ER1.1 Introduction and Welcome

ER1.2 Chairperson Introduction

The EPReSC Chairperson welcomed all members of both RASSC and EPReSC to the first joint meeting. She commented that this was a great opportunity for EPReSC to benefit from the synergies available between these committees. EPReSC was only created in June of 2015, which marks the reasoning for the difference in number of historical meetings. The Committee is focused on addressing Member State needs and developing consistent guidance on Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR). EPReSC is now well into our second term with representatives from 64 Member States and 9 international organizations participating as observers. Recently, EPReSC has focused on communicating with the public, in this regard she highlighted the recent international symposium on communicating nuclear and radiological emergencies to the public. Lots of outcomes stemmed from the symposium and EPReSC will be systematically addressing these outcomes. In addition, EPReSC will focus on the roadmap for about 5 years out. The initial roadmap from 2016 has seen the accomplishment of many of the significant objectives. Joint sessions among Committees are very beneficial, as indicated in the self-assessment of each Safety Standards Committee (SSC) about a year ago, which concluded that joint sessions are very useful for better understanding the work done by each SSC.

The RASSC Chairperson specified that this was the 1st joint session between these two committees and wished for fruitful discussion and a widening of each committees’ views on both topics. Communicating radiation risks has been the discussion that morning in RASSC. The afternoon would yield the understanding that supporting documents will be needed. She welcomed all and expressed her interest to share the session with all the EPReSC colleagues here and having the colleagues on WebEx as well.

ER1.3 Adoption of the agenda.

No comments or questions. The agenda is approved.

ER1.4 Administrative Arrangements:

The RASSC coordinator noted and that the report from the meeting will be jointly subject to comments from both committees.

ER2.1 Report of the 45th meeting of the Commission on Safety Standards,

Mr. Dominique Delattre was unable to join and thus Ms. Katherine Asfaw provided the presentations assigned to him. She referred to the roadmap established for the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) for long-term structure of safety requirements, which is now complete. The CSS endorsed different safety standards in the April 2019 CSS meeting including DS475 under the lead of EPReSC. The safety standards endorsed are to begin technical final editing. In addition, three (3) new DPP’s were endorsed, including a total of that six (6) draft safety guides that will be drafted or revised. The number of standards published remains relatively constant, while documents at each stage stay consistently around 10. With the recent modification of the SPRESS procedure, the CSS and
Publication Committee now look at the draft safety standards simultaneously. The timeline for review of these documents has decreased significantly with the additional editor provided by NS. However, lack of resources meant that this position could be difficult to sustain. She highlighted the availability of the NSS-OUI Platform feedback mechanism for streamlining the review by SSCs. She explained the discussion held in CSS about the review of SF-1 conducted by all SSCs. The CSS meeting in December will look at policy discussion and how topics of focus may change in the future as the end of term is approaching.

Ms. Asfaw mentioned to the attendees that additional topics may be suggested through the respective committee chairperson or coordinator for the upcoming December CSS meeting.

The United Kingdom requested information on how topics would be selected for discussion in December and if the committees will be allowed to weigh in on which topics are covered? Ms. Asfaw responded that topics chosen to cover will be decided in-house. However, if a topic isn’t discussed at the next CSS meeting, it doesn’t mean that it won’t be covered in future CSS meetings or Secretariat efforts. The United Kingdom then asked: How does the CSS plan to streamline the safety standards and make them easier for practical use by Member States? Ms. Asfaw stressed that streamlining the process for safety standards is a continuous process. But we should also consider the resources needed to draft and maintain up to date these standards. On average, the CSS issues 10 standards per year implying that each standard can be revised every 12-13 years. She clarified that there are no plans to decrease the number of safety standards.

**ER2.2 NSS-OUI IT Platform:**

Ms. Asfaw advised all committee members to be registered to use the NSS-OUI Platform. For doing that, they need to provide to their respective administrators and Secretariat their NUCLEUS credentials. The NSS-OUI is the standard system for providing feedback on safety standards. All published standards are available on the NSS-OUI Platform and there are only a few days between new safety standard publication and upload on the NSS-OUI Platform. Currently, tagging is ongoing for all safety standards with the definitions from the newest revision of the IAEA Safety Glossary. The 2018 edition of the glossary has been published with the online version of the glossary being updated to pair with the NSS-OUI IT Platform.

