topics. He welcomed this initiative from the EC.

**EP8.2: Report from ENISS**

Mr. Skegg delivered a report on activities of ENISS since EPRReSC-8. Specifically, ENISS has worked on both consultations on the design and implementation of new reactors, and the decommission strategy for older reactors. ENISS has typically focused on only NPPs but is now focused on all nuclear installations. ENISS has worked with the IAEA on a variety of topics including EPR, nuclear waste, and safety assessment. ENISS has begun developing position papers on topics such as Defence in Depth and Developing Safety Improvements for Existing NPPs. In the field of EPR, there are some difficulties in balancing political and technical aspects. There is also some divergence in
international vs. national standards. A review of emergency preparedness in line with new reactors is valuable and must be done.

Sweden commented on the scheme presented linked to safety objectives for new reactor designs and asked about its use in the design process. Mr. Skegg said that ideally, the factors that lead to the accident are minimized on the first 4 levels of Defence in Depth. The goal is to invest more effort in the steps before emergency response with engineered controls. The goal of new SMRs is to eliminate the possibility of severe deterministic effects occurring after an accident.

FAO asked about current ENISS positions on fuel fabrication and reprocessing. Mr. Skegg agreed that more guidance could be created for both these topics.

**EP8.3: Report from FAO**

Ms. Blackburn presented on the ongoing efforts in the FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture. The focus regarding EPrReSC is standards on radioactivity in food. Currently, there is a gap in the standards for non-emergency scenarios, and very little guidance for radioactivity in food. The guidance FAO intends to work on will not replace emergency guidelines but should be good for both before emergencies and after the emergency is terminated.

Germany asked about the gap in reference levels for radioactivity in food and asked how best this gap can be explained. Ms. Blackburn replied that the issue is requirement 51 of current radiation standards, which sets out reference levels for food and water. Specifically, the competent authority shall establish reference levels for food and water equal to 1mSv for existing exposure situations. However, most countries don’t have this because they don’t have guidance. For water related levels WHO has set requirements, in general the public gets 5% of annual radiation dose from water due to the 0.1 mSv requirement for water. For food this is more complex, and the gap is the lack of direct guidance for setting reference levels for food in existing exposure situations.

Canada asked if the working group considering existing guidance for emergency situations in order to ensure communication to the public. Mr. Blackburn replied that it was not done at this stage yet. The FAO has a good handle on natural radiation, but human made radiation is different, and this is important for terminating an emergency. The standards should account for both economic and social factors, as some communities culturally rely on certain foods and may be more exposed as a result. Typically, food standards reviewers don’t understand radiation requirements and emergency response or termination of emergencies.

**EP8.4: Report from ILO**

Mr. Niu presented on the function of ILO and conventions which are adopted by the international labour conference. Mr. Niu focused on how ILO can move forward to
meet challenges in the future. Mr. Niu highlighted the report of global emission and
the focus on safety and healthy work including the fundamental pillars of freedom as
it relates to the sustainable development goals. Focusing on nuclear and radiological
emergencies, ILO Convention 174 is relevant and applies to all major hazard
installations and defines responsibilities of each organizations, competent
authorities, and overall Member States. It is applicable in the fields of hazard
assessment and emergency planning. ILO has continually worked with the IAEA on
safety guides both in radiation protection and EPR. ILO also assisted in the
International Technical Advisory Group (ITAG) on the IAEA Report the Fukushima
NPP Accident. ILO now is trying to work out details in compensation issues, and has
an upcoming conference on the topic to be held in Switzerland.

UAE asked if ILO participates in ConvEx-3, and if so, which kind of scenarios could ILO
participate in. Mr. Niu replied ILO has a passive role in ConvEx-3 and will not change
this in accordance with limitations on resources.

Spain commented that IAEA guidance is not legally binding, and he asked if a country
has signed an ILO convention, would it be considered legally binding. Mr. Niu replied
that is correct, ILO uses Basic Safety Standards, which become legally binding on
Member States. Conventions are not legally binding instruments.

