EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE STANDARDS COMMITTEE
(EPReSC)

Report of the Second Meeting of EPReSC

27 to 30 June 2016

International Atomic Energy Agency
Vienna

Approved by the Third Meeting of EPReSC on XX-XX-2016
INTRODUCTION

The second meeting of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Standards Committee (EPReSC) was conducted from 27 to 30 June 2016. It was attended by 37 representatives from Member States (MS) and 7 from International Organization. Additionally, 3 representatives from MS attended the meeting thru WebEx Service.

EP-1: GENERAL

EP1.1: Opening remarks

The meeting was opened by Ms Elena Buglova, Head of the Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC), the key points of her remarks were:

- EPReSC is a large group, reflecting the importance of emergency preparedness and response (EPR).
- This is the second EPReSC meeting, but actually the first meeting involving work as it is done in the standards committees meetings.
- EPR is a crosscutting topic.

EPReSC goal/task: how EPR is reflected/addressed within IAEA safety standards and to ensure consistency of other safety standards on EPR. Ms Buglova encouraged MS representatives to have active participation and provide feedback during the EPReSC meeting. Among the strategic topics to be discussed this meeting, she emphasized the importance of the activities to support implementation of GSR Part 7 requirements. Finally, she introduced the new Scientific Secretary of EPReSC, Mr Ramon de la Vega

EP1.2: Chairperson’s remarks

Ms Heinrich presented her opening remarks, with emphasis on the importance of this second meeting. She pointed out several key aspects:

- EPReSC mandate to address the crosscutting area of EPR and to review the application of EPR requirements in a consistent manner within all standards
- Important issues to discuss during the meeting: approving/clearing draft standards, review of GS-G-2.1 and discussions on public communication
- Welcome to the new participants joining the Committee
- She provided some figures relevant to EPReSC: 63 members and 10 international organizations in EPReSC, 17 draft standards to be discussed during this meeting

EP1.3: Logistics and administration

Mr Ramon de la Vega, the Scientific Secretary of EPReSC, presented the logistics and administrative arrangements.
**EP1.4: Adoption of the agenda of the second EPReSC meeting**

The agenda was adopted with some comments, noting that flexibility would be required based on the discussions and the availability of some speakers not belonging to the Committee. The agenda was addressed in a flexible manner, changing sometimes the order of some items, based on presenters’ availability or other considerations.

A question was raised by New Zealand, regarding the convenience for future agendas to give countries opportunity to present different issues during the EPReSC, for example how to implement standards and other issues. The Chair appreciated the initiative, pointing out that it should be considered for future meetings.

The Agenda was adopted with the referred consideration for flexibility.

**EP1.5 Approval of the report of the first EPReSC meeting**

One point was raised by Iran, asking about the need of operating guidelines for EPReSC while the other standards committees do not have operating guidelines. Ms Heinrich explained that operating guidelines are a useful tool on how we conduct our work specially in these first stages; other committees do not have it because they had been operating for some time before EPReSC was created.

The Report of first meeting was approved with no other comments and with no objections.

**EP1.6 Update from the 39th meeting of the CSS**

This presentation was given by Ms Heinrich on behalf of Mr Delattre, reporting on the outcomes of the 39th meeting of the CSS. No questions to this presentation.

**EP1.7 Update from the last Meeting of the Chairs**

Ms Heinrich provided some hints on the last meeting of the Chairs of Standards Committees. There were no questions or comments.

**EP1.8 Update from the Eighth Meeting of the Representatives of Competent Authorities under the Assistance and Early Notification Conventions**

Ms Buglova gave a presentation on the recent meeting of the National Competent Authorities identified Under the Early Notification and Assistance Conventions, held in June 2016.

New Zealand asked about the relationship between EPReSC and Competent Authorities Meeting (CAM). Ms Buglova clarified that, even though the mandate of both groups were clearly different, there are links between the two; for instance in
both meetings there are many common attendees, these provides for better consistency and well understanding of standards implementation. Ms Heinrich supported that view.

WHO raised a couple of questions. The first question was about the role of international organizations at CAM. Ms. Buglova explained that topics included in the CAM’s agenda reflected the requests from MSs for longer time for discussions, therefore there were no presentations of international organizations; in the future this point could be revisited if new suggestions are received. The second question was regarding the possibility of opening a period of consultations for international organizations to review the conclusions of CAM. Regarding this point, Ms. Buglova clarified that the CAM conclusions are adopted by MS and no further changes could be made and that international organizations having attended CAM will have the CAM meeting report distributed in due course.

Canada asked about the possibility of having EPReSC considering conclusions of CAM. The Chair supported this possibility, acknowledging the added value from CAM to the development of standards.

**EP1.9 Update on the NSS-OUI IT Platform**

Mr Delattre gave a presentation on the IT system of NSS-OUI platform (Online User Interface), including

- NSS-OUT is a content management system and knowledge management system; publications are managed not only at the level of publication but also their content is managed
- Advanced search and navigation capabilities
- Possibility to manage relationship between publications (top – down and horizontal relationships between requirements); search by publication or by requirement
- He requested feedback from the users on how the platform works

Some questions followed.

Germany asked about the possibility of creating user group to share information. Mr Delattre informed that it’s envisaged to implement in the future arrangements to allow for virtual discussions among user of the system.

Finland suggested the implementation of advanced search capabilities to find documents and publications; Mr Delattre pointed out that searching mechanisms are already implemented in the system, though with limited capabilities.

Iran welcomed the setting up of this new system. South Africa asked about whether TECDOCs were considered in the system. Mr. Delattre indicated that the idea is that the system is to help users to implement safety requirements and safety guides;
suitable links will be provided to those technical documents which are relevant for standards implementation.