The RASSC chairperson stated that the NSS-OUI IT platform has been tested by Australia and that RASSC is now looking for another nation to volunteer to test its capabilities and report to the Committee.

**ER2.3 Safety Report on Attributability of Radiation Health Effects and Inferring Risk**

Ms. Asfaw introduced the progress report and the reasoning for the creation of this practical guidance for the application of safety standards. While this isn’t a safety standard, the creation of a DPP is required. The Consultancy meeting held last March had a number of presentations from and discussion among attendees, including UNSCEAR, ICRP, SSCs representatives, selected experts and Agency staff. The Consultancy meeting was attended by members of both RASSC and EPreSC. There was extensive discussion on the scope of the document. The scope was agreed upon and developed to form an annotated draft DPP. In building a complete DPP, the bullets were turned into paragraph and a more standardized table of contents was created. The consultancy meeting recommended to
consider the Safety Report primarily as a document for use by the Secretariat in developing safety standards. The Coordination Committee approved this draft DPP recently.

ENISS stated that there is clear and plain-language in the UNSCEAR report Annex A. Within RASSC a special working group didn’t see any significant changes based off the UNSCEAR report. Making changes may lead to additional confusion and this report could have limited usefulness. Ms. Asfaw replied that this report has been requested by the CSS and is a formal action on the Secretariat. The purpose of the safety standards is not for attribution of health effects, but the misuse of this concept has been highlighted before. Clearing up these misunderstandings is the goal, and the involvement of the SSCs committees is expected to include all views and reduce confusion. ENISS considered that referring to safety standards as having been misused in the past is a strong statement. This statement could place blame on all the committees. The message that the safety standards are not used for calculating risks or attributability of effects is already clear. Ms. Asfaw responded that she didn’t mean to imply that safety standards are misused, but rather that the public use of these safety standards is where the issue can arise.

The EPRReSC Chairperson indicated that the work on this document can be valuable, especially when communicating in an emergency, as we want more clarification on collective dose.

UNSCEAR commented that there is sometimes a need for clarification in safety standards. UNSCEAR welcomes the safety report from the IAEA to clarify how this UNSCEAR report might affect the safety standards.

ILO commented that it would be helpful if the presentations from the consultancy meeting were made available to the committees. These presentations and this work can have an impact on the decisions made by the IAEA. Work should be done on previous documents including IAEA TECDOC-870. The review of these older documents should state whether they are valid basis for this new safety report. Ms. Asfaw replied that this TECDOC is in a very specific area which is not normally covered under the safety standards or this report. This report will clarify the role of the safety standards, which is not to be used in court, to determine whether a health effect is due to radiation exposure. She mentioned that the review of existing documents with this new report would be beneficial.

Iran (via WebEx) states a general question relating to the difference between IAEA safety standards and ISO standards. Ms. Asfaw clarified that we do work in certain technical areas closely with ISO. The safety standards are meant to parallel with ISO standards and not to be in conflict with them.

The Czech Republic suggested that developing the safety report with the description of the DPP, could lead to having a handbook for scientific secretaries which dictates how safety standards should come into line with this new information. This could somehow undermine the role of SSCs. Ms. Asfaw answered that this report is not intended to be a revolution in safety standards and how we apply them, but rather an evolution in the process of creating safety standards. She clarified that for a publication not based on consensus like this Safety Report, the document does not need to be open to comments or approval of SSCs. Czech Republic went on to state that compensation schemes as outlined in relation to 2012 UNSCEAR report can be updated. Suggested initiating some work in parallel on updating these schemes. Ms. Asfaw replied that TEC-DOC 870 could be worked on in parallel work with the report, but it is entirely up to the Secretariat.
The EPReSC Chairperson stated that there may not be 100% consensus with this process. But it has been considered that the process outlined in the presentation is the method for creating this new valuable publication. WHO, in response to comments about work compensation, indicated that compensation has nothing to do with attributability of health effects or prospective health effects. Compensation is used from a legal perspective for workers regardless of whether the disease is actually attributed to radiation. Regarding the safety report, the decision of the IAEA to not repeat the work of other agencies is welcome, but WHO has some concerns about Chapter 3 in this regard. Chapter 3 can have some health risk assessment, which is already specified in other documents and isn’t the purpose of the IAEA safety standards. The proposed Chapter 4 could be very useful in comparison with Chapter 3. Avoid moving beyond what we consider the scope of competence of the IAEA and the safety standards. Responding to WHO, Ms. Asfaw states that Chapter 3 is in place to help the reader understand Chapter 4. Chapter 3 isn’t intended to rewrite the pieces of information from UNSCEAR 2012 or other technical documents. Understanding these concepts before going into Chapter 4 is the purpose of Chapter 3.