China asked if there is an ILO publication on first responders in a radiological
emergency. Mr. Niu specified that Convention 121 covers ionizing radiation, and 194
covers diseases as a direct cause of radiation.

**EP8.5: Report from NEA/OECD**

Ms. Garnier-Laplace presented an update on EPR-related activities being undertaken
by the OECD/NEA. The structure of the NEA’s Committees and Experts Groups was
outlined, including the creation of three new Expert Groups on Comparison and
Understanding of Dose Prognosis (EGDP), Real-Time Communication Platforms
(EGRT), and Non-radiological public health aspects of radiation emergency planning
and response (EGNR), which is planned to kick-off in 2020. The recovery
management group has focused on cross-cutting issues and practical guidance for
recovery, including technical issues. A workshop was held in mid-February at the
University of Tokyo on these topics. There are other future events coming up
including an international radiological protection school, and a workshop on
optimization of a protection strategy titled “Rethinking the Art of Reasonable”.

Australia asked if the content of the referred WS would be available via video. Ms.
Garnier-Laplace replied that virtual attendance is allowed in most of the NEA/OCDE
events but that she would check for that. Normally presentations are available on the
website, and a summary report is also posted at the end of each workshop. Making
the findings of these workshops available publicly is the goal.

**EP8.6: Report from WHO**
Ms. Carr addressed the Committee with a presentation on recent WHO updates and main WHO activities relevant to EPR. She spoke about the new Global Programme of Work, WHO’s 5-year strategy, which has a specific focus on the Sustainable Development Goals and making an impact at the country level. This includes addressing health emergencies for 1 billion or more people. For the specific Radiation and Health Team (RAD), work is continuing the topics of both ionizing and non-ionizing radiation. RAD is not in the WHO division dealing with health emergencies, but they deal with radiation emergencies as well and are WHO’s focal point for the IAEA-IECs. WHO has worked extensively with other international organizations on radiation emergencies. One topical area is the psycho-social impact of radiological and nuclear emergencies, in which they are working with NEA/OCDE. The draft of this document is being prepared and now it has been submitted for comments. This work also included case-studies and further information. WHO is interested in future cooperation opportunities including assessment and management of internal contamination, clinical management of acute radiation syndrome, and stockpiling for radiological or nuclear emergencies.

Canada asked about the further coordination between EPREV and the WHO JEE. Ms. Carr replied that it was discussed by the WHO Legal Office. There is the possibility of an agreement to address the case of countries hosting both the EPREV and WHO, this is under discussion. Mr. De La Vega followed up by pointing out that in his opinion there are good grounds for improving coordination between both services. We may have good information sharing, and would have no issue in sharing experts, and seek for better coordination to avoid duplication as much as possible. A proposal of practical arrangements is expected to be submitted soon to WHO. Ms. Carr informed that the new DG of the IAEA is planning to meet with the WHO DG, and that she hopes to put this issue on the agenda for that meeting.

Pakistan asked how EPReSC could receive more information on WHO webinars. Ms. Carr replied that these webinars are public, and that EPReSC members may register in a notification list so that an email can be sent to notifying on new webinars and get access to previous webinars as well.

**EP8.7: Report from the World Nuclear Association**

Mr. Lindberg reported on the World Nuclear Association and their efforts in EPR. Based in London, the WNA includes representation of 183 member companies. Mr. Lindberg stated that WNA is the global voice for the nuclear industry and is primary representation for the industry at global events. Much of their effort is focused on interacting with the media and being both proactive and reactive when situations develop. A big goal of the organization is to push for 25% of electricity to be provided by nuclear by 2050. Specifically, WNA provides high-level information and informed commentary on any emergencies. WNA will also facilitate global contact and expert networks.
Ms. Heinrich asked if WNA performed exercises with Member States Mr. Lindberg replied that yes WNA does, but mostly on an ad-hoc basis.