### EP2: COMMITTEE OPERATION

#### EP2.1 Operating guidelines

The Chair provided some additional guidance on how MS can make comments through the EPReSC member’s area. She emphasized the importance of making clear statements on what are the proposed changes or suggestions for improvement. Also, regarding Standards where EPReSC is not the leading Committee, comments should focused in aspects relevant to EPR. Mr de la Vega also supported the idea of taking advantage of the member’s area for the submission of comments, avoiding other more time consuming ways like sending comments by e-mail to the Secretariat.

Some questions were raised by the participants:

France asked a question about the person who was entitled to post comments in EPReSC member’s area. Mr. De la Vega explained that MS are supposed to appoint an EPReSC member; the person entitled to post comments is only one person by country; it is up to the country to internally organize this process. The Chair confirmed that this is the procedure for all the Standards Committees.

Iran raised a point about the time period for comments, it’s short and makes difficult to circulate properly the information. The Chair acknowledged this operational limitation, difficult to fix, hoping that as the activities of EPReSC progress this process could be streamlined. Iran also asked about drafts that were not approved by the leading Committees and that are anyway sent to EPReSC for discussion. The Secretariat clarified that the process in EPReSC is identical to the others Safety Standards Committees, addressing the specific example raised by the representative of Iran.

Ms Heinrich proposed to approve the operating guidelines; there were no objections. The Operating Guidelines were approved.

### EP3: REVIEW OF IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS

Ms Heinrich suggested that all comments to be raised should be preferably focused on EPR topics.

#### EP3.1 DS495: Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material (revision of SSR-6)

Mr Whittingham gave a presentation on the content of the draft Standard and the process undergone so far:
- Draft in Step 7 of the approval process
- All comments have been addressed during the presentation, most of them accepted, few rejected; there is still the possibility for MSs to comment on draft, when the draft will be sent for 120 days for MSs comments.

There were no comments or questions on the presentation; document has been APPROVED by EPReSC to proceed to next step of the drafting process.

**EP3.2 DS474: Draft Safety Guide on Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency**

Ms Nestoroska Madjunarova gave a presentation summarizing the process of receiving and addressing comments on the draft from the Committee members. Some questions were raised afterwards to the presenter:

USA asked about whether this guide is the only one defining transition phase, expressing some fears about the possibility of creating some confusion in the terms referring to termination of the emergency. It was confirmed by the presenter that is the first guide using this terminology.

Canada asked about the implications of not approving the document. Chair and Secretariat clarified that the draft would stuck in Step 7 at least until it is approved in the next EPReSC meeting, noting that even with EPReSC approval there is still an opportunity for MS comment to resolve any remaining issues.

China raised a point on medical evaluation which was noted. Australia noted their desire for the committee to approve the draft. USA supported going ahead with the draft despite some doubts with the clarity of the wording. Then Mr. Delattre clarified that the aim of current step Step 7 is seeking technical maturity of the text, compared to the next submission to EPReS, step 11, seeking consensus. Intervention from Iran representative followed, regarding some aspects of the wording on deterministic effects, which were clarified by the presenter.

Afterwards there were intervention by Sweden, and Japan, supporting going ahead with the draft and raising some points regarding reference level which were answered by the presenter.

Considering all the opinions expressed, the document was APPROVED to be sent for comments to MS.

**EP3.3 DS491: Draft Safety Guide on Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants**

Mr Villalibre gave a presentation summarizing the history of the draft, what requirements the safety guide supports; an overview of the comments received;
document has been approved by all other committees; total 420 comments received, mainly for clarification and some additional for relevant information; changes have been incorporated in the draft; request approval by EPReSC; no unresolved comments by today.

There were no questions; document was APPROVED to be submitted to MSs for comments.

**EP-4: IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS FOR INFORMATION**


Mr Gater gave some background on DS478 and mentioned that it is currently at SPES step 10. He said that the existing scope would be retained. The targeted date of a publication will be in 2017.

Iran asked about the reason to consider a specific event (overfilling a UF6 container), which was explained by the presenter referring to the relevance of chemical hazards stemming from a UF6 container explosion.


Mr Poulat made a presentation providing background information on the document NS-G 1.10 published in 2004 and now under revision to fulfil updated requirements of SSR-2/1 rev 1. One question of Israel followed, referring to security aspects relevant to protect containment structure. The presenter answered referring that this is at the MS level depending on the security Design Basis Threat (DBT) which is country specific.

**EP4.3 DS483: Draft Safety Guide on Severe Accident Management Programmes for Nuclear Power Plants**

Mr Kim presented the content of the safety guide NS-G-2.15, published 2009, now under revision after the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident to include lessons learned.

- Revised draft in 2015
- Number of comments received from NSNI, IEC, NS Coordination Committee
- Posted for comments in April 2015; 288 comments received from NUSSC, WASSC, RASSC and NSGC; all addressed
- Presented the development at first EPRESC meeting, looked for consistency with GSR Part 7
- Future plan: to be reviewed by the SCC(s) in November 2016 at Step 11
- A more detailed presentation for EPRESC will be held in November 2016

There were no questions.
Ms Lungu presented the document development, Fukushima implications and the current status of DS472 (step 10: second internal review of the draft publication). Presented the list of the IAEA documents served as the basis for the document as well.

There were no questions.