The United States comments that chapter 3 is a risk-related concept, and in the DPP, it does talk about attributability. The objective of the safety report is to apply these concepts. The DPP should be clarified and wondered whether the document will touch on risk concepts at all. The issue of risk should not be included in the report. Ms. Asfaw replied that the safety report is to bring information about risk concepts into the document but stresses that it isn’t meant to be a duplication or rewrite of information currently in the UNSCEAR report.

**ER3.1 Draft Safety Guide: Preparedness and Response for an Emergency During the Transport of Radioactive Material (DS469)**

Mr. Mark Breitinger provided the background for the revision of this safety guide in updating the document of the same title. (TS-G-1.2) previously published in 2002. The document is on-schedule as outlined in the initial DPP. The document was presented at Step 11, where SSCs conduct final review after initial approvals of DPP and draft at Step 7. The current version is the product of 6 different consultancy meetings and one technical meeting, each initiated to provide guidance on the document. The guiding principles are to use the material from TS-G-1.2 as much as possible and to focus on a broad variety of emergencies, as different MS prepare for emergencies differently. The scope excludes events without safety significance, as well as movement of radioactive material within the site boundaries of authorized facilities. At Step 8 of the process, a total of 360 comments were submitted from 11 countries and 1 international organization. At Step 11 of the process 119 comments were submitted by 6 countries and 1 international organization. Many of the comments were written jointly between representatives from the same country to different SSC. The resolution of these comments included adding information in the introduction and appendices to reflect low probability of emergencies during transport and to emphasize the hypothetical nature of the appendices. In addition, Annex II was removed due to inconsistencies with SSR-6 (Rev. 1), published in 2018 since it wasn’t fully incorporated, but no other changes were made to the Appendices or Annexes. After its approval at Step 11, the next step includes technical editing of the draft.

Australia commented that the hazard assessment isn’t what we were trying to compare to, but rather we were trying to compare to the consequences or risks. Mr. Mark Breitinger commented that if we switch to consequences, then we don’t fully account for the hazard assessment including the security and safety assessments. He also stated that using words like risk and consequence hurts the overall document.
Japan commented on protection strategy in the context of this safety standard. The description of protection strategy is not complete in this draft. Even though this topic will be covered under GSG-2.1 and GSG-2 having a more complete definition would be helpful. There is a potential for a bias towards Operational Intervention Levels based off the current document wording. Mr. Mark Breitinger replied that in terms of EPR, transport emergencies are a sub-set of Emergency Preparedness Category (EPC) IV. Regarding GSR Part 7 requirements, the document only addresses aspects of emergencies due to the transport. The document may appear that it relates more to OILs, but rather both OILs and Protection Strategy are used as linkages in the document. OILs provide guidance and linkage between the EPR community and the transport community on what emergency response actions should be taken during a transport emergency.

Both the RASSC and EPReSC Chairs welcomed any comments or requests for further information relating to rejected comments. The EPReSC Chair outlined the process, where SSCs would have the opportunity to see the document once more after Technical Editing, in a silence procedure defined with that purpose.

There were no further questions or comments and both EPReSC and RASSC APPROVED the draft DS469 for submission to the CSS for endorsement.


Ms. Farhana Naseer provided the background for the revision of two safety guides (SSG-20 and SSG-24) which included addressing new safety requirements from SSR-3 and incorporation of experience and feedback from the Fukushima accident. The scope now covers subcritical assemblies and the interface between nuclear safety and security however, the structure remains essentially the same. She depicted the comments received from SSCs and provided information on their resolution. In total, DS510A had a total of 212 comments and DS510B had a total of 125 comments. While the majority of comments were accepted, the rejected comments were primarily to avoid inconsistency with the IAEA Safety Glossary and safety standards.