Iran noted the Chernobyl HBO series, and asked if WNA was involved or provided materials for the public. Mr. Lindberg replied that it was a media storm, that there is massive interest in Chernobyl and Fukushima. Ms. Heinrich followed up, asking if the WNA is reviewing the material it has on these emergency topics to make sure it is up to date. Mr. Lindberg replied that yes, they are continually updating material, and they prepare FAQ sheets for interested media agencies.

**EP9: CLOSING OF THE MEETING**

**EP9.1: Review of EPReSC-9 conclusions and actions**

Ms. Heinrich summarized the main agreements and actions stemming from the meeting, as described across this report, including:

- The following draft SSs and DPPs approved for moving to the next step in the SPESS process, as indicated in the Agenda.
  - DS468 (Step 11)
  - DS509 (Step 7)
  - DS516 (Step 7)
  - DS521 (Step 3)

- Decision on approval of DS469 made in EPReSC-8 remains unchanged. More information was shared regarding what happened after the technical editing process and the silence procedure and an update on the discussions in TRANSSC with further comments raised at TRANSSC by France and Japan, which will be addressed by the CSS.

- Secretariat will submit plans for the development of EPR series publications 2 months prior to the next EPReSC meeting and allow for 5-week term for comments. Secretariat will address comments from EPReSC on this planned activity and inform in the next EPReSC meeting taking place. This process will be included in EPReSC Operating Guidelines.

- Regarding EPReSC Roadmap, it was decided:
  - Priorities currently identified: continue to completion revision of GS-G2.1; revision of GSG-2. More priorities could be defined as more information becomes available on gaps and content of these draft SSs
  - Guidance on Protection Strategy to be developed at SG level. Need to define in due course timeline considering the current EPR Series on this, which is almost finalized
  - Secretariat to develop a “map” of existing EPR guidance (SS+EPR series) regarding different GSR Part 7 Requirements
  - More involvement of EPReSC in identifying gaps in EPR guidance. This will become a topic to be discussed periodically. To be included in EPReSC Operating Guidelines
Guidance on Emergency Workers and Helpers to be developed by the Secretariat as EPR Series

Development of SSG on EMS is not supported

Different views on support the development of SSG for EPCI and IV.

Discussion to be resumed in due course

EPR/Security interface identified as a priority topic for development of guidance. To be discussed in due course how to deal with it.

Secretariat will submit quarterly updates on IEC events to EPReSC members

Regarding presentations on Member State EPR arrangements, Finland and Australia volunteered to deliver a presentation on their arrangements for radiation monitoring and decision-making in EPReSC-10.

EP9.2: Dates for future Meetings

Mr. De La Vega provided information on dates for future meetings:

• 10th EPReSC meeting tentatively scheduled June 9th to 11th 2020.
• 11th EPReSC meeting is scheduled to take place from November 3rd to 5th 2020 and it will be a joint session with TRANSSC.

EP9.3: Information by Slovak Republic on the Working Group for IRIX format revision

The Slovak Republic raised questions about the usage of IRIX format and specified that the WG on the IRIX format will have a simple questionnaire for Member States, including questions such as: Does your country use IRIX? And if so for what purpose in EPR? The goal of the WG is to develop the format of IRIX. Slovak Republic wants to invite other Member States to join the WG. The goal will be to identify missing critical info or other updates to the format to make it better suited to Member State needs.

EP9.4: Closing Remarks

Mr. De La Vega mentioned the upcoming Technical Meeting (TM) on EPR in Next Generation Reactors, and invited Member States to participate. The dates of the event are April 6-9, 2020.

Ms. Heinrich thanked the participants for their important contributions provided during the meeting and the fruitful discussions held. She sent a special thanks to the Ireland, UAE, and Sweden for sharing their presentations, and the colleagues whom attended through WebEx. She encouraged the continuing work of EPReSC including the intersessional efforts and silence procedures and thanked all participants for their support of EPReSC.
List of Participants
Ninth Meeting of the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Committee (EPReSC)

EPReSC-9 - List of attendees. Attendees through WebEx highlighted in italics

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