Ms Lungu presented document development, Fukushima implications, and the current status of DS473 (step 10: second internal review of the draft publication). It’s a complement to DS472 (focused on managerial aspects) and is more technical. The list of documents to be merged is quite more extensive if compared with the list for DS472. The revised draft was approved in 2015 after addressing 308 comments. One question was raised by Iran, regarding responsibility of regulatory body for security. The presenter explained that security was outside the scope of the document. Mr. Gater commented also on the topic and confirmed what was said by Ms Lungu.

Ms Yankovich presented objectives of the document, key issues addressed in the document, document structure and relationship to other IAEA standards, update and the path forward. Some questions were raised afterwards:

Finland highlighted the importance of involving stakeholders in reference levels. Belarus expressed their interest in participating in the drafting process so that they were able to provide insights coming out from their experience in remediation after Chernobyl. The presenter appreciated this offer.

Japan asked about whether the scope of the document included decontamination and the outcome of a recent Technical Meeting (TM) on that. The presenter provided some information regarding that TM.

Germany asked a question about some specific values included in the document. The presenter gave explained that site specific values are difficult to include in such a document.

The upcoming Consultancy Meeting (CS) on reference levels was referred to by Australia. Canada asked about interface aspects to ensure consistency among the...
strategies used during the emergency and the ones put in place for remediation. The
presenter acknowledged the importance of that point.

EP-5: DPPs FOR APPROVAL

**EP5.1 DS469: draft Safety Guide on Preparedness and Response for an Emergency during the Transport of Nuclear Material or Radioactive Material**

Mr Breitinger presented a background on the document; justification, objectives, and scope of the document; production schedule; and comments from EPReSC. Some Questions followed:

Finland asked about possible small events, when there is no need for an emergency response. The presenter emphasized the fact that those events will not be covered by the document, since it will cover emergencies.

Portugal asked about whether coastal and shipping states were in the process. The presenter answered positively; participation of representatives of experts from this kind of countries is sought.

Israel inquired the reason to exclude the transport of radioactive materials within facilities. The presenter answered that SSR6 excludes that kind of transport that don’t take place in the public domain.

UK supported the document and expressed their interest in participating in the drafting process.

No objections were raised to the DPP and it was APPROVED.

**EP5.2 DS497 Revision of eight closely interrelated Safety Guides: NS-G-2.2 to 2.8 and NS-G-2.14**

A presentation was given on this DPP by Ms. Ranguelova. A remark was raised by the EC suggesting that the reference made in the DPP to continuous safety improvement should consider the Vienna Declaration to further clarify the expectations on this subject.

No objections were raised to the content of this DPP, which was APPROVED.

EP-6: NSGS DOCUMENTS AND DPPs FOR CLEARANCE

Mr Pelletier gave a presentation on the content, status and the process followed by the draft:

- Document at Step 11 – final stage prior to publication. If cleared, to be submitted to the DDG-NS
- Presentation included overview of the current draft; process followed until now and planning for future activities towards publication
- Document provides guidance for planning for and managing the response to nuclear security events
- Document has gone through lot of iterations: 8 CSs with 49 representatives from 14 MSs; 142 comments received, incorporated in the revised draft
- Cleared by TRANSSC and RASSC; if cleared today, target publication date would be December 2016

Afterwards, questions were raised by MS:

Israel: every country should have infrastructure for responding to radiation emergencies; what are the differences between infrastructure to respond to security and to other types of events?

Answer: Every country has infrastructure to respond to emergencies; when we add security, we refer to malicious acts; in addition to all actions to protect the population, for nuclear security events we add actions to prosecute the criminals, at the same time with the emergency response; it is sure that there is an interconnection between the response to emergency and the response of law enforcement teams when we have events dealing with radioactive material dispersion; but we may have nuclear security events only with prosecution actions, when there is no emergency on going; so these kind of activities are mentioned in this guidance; The publication does not address the response to any nuclear or radiological emergencies; but the connections are crucial, coordination between law enforcement and safety response.

USA: The use of word “framework” in the document seems to imply a standalone security system, but we should speak about integration of security within the national emergency framework; It should be more clear within the document that security response is to be integrated and not stand alone;

Answer: A lot of experts were discussing this document until now; we have much guidance in it on this integration and coordination with the response to nuclear or radiological emergency. Maybe we can do more but it is important to publish this document as it is, just for the sake of this coordination; We may think to revise it at

1 In this part of the minutes, and considering the relevance of the discussion, the interventions of the participants are intended to be a reasonable accurate transcription of what was said, departing from the criterion applied to the remainder points where interventions were summarized.
some point for even better emphasize of this coordination between response to a nuclear or radiological emergency and response to malicious acts; The Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) has approved the draft to be published but would consider an early revision to highlight more the coordination and integration.

USA: we are concerned about planning for an early revision. We should provide MS with a more consistent vision of integration in the initial publication.

Belarus: Agree with USA with similar comment to the document. This document proposes a new approach, that countries should have a parallel plan for response to security events, which is not consistent with GSR Part 7. What is the reason to have another plan? We should have only one plan and use a general system for emergency response.

Answer: The document is not addressing an emergency response plan; the national framework provides the basis for the response also to nuclear security events; some part of the plan should address the response to nuclear security events and this is to be considered when planning for response to nuclear or radiological emergencies.

Belarus: How did you introduce this in the draft?

Answer: it is declared in para 1.3 that the document does not address the response to any nuclear or radiological emergency, but provides guidance on how to deal when nuclear security events are related to a nuclear or radiological emergency. There may be events with no contamination or radiation exposure, but requiring response for nuclear security events. When radioactive contamination or exposures are present, the coordination between safety and security is crucial.

Belarus: We still should not have separate systems for responding to nuclear security events.