The Russian Federation clarified that according to SSR-3, requirement 22, result of analysis of design extension conditions is impracticable for limitations on consequences from accidents. The suggestion is to correct 2.17 and 3.34 of SSG-20 to add the comment to not limit scope to only systems and items with these limits. This will ensure alignment with requirement 22 of SSR-3. Ms. Naseer replied that she considered these comments from the Member States and can further discuss with representatives to address these inconsistencies.

Mr. Amgad Shokr clarified the comment from the Russian Federation, that the goal was to amend paragraph 2.17 to not just specify equipment but also to measures. He invited proposed text from the Committee to resolve this issue.

EPReSC and RASSC Chairs invited further comments on these documents. Hearing none, both Committees APPROVED these documents for submission to Member States for comments.

**ER4 DPPs FOR APPROVAL**

Ms. Helen Rycraft introduced the DPP for a new safety guide to replace Application of the Management System for Facilities and Activities (GS-G-3.1) previously published in 2006. The DPP is revised in scope and content from that previously provided to Committees for approval in June 2018. At that time it was proposed that the revision current safety guide The Management System for Nuclear Installations (GS-G-3.5) would also be covered by DS513 but that is no longer the case.

The current revision has been initiated to provide generic guidance on the implementation of the requirements in GSR Part 2 Leadership and Management for Safety and will follow the same general structure. The new safety guide will contain improved guidance on leadership, management and culture for safety for non-nuclear facilities and activities. Feedback from Member States and lessons learnt from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident in 2011 will also be addressed.

A total of 90 comments were received from 15 Member States and one International Organization. All were addressed and the resolution table was posted on the Committees’ website in advance of the meeting. As the lead Committee, NUSSC will consider all comments made on the DPP by the other Committees and will coordinate with the other Chairpersons, if necessary.

ENISS advised the new safety guide should avoid duplication of material that already exists and recommended that it should expand on leadership issues in relation to emergency preparedness and response.

The United States expressed its support for the DPP and advised on the need to ensure consistency with other documents and avoid unnecessary duplication. As this is a general safety guide applicable to all facilities and all activities, it needs to cover all core concepts.

Israel commented that the terms “safety culture” and “culture for safety” convey very different meanings that need to be explained and the terms used consistently. Ms Rycraft confirmed the difference and mentioned in the document the definition of "culture for safety" would be included.

In reply to a question from Japan, Ms. Rycraft explained that the safety guide The Management System for Nuclear Installations (GS-G-3.5) was too specific for a general safety guide and will be revised separately.

There was extensive discussion regarding the need to develop specific safety guides or lower level documents to complement DS513. It was noted that there are already guidance documents under development dealing with waste facilities and research reactors. Earlier in the week RASSC discussed the DPP for a TECDOC on Application of the Graded Approach in Regulating Radiation Sources Facilities and Activities.

The RASSC Chairperson considered that the borderline between general and specific safety guides was not always clear. This is particular problematic when dealing with the graded approach, which is well developed in relation to the nuclear industry but poorly developed in other areas. The United Kingdom added that it was not clear how small and medium operators would be addressed in DS513. There were also questions as to why the development of the document, which is to be generic in nature, is being led by NUSSC.

Ms. Rycraft replied that the gap analysis undertaken as part of the review process highlighted the lack of guidance on non-nuclear facilities. This will be enhanced in DS513, but it would not be appropriate to provide specific guidance for specific industries. However, examples can be included as annexes, if this is the wish of the Committees. Regarding the role of NUSSC, Ms. Rycraft commented that this is purely for historic reasons and all Committees will be fully involved in the development process.
There were no further questions or comments and both EPReSC and RASSC approved the DPP for submission to the CSS for endorsement.

**Action:** The Secretariat to forward the DPP for the draft safety guide *Leadership, Management and Culture for Safety (DS513)* to the CSS for endorsement

### ER4.2 Draft Safety Guide: Radiation Protection Programmes for the Transport of Radioactive Material (DS521)

Mr. Eric Reber presented the DPP to update the current safety guide *Radiation Protection Programmes for the Transport of Radioactive Material (TS-G-1.3)* which was published in 2007. The need to revise TS-G-1.3 was identified by TRANSSC at its meeting in November 2016 and, once finalized, the new safety guide will support the 2018 edition of the *Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (SSR-6).*

A total of 35 comments were received from five Member States. A revised DPP and the resolution of comments table was posted on the Committees’ website in advance of the meeting.