Answer: but we do not speak about separate systems. GSR Part 7 is considered in this document and we do not want to repeat all those activities that are considered in GSR Part 7. Our message is to consider whatever is in place and add guidance for response to nuclear security events.

Zambia: There is a need for clarification: when you make reference in 1.14, how do you clarify that statement in relation to the fact that the publication does not address the response to a nuclear or radiological emergency? If it addresses only security response, for me 1.14 is somehow contradictory.

Answer: In 1.14 is mentioned that we do not deal with events in relation to physical protection of nuclear facilities which is described in other documents, but we are dealing with response to events involving radioactive materials that are out of regulatory control.

Iran: When we speak about the national emergency plan, we speak about everything; when developing a national framework for nuclear security events it seems to be totally different. Should we develop another national framework for responding to nuclear security events? It may be that we do not know in the beginning the cause of an emergency, and then how to shift from one framework to another?
Answer: it seems that both safety response and security response are considered and integrated in your national framework and this is how it should be.

Iran: Applicable IAEA documents on EPR have included forensic team for nuclear and radiological emergencies;

Answer: this guidance provides for integration of prosecution actions and this has not been addressed until now; it should be that all relevant response actions have to be all integrated in one plan but it is not the case yet.

NSGC Scientific Secretary: this guide is not about response to an emergency; GSR Part 7 is not about response to a nuclear security event; they are linked; when the cause is not clear, it may be that both responses have to be closely integrated; nuclear safety and nuclear security events could be related or not.

Ms Buglova: These are very correct statements I have heard, about integration and coverage; we should look how the text reflects these statements. IEC provided its input for this document, but the output is not in line with GSR Part 7, the text is not fully consistent. GSR Part 7 does not cover specifically nuclear security events, because it’s aimed at addressing EPR for any nuclear or radiological emergency irrespective its origin. When we look at definition of nuclear security events provided in this draft, we have three types of events defined. The definition of emergency from IAEA Safety Glossary, which is not new, suits type one of the defined nuclear security events and potentially type two also. In the document, it is not only nuclear security response covered, it is much more. It could be confusing for the user.

France: Part of the question has been answered by Ms Buglova; there is possibility for confusion for sure, but when we speak about nuclear security events, the response is different, also in terms of communication and others. Another question: the document has been approved by others, and there were also some EPReSC comments; have you accepted or rejected the comments received?

Answer: We had comments, some for explanatory purposes, some were about complementarity with GSR Part 7; some of these comments were not retained because there could be nuclear security events when there is no emergency. We had experience with such nuclear security events, without any emergency; it is a complementarity with GSR Part 7; we didn’t want to give guidance on the response plan, we consider that response to nuclear security events should be part of this emergency response plan; the interfaces of both responses have to be integrated; MSs need guidance on how to build the response plan with due consideration of the response to nuclear security events;

Finland: When reading the document I would have liked to have seen more emphasis on nuclear security event response in the training section, how the training should be. When NSGC recommended that the document should be updated soon, what does this mean in IAEA language?

Answer: Always we can improve the documents; even if we can add additional recommendations or additional details, this document will be useful for MSs in
order to build national plans with due considerations of the guidance incorporated here; that is why we should publish this document, to build the response plan.

NSGC scientific secretary: we did not mention any revision timeframe, the usual timeframe is 10 years, in this case may be as usual; The revision process should be initiated in the next years, and should follow the normal process timeframe. We do not know when we will start that process.

Israel: What confuses me is that any country should have security infrastructure for many aspects and the security of nuclear material stays with the country; What is so special that we need to publish guidance on this?

Answer: It is very important and necessary to integrate nuclear security in the national framework; nuclear security events are to be considered within the national security of the country and this guidance provide support for this national security framework when dealing with nuclear security events; I invite you to read the whole document.

Ireland: We have the same comment as Israel and USA, there is a total confusion, about definition of emergency; a nuclear security event could be part of this definition of emergency.

Answer: It can be in some situations but not always. In an attack by terrorist group with RDD, not exploded; who will take the lead? Is the law enforcement team or the safety team? Both would be involved, but the lead will be law enforcement; this is the guidelines we provide here, for such situations.

Ireland: We agree in some points, but we should reach a consensus;

Germany: The guide is useful for those events that do not have a safety component. But we have situations when safety is involved, such as in case of releases. I miss a clear statement about transition from nuclear security to nuclear safety.

Answer: Very good comment; we have addressed it in the document. This transition has to be included in the response plan. This is a basis to build the response plan.

Portugal: We have the same comment as Germany. Most security plans are classified. It would be very difficult for safety people to work with classified information. Is there any idea how to deal with this?

Answer: There is no explanation in this guidance on this topic; both safety and security responses have the main aim to protect the public; that information useful to protect the public will be available to safety people.

USA: Although the intent of the document is to provide guidance, it may be that MS will be more confused than helped if we were to approve this draft as it is now.

France: This document is for cases of events that involve radioactive material out of regulatory control, not in relation to facilities or authorized sources, but with events outside the usual response under the national system; On the other hand implementing a document without maturity may create confusion. I would be in favor that we read it again and create some maturity for this document.
Canada: About guidance and implementation: GSR Part 7 doesn’t specify how different entities should coordinate among them for security events.

Ms Heinrich: To summarize discussions: The situation is that EPReSC was not involved with this document until this stage; and GSR part 7 was just published. I am hearing that we do not have consensus for clearing this document. We will note in the report that the document should look at consistency in terminology and definitions, and should not create overlapping of conflicting guidance for MS in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency initiated by a nuclear security event. I propose that we do not clear the document, that the Technical Officer coordinate with the IEC to revise text, and that EPReSC will contribute to revise the document so that issues will be clearly addressed and the relationship to GSR Part 7 will be clear.

Technical Officer: We had lot of comments from MS that today have raised comments again; please take care of the experts you nominate for comments in the future.

Ms Heinrich: The document is not cleared by EPReSC. We are very interested to work together with the Technical Officer to improve this document, make it compatible with GSR Part 7, and ensure that Member States implement a single, comprehensive response to nuclear or radiological emergencies.

Summarizing, the main reasons to NOT CLEAR the document are:

Type 1 and 2 security events defined in the draft NST004 could result in nuclear or radiological emergencies. GSR Part 7 addresses the preparedness and response to emergencies and should be implemented for these emergencies without creating parallel organizations as suggested in the document.


Mr Larsen provided a presentation summarizing the status and content of the draft standard.

No Questions were raised and the document was CLEARED to proceed to further steps.

EP6.3 DPP NST058: Development, use and maintenance of threat assessment and design basis threat

Mr Parulkar presented background on current Nuclear Security Series (NSS) 10, explanation of threat assessment, and the methodology for developing the design
basis threat to be used in the design of the security system of the affected facilities. Some questions followed

Iran raised a comment wondering whether the use of the word maintenance was appropriate regarding threat assessment. The presenter clarified that in this context that word should be understood as the need to keep up to date threat assessment

South Africa asked a question about the responsibilities of the regulator in the process. The presenter emphasized that DBT is responsibility of the designated CA, and the implementation is responsibility of the operators. Sometimes the regulator was involved in the DBT definition, although it is country specific.

Germany asked about difference between design basis and beyond design basis. The presenter reminded that the document is just for security purposes, without involving safety considerations.

USA asked about involvement of MS in the development of the document, which was confirmed by the presenter.

No objections were raised; DPP was CLEARED to proceeds to next development steps.

**EP-7: EPR Series PUBLICATIONS UNDER DEVELOPMENT**

This point of the agenda was included for information purposes.

**EP7.1 Considerations in Emergency Preparedness and Response Arrangements for an Operating Organization**

Mr Beavers gave a presentation on one of EPR series documents; looking at arrangements for EPR of an operating organization. There were no questions.

**EP7.2 Operational Intervention Levels for Reactor Emergencies and Methodology for their Derivation**

Mr Vilar Welter provided a presentation on the content of the draft EPR series document. Some questions followed:

Iran raised a point referring to specific examples from the recent case of Fukushima Daiichi accident, asked about possible unexpected reasons during an emergency may compel to revise Operational Intervention Levels (OILs) and whether this was addressed by the document. The presenter emphasized the fact that OILs should be considered integrated in the protection strategy, not isolated from it, and specific situations should addressed case by case under the frame of the protection strategy.
Australia asked about next steps in the process of the document. The Technical Officer noted that the document has been submitted to Publications Committee for clearance. Australia asked as well about the protection strategy document and the consultancy meeting related to the development of this document and the relationship to OILs document. The Technical Officer replied that OILs will certainly be considered as a relevant part of the protection strategy, which is something more complex.

Belarus inquired about the consideration of country specific coefficients to assess radionuclide migration thorough the food chain, and also for the difference in Cs source term linked to different reactors. The Technical Officer emphasized, regarding Cs, that it was used mainly as a marker radionuclide. The calculations took into account a complete spectrum of radionuclides, which certainly are influence by the kind of reactor. Regarding the issue of country specific coefficients, the Technical Officer acknowledged their importance, noting that the document was based on average, standard values.

Belarus asked about how international standards for food had been considered in the document. The Technical Officer clarified that those international standards referred more to international trade and were not intended to derive directly to emergency actions. The OILs are calculated taken from dose calculations taking into account the specific circumstances of radionuclide migration to food chain. Germany asked about the use of the OILs published in 2013, which was confirmed by the Technical Officer.

Germany referred to a specific exercise that they plan to undertake to check for consistency the OILs defined in their national regulations. He asked about the process followed in this document to address the source term and other aspects influencing the calculations. The Technical Officer explained that in the document several absolute amounts of radionuclides were assumed to determine relative amounts. The justification for the use of that mixes is included in the document.

Iran raised a question about the reason for the difference in the units used for dose limits to fetus between ICRP (mGy) and GSR Part 7 (mSv) The Technical Officer explained what kind of units was used in the document for the different purposes and the grounds for that, but he noted that he wasn’t aware about the rationale for the difference referred by Iran’s representative.

Japan explained their experience during Fukushima accident when they revised the OILs and asked about the possibility of using the document for that purpose. The Technical Officer noted that the document could provide certainly a basis for that kind of uses, but one should be careful regarding those specific uses. Also he noted that in the case of the OILs, the relevant aspect to assess their adequacy is the order of magnitude, not the exact values.
Finland supported the comment related the importance of the order of magnitude and asked about the date of availability of the document. The Technical Officer answered that it was up to the Publications Committee, but he hoped to have the document released by the end of this year.

**EP7.3 Guidelines on harmonization of response and assistance in a nuclear or radiological emergency**

Mr Kenny presented a summary of the publication, objectives, scope, the utilization of publication, and gave an overview of the contents of the publication. Some questions followed.

Egypt inquired about whether the document addressed the qualifications of the laboratories. The Technical Officer noted that the document didn't include any provisions on quality control.

Iran was interested in the relationship of the document with other previous documents like TECDOC1092 and TECDOC1162. The Technical Officer informed that this document complements the referred TECDOC.

Canada noted that the scope of the document goes beyond assistance. The Technical Officer acknowledged that, and noted that he considered it necessary to make sure that information is shared among MS in a consistent manner.