**Japan** considered the text related to emergencies in TS-G-1.3 is very useful for Member States and did not support its removal. The Secretariat replied that all emergency and response issues are addressed in the draft safety guide *Preparedness and Response for an Emergency during the Transport of Radioactive Material (DS469)* and the intention is to avoid duplication in this new safety guide.

**ILO** supported the views of Japan, noting that the draft safety guide DS469 does not refer to the radiation protection programme. ILO also noted the need to address the interface between the radiation protection programmes in place for transport and at the point of delivery; to update the content of the radiation protection programme to make it consistent with GSR Part 3 regarding personal protective equipment and other personnel protection measures; and to clarify whether the instructions for handling incidents are part of emergency response or are covered under local rules and working procedures.

**Iran** (via WebEx) supported the views of Japan and ILO and added that section 6 should be deleted as it duplicates material already in GSR Part 7.

The ERPeSC Chairperson commented that all relevant issues need to be covered between DS469 and DS521. Some overlap might be appropriate to ensure that each safety guide is “stand-alone”.

Both Committees agreed that the changes necessary to the DPP were significant and were not appropriate to be managed by silent procedure. EPReSC and RASSC did not approve the DPP and deferred consideration to a future meeting.

**Action:** The Secretariat to revise the DPP for the draft safety guide *Radiation Protection Programmes for the Transport of Radioactive Material (DS521)* in line with the comments received and submit to a future meeting of the Committees.

### ER4.3 Draft Safety Guide: Radiation Protection Aspects of Design for Nuclear Power Plants (DS524)

Ms. Csilla Toth presented the DPP to revise the safety guide Radiation Protection Aspects of Design for Nuclear Power Plants (NS-G-1.13) published in 2005. The revised safety guide will incorporate experience on application of NS-G-1.13, operating experience feedback from Member States and
lessons learnt from the Fukushima-Daiichi NPP accident. The scope remains essentially unchanged. The revised safety guide will describe measures to be taken in design of NPPs for radiation protection of workers and the public, for protection of the environment, for all operational states and accident conditions, as well as for the commissioning and decommissioning stages.

Thirty comments were received from 10 Member States and one International Organization. Comments were primarily of editorial nature and for clarification. All comments have been resolved. The DPP has already been approved by WASSC.

Switzerland referred to Table of SSCs comments resolution and comment of Pakistan and proposed that the term “effluent monitoring” be replaced by “discharge monitoring”. This was agreed.

There were no further questions or comments and EPReSC and RASSC approved the DPP for submission to the CSS for endorsement.

**Action:** The Secretariat to forward the DPP for the draft safety guide *Radiation Protection Aspects of Design for Nuclear Power Plants (DS524)* to the CSS for endorsement.

**ERS OTHER TOPICS**

**ERS.1 IAEA project on Radionuclides in Food and Drinking Water in Non-Emergency Situations – update from the Secretariat**

Ms. Richelle Tolton updated both Committees on the work undertaken on the project *Radionuclides in Food and Drinking Water in Non-Emergency Situations* since the previous presentations in June 2018. Historically, all references to radionuclides in food and drinking water in the IAEA safety standards have been in the context of emergencies but since 2014, GSR Part 3 has a requirement for national authorities to set reference levels for food and drinking water “of about 1 mSv” in existing exposure situations. A Steering Group has been established to oversee development of the supporting guidance, with a joint secretariat of FAO, IAEA and WHO.

The project is supported by resolutions each year at the IAEA General Conference, which in 2018 requested the Secretariat “to develop principles for harmonized guidance on radionuclide activity concentration values in food and drinking water, in continued cooperation with relevant international organizations and national authorities.”

In April 2019, the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Food (CCCF) of the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission asked the IAEA to develop a document providing “factual information on the radioactivity of both human-made and natural origin that can be found in feed and food (including drinking water) in normal circumstances.”