USA asked about the criteria to bring documents to EPReSC for review. The Chair clarified that these documents had been presented to EPReSC for information purposes only, since they were not requiring EPReSC approval.

New Zealand asked about whether there were foreseen new documents to harmonize assistance in other fields not considered in this one, like decontamination, source recovery, etc. The Technical Officer confirmed that new documents in this field are expected to be developed.

**EP-8: STRATEGIC ISSUES**

### EP8.1 Update from the Working Group on the revision of GS-G-2.1

Mr Breitinger presented the content of the Discussion Paper (DP) prepared by the Working Group (WG) on revision of GS-G-2.1, where a wide range of topics are covered and some options were suggested to the Committee in order to decide how to address GS-G- 2.1 revision process.

New Zealand supported the idea of separate safety guides for nuclear power countries and countries without nuclear power program. For emergency preparedness category IV, they found more convenient to have those aspects addressed by the safety guide on transport. Mr. Breitinger explained that Category
IV is more than transport accidents; for example, there may be emergencies initiated by nuclear security events.

Finland emphasized the importance of not only focusing on nuclear emergencies, and that radiological emergencies need to be paid adequate attention. New Zealand supported this opinion. Ireland also supported that view, emphasizing as well the importance of giving consideration to resources and infrastructure needs in non-nuclear countries.

New Zealand agreed but, reinforcing their support to 2B option as set forth in the DP, considered that, from a practical standpoint, nuclear emergencies were those generated by EPC I, II and V; and radiological emergencies were those for EPC III and IV.

Japan also supported the idea of 2B option and asked about how was addressed the inclusion of specific topics, as defined in pg. 8 of the DP, in revision of GS-G-2.1? The presenter suggested that the debate should also include the point of defining which topics the Committee wanted to have treated at the safety guide level, and also define priorities.

Canada asked for the criteria about what should be in a safety guide and what in other documents of lower level. Mr. Delattre explained that a safety guide should provide guidance on how to implement safety requirements; if the information to be addressed is mainly for exchange about technical aspects, then a TECDOC is more adequate. As a general criterion, information that is not valid for a long time usually goes into TECDOC, safety guides include information that is valid for a longer time.

Egypt supported conclusion 2a in DP because it was easier to implement for all kind of facilities.

Iran asked about the rationale to develop one or more safety guides, considering that having just one would avoid repetition of work. Mr. Breitinger agreed with the idea that currently GS-G-2.1 covers all EPCs; and having more than one guide could potentially lead to repetition.

Australia supported having one safety guide.

Mr. Delattre advised not to develop too many documents in order to improve the sustainability of the system, if we have too many documents it’s difficult to update them regularly.

UK pointed out that consideration should be given to the content. If the topics to address had enough points in common the one guide would be better, if not the option of developing two guides should be considered. Mr Breitinger suggested that perhaps specific aspects of different emergency preparedness categories could be addressed in an Appendix of the document. Regarding the detailed content of the document it should be defined at the DPP drafting stage.
Several attendees (USA, Portugal, and Australia) supported the idea of considering as starting point the development of one safety guide, trying to develop a modular document suitable to address different EP Categories.

Iran considered the process of preparing different safety guides as having risk of being confuse, and also to think about what we have to write in addition to the existing safety guides.

The Chair noted that no consensus with regard to splitting the safety guides; there is agreement to revise the current safety guide.

Mr Delattre noted that in order to not delay the process, it is possible to develop a DPP for the revision of GS-G-2.1 in a single revised safety guide, and to later split it into multiple safety guides if the drafting process indicates a need to do so. He noted that this has been done previously on multiple occasions.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) representative asked if the new guide was going to be subject to review by international organizations as it was the case with GSR Part 7. The Chair answered confirming that intent.

Mr De la Vega emphasized the need of developing a strategic view about the entire process for developing guidance to implement GSR Part 7 requirements, considering that this was one of the aims of the DP. Mr Breitinger pointed out that a clear consensus existed regarding the need for revising existing safety guide, but EPReSC should try to be more specific defining its aims on this regard.

At this moment the Chair reminded that a possible option could be to postpone the decision to the next meeting and request the WG to further analyze the issue.

Canada supported the idea about revising GS-G-2.1 and asked about the time frame for the process. Mr Breitinger pointed out that the whole process for revision of a safety guide takes approximately 4-5 years.

South Korea emphasized the need to identify topics to be included in a new guide and to base the decision about splitting in different guides ahead in the process.

The Chair summarized the discussion, after the variety of raised opinions and suggested to request the Secretariat to come to the next meeting with a proposal of content for the revision of the existing safety guide. Mr. De la Vega indicated that Secretariat will bring to the next meeting with a document defining the items to be included in the revision of the existing guide.
One remark was raised by Germany about defining which kind document would be presented for next meeting. Mr. Breitinger suggested that, according the SPESS process the document should a DPP.

The Chair proposed to close this part of the discussion by saying that for next meeting the Secretariat should bring a DPP for the revision of GSG-2.1 and also attention should be given to indicate which aspects will not be included in that revision and suggestion on how to address them.

Mr. De la Vega expressed the need for making sure that all the items considered in the DP would be addressed.

UK and Sweden supported the idea of having a DPP for discussion during next EPReSC meeting.

The Chair highlighted that consensus existed to prepare a DPP and bring it to EPReSC third meeting in November, and reminded the need to clarify the specific technical topics pertaining to GSR Part 7 implementation that are not addressed in the current version of GS-G-2.1.

Mr. Breitinger reminded that one important point was to analyze if there were topics that could warrant specific safety guides in the future, in particular the DP suggested five topics. USA asked about the implication of going ahead with that approach. Mr. Breitinger emphasized the point raised previously by Mr. Delattre regarding not to develop too many documents.

The Chair underlined the need to address the answer to question included in the DP regarding five specific items and how to approach them, which involves long-term work for EPReSC.

Canada and USA requested some clarification on those specific items. Mr. Breitinger explained that GS-G-2.1 addresses guidance for national arrangements, but there are other topics that go beyond that, which usually have been addressed in additional technical EPR documents; The DP suggests that for some of those items it could be word to develop safety guides to address them. He explained also the specific parts of the DP were those points were analyzed.

Additional clarifications were requested by Canada and Portugal, regarding mitigatory actions and protection of emergency workers, suggesting the convenience of addressing them in specific safety guides.

Japan acknowledged that those five topics identified in the DP were new requirements, but they could be addressed also in the revision of GS-G-2.1 and a decision on this point could be made during the next meeting.
At this point the Chair noted that the discussion was not mature enough to make a
decision on this particular subject and suggested asking the Secretariat to provide
further elements of analysis on this subject to the Committee so that a decision
could be made during the next meeting. Several MS (South Korea, Germany and
Canada) supported this view so that the discussion on those five items needed to get
more mature. Mr Breitinger suggested that the discussion on the DPP to be held
next meeting, together with additional elements for analysis provided by the
Secretariat, could help future discussions on that.

The Chair closed this point summarizing the agreements on: development by the
Secretariat of a DPP for revision of GS-G-2.1; and a request to the Secretariat to
prepare a revision of the analysis of the special topics referred in the DP,
considering the discussions held in this meeting and further contributions from the
WG created for this task.

**EP8.2 How to communicate what is safe in an emergency:**

**EP8.2a UNSCEAR Report: Attribution of radiation health effects vis-à-vis
inference of radiation risk**

Mr Gonzalez gave a presentation on the Report issued by the United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR). Afterwards, a
very intense and interesting discussion, involving many questions to the presenter,
took place.

Among the topics raised, the following ones could be highlighted:

- Assessment of radiation risk to the foetus
- Problems of misunderstanding in addressing those topics owing the lack of a
  complete glossary to set common understanding on the terms used
- How to define a “safe threshold” for radiation risk and how to communicate
  it to the public
- Possible lack of risk to the public stemming from planned exposure
  situations, taking into account the low limit set in the regulations (1 mSv)
- Radiation risk linked to chest radiographies. Risk for pregnant women in
  medical imaging practices

The presenter answered the questions emphasizing the lack of data to build solid
grounds regarding the risk stemming from low doses and the importance to use
clear concepts and terms in communicating those issues. Also he set several areas
were further scientific knowledge was needed to effectively bridge the existing gaps
on radiation effects.

**EP8.2b Update from the Working Group on how to communicate what is safe**
Mr Meschenmoser provided a presentation on risk perception and of the DP, including risk perception versus actual risk, communication using modern technology/internet, revised safety requirements in GSR Part 7, and the mission of the Working Group.

The Chairman underlined the fact that a draft safety guide for communication with public was under development.

Finland commended the DP, emphasizing the need to address communication not only with the general public but also with many different stakeholders involved. Canada underlined the need for being proactive regarding communication and considering it as a continuous activity. New Zealand supported Finland’s view. Mr. Meschenmoser supported also those comments.

Slovakia suggested that some already existing IAEA documents that should be taken into account on this this regard, like the EPR-NPP PPA 2013 and the INES Manual. WHO referred to a working group within IACRN which has been established for public communication, raising the willingness of this group to cooperate in this field.

Ireland remarked the importance of the need to engage people before communicating with them and also to take into account the need for advice in communication. Mr Meschenmoser acknowledged those points, noting that engaging with stakeholders is many times easier than engaging with public and also the importance of some environmental and social factors regarding communication.

ILO stressed the importance of coordinating among authorities and also allowing people to participate and not to be a passive player. Mr Meschenmoser referred again to IACRN and the Joint Plan as an example of coordination, pointing out that doesn’t mean one voice message.

Australia emphasized the difficulties to answer the ‘Am I safe’ question and the need to take into account more simple operational questions. Mr Meschenmoser supported that opinion, though pointing out the need for clear answers to the question. UK referred to the basic question to be answered, pointing out that is more appropriate to formulate the question as “Am I safe?” instead “What is safe?” Mr Meschenmoser supported in part this view.

Iran referred to their experience in communicating with pregnant women in radiological examination, and the difficulties in answering to the people the meaning of what they read; when you say yes to the question ‘Am I safe’ question. Mr Meschenmoser acknowledged that view, and noted that it will be fully taken into account in new communication projects like the revision of INES Manual.

Egypt raised the point of communication with first responders, who may raise questions crucial for the adequate performance of emergency activities.
WNTI referred to their experience dealing with the public in the transport industry. They supported also the “Am I safe” question against the “What’s safe” question. They also asked about how the new safety standard DS475 would consider that. Mr Meschenmoser explained that there are a lot of aspects to take care for DS475 development and many contributions are needed to draw the whole picture. Portugal supported position of Finland and Ireland, regarding the need to take into account stakeholders and engagement.

Germany pointed out that the DP was rather about methodology than about practical answers, they also supported to put the focus on the “Am I safe” questions. Mr Meschenmoser emphasized the need of a step by step approach to this complex issue.

Ms Buglova explained the intent of the DP as a step in the way towards the completion of the safety guide, she also supported ILO’s view regarding importance of language without losing the perspective regarding the key question (Am I safe?) to be answered.