Ms. Tolton summarized the conclusions of a Consultant’s Meeting organized in May 2018 to consider the transfer of radionuclides in the aquaculture industry. Aquaculture (fish farming) is a major industry that now provides close to 50% of the world’s supply of fish and shellfish, with Asia (particularly China) being the major producer. Limited published data indicate lower concentrations of polonium-210 in farmed fish that are artificially fed compared to those captured in the wild. Molluscs normally have the highest concentrations of polonium-210 and as these are normally not fed, the doses to heavy consumers in unlikely to change. The Consultants’ Meeting concluded that whether or not the fishery
products were farmed or wild would not be expected to have a significant impact on the radiation doses received by average consumers but could be important for certain sub-groups of the population. The Consultants recommended that further information should be collected.

Egypt commented on the importance of radium-226 and radium-228 as a source of radiation dose in drinking water and asked the Secretariat to ensure that these two radionuclides are adequately addressed in relation to food.

WHO commented that, in respect of drinking water, natural radionuclides are often more challenging than humanmade radionuclides.

Australia underlined the importance of polonium-210 in food as a source of radiation exposure and the need to clearly differentiate, for all radionuclides, between high concentrations and high doses.

The EC asked for more information on the scope of the paper requested by CCCF. From the floor, FAO replied that the CCCF procedure for preparing papers such as this is to establish an Electronic Working Group (EWG). The IAEA has been asked to prepare the first draft, which will be submitted to the Chair of the EWG for further development. The EWG is chaired by the EC and co-chaired by Japan. The document is only for information and is not an exercise in developing new controls or limits. Emergency exposure situations are specifically excluded from the scope.

France noted that regulations for radionuclides in drinking water have already been established in national legislation for EU Member States. In the case of food, while the emergency situation is addressed in international standards, there is an urgent need for corresponding guidance for non-emergency situations.

**ER5.2 Public Communication-related Topics: Plain Language Materials for Preparedness and Response – status report**

Ms. Sinead Harvey described work being undertaken to develop plain language materials for use in emergency preparedness and response. This work supports para. 2.19 of the safety guide *Arrangements for Public Communication in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency* (GSG-14) which states that “one function of public communication in a nuclear or radiological emergency is to convey technical information in suitable language for a general audience. Such information should be provided in a clear and comprehensible form (i.e. ‘plain language’).”

The plain language briefing package is being developed primarily to support technical briefers and spokespersons with background materials for use within the IAEA Incident and Emergency System. The items covered will include the basics of radiation, the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear reactors, radioactive waste, radioactive sources, nuclear security, protective actions and the IAEA’s role in emergency preparedness and response. The final package will be provided to Member States as reference material in all six UN languages. In due course a PDF interactive version will be developed.

Slovak Republic asked if it was possible to translate the material into non-UN languages. Ms. Harvey confirmed that should be possible. For copyright reasons, it may be necessary to obtain clearance from the Agency.
In a response to questions from Australia and Canada, Ms. Harvey confirmed that the package is expected to be available before the end of 2019 and will be provided through USI to those who have access.

ENISS asked if the material has been tested during an exercise and if it can be used in non-emergency situations as briefing material. Ms. Harvey replied that the material is still being edited but it is envisaged that it will have multiple uses, both during emergencies and for media briefing.

Japan advised that the material should be tested on the public to see if it is understood and is really “plain language”.

The United States considered that the tool will be useful and asked the Secretariat to inform Member States as soon as it is available and, in addition, to develop an outreach campaign to promote its use.

The EPReSC Chairperson commented that, although it looks straightforward, the work is slow and tedious. She thanked Ms. Harvey and her colleagues for their dedication to the project.

**ER6 CLOSING OF THE MEETING**

**ER6.1 Conclusions of the Joint Session**

The EPReSC Chairperson noted that this was the first occasion on which EPReSC and RASSC met in joint session. Both Committees have many issues in common and joint discussions allow different perspectives to be brought to the same issue, resulting in better decisions. Ms. Heinrich considered that similar sessions in the future would be very beneficial.

The RASSC Chairperson thanked all participants for their very active discussion and contribution to the meeting. Ms. Bly referred in particular to the item on attributability, concluding that the path forward is now more clearly defined. She also underlined the importance of the DPP for the safety guide *Leadership, Management and Culture for Safety* (DS513) and the need to develop supporting documents for small and medium facilities.

Both Chairpersons thanked the Secretariat for organizing the session.

**ER6.2 Closing**

Both Chairpersons jointly closed the meeting.