At this stage the Chair suggested to conclude this discussion, proposing to have the Working Group continue its work and to update EPReSC on further developments at the next EPReSC meeting. She also encouraged any interested person to cooperate with the WG leaded by Mr Meschenmoser.

**EP8.3 Strengthening implementation of revised Safety Requirements in Emergency Preparedness and Response, No. GSR Part 7:**

**EP8.3a Activities to support the implementation of GSR Part 7**

Mr de la Vega presented an overview of GSR Part 7. He highlighted the Secretariat support for implementation, focusing on training and workshops, and webinars. Other support activities were specifically addressed in 8.3b and 8.3c presentations.

Israel asked about whether the Agency was considering making a survey on GSR Part 7 implementation and the possibility of sending expert teams to MS to support that aim. Mr de la Vega answered that no plans existed on surveys to MS to date, but that suggestions on this regard could be considered. Regarding sending experts to MS, the criterion is to send them for specific activities requested by MS.

Australia expressed their interest in additional webinars and asked about the organizations to be invited to participate. Mr de la Vega explained the willingness to develop those seminars upon request and definition of specific topics. The organizations to be invited were up to the MS.

Sweden expressed their interest in webinars to support preparing for the next Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS). Mr de la Vega pointed out that to date no such a webinar had been developed. Ms Buglova clarified the aim of the IEC was
support GSR Part 7 implementation and that the EPR module of the IRRS covers only regulatory aspects of EPR. In this field no changes have been included in GSR Part 7 compared to former GS-R-2.

Japan asked about details of a workshop to take place in Japan regarding those new GSR Part 7 requirements. Mr. de la Vega clarified that the activity was planned and ongoing, the official announcement were to be sent soon.

New Zealand asked about peer review services tailored specifically to the needs of countries with no nuclear programs, like New Zealand. Mr. de la Vega explained the different services offered by the IAEA regarding EPR: the IRRS (with a module on EPR, covering regulatory aspects only) and the EPREV mission which covers all the aspects of EPR. Ms Buglova pointed out that the NS Department had launched an initiative to assess the peer review services offered to MS to try to streamline them.

**EP8.3b EPRIMS: A self-assessment tool against GSR Part 7**

Mr. Salinas presented the Emergency Preparedness and Response Information Management System (EPRIMS), including the needs that EPRIMS is responding to, key features of the system, how to access the system, designated coordinators, and a demonstration of how to use the system. Some points were highlighted:

- Encourage MS to nominate national coordinators, for those who didn’t do it yet
- The system is for MSs to use it
- Encourage MS to publish the modules, and share them with IAEA and with partner countries, but when you do not want, it is up to you.

Brazil asked about the interface with RASIMS. Mr. Salinas clarified that EPRIMS has imported all the information existing in RASIMS, EPRIMS has superseded RASIMS for EPR self-assessment information.

Zambia and New Zealand asked about the process for EPRIMS national coordinators nominations. Mr. Salinas explained that a Note Verbale (NV) had been sent on that, summarizing the process. Ms Buglova clarified that the CAs had been copied on the NV and requested the attendees to express whether they wanted to have a copy of the NV (some MS expressed their interest on that).

Canada asked about some details pertaining to the procedures for handling and populating EPRIMS information. Mr. Salinas provided those details.

Netherlands asked about the origin of the information included in EPRIMS and who is responsible to provide information on reactor technical data. Mr. Salinas clarified those points, explaining that in some cases information comes from already existing data banks and in other cases is provided by the MS through the EPRIMS coordinators.
South Korea asked about connection among IAEA systems for Assessment & Prognosis (A&P) and EPRIMS. Mr. Salinas clarified that while EPRIMS is not intended to be used in response to emergencies, some data contained in EPRIMS could be useful, it’s up to the users to decide.

**EP8.3c EPREV: A peer review against EPR related Safety Standards**

Mr Breitinger presented an overview of Emergency Preparedness Review (EPREV) missions, including what EPREV is, practical objectives of an EPREV mission, overview of EPREV mission to date, scope of an EPREV, the EPREV process, the EPREV report, the basis for the review of EPREV, the type of recommendations and suggestions that can come out of an EPREV, and an explanation of ‘good practices’ which can come out of an EPREV. Afterwards some questions were raised:

USA asked about whether the reviewer were appointed by MS or they were technical experts. Mr Breitinger clarified that the reviewers were technical experts in the specific review fields.

Canada asked about whether some aspect related to nuclear security was included in EPREV missions. Mr Breitinger explained that the EPREV missions don’t address detailed nuclear security information, they address interface with nuclear security at the level appropriate to have the experts able to assess the requirements included in GSR Part 7.

South Africa asked about the follow up missions. Mr Breitinger indicated that follow up concept is considered in the EPREV guidelines, typically 3 or 4 years after the main mission.

**EP9: REPORTS FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**EP9.1 European Commission**

Mr Patel reported on main activities of EC on EPR topics. There were no questions.

**EP9.2 ENISS**

Mr Pilleux reported on ENISS activities meaningful to EPReSC activities. There were no questions.

**EP9.3 Food and Agriculture Organization**

Mr Blackburn informed on the availability of the paper prepared and made a short summary. He informed the Committee of an upcoming meeting in October and invited the EPReSC participants to attend the meeting. He noted that FAO currently have a research project on electronic platform for dealing with an emergency. He mentioned the TECDOC publication on criteria for radionuclides concentration in food, milk and drinking water (framework to help people to calculate their own criteria). One question was raised by Ireland, about the relationship of this TECDOC with IRMIS.
**EP9.4 World Health Organization**

Ms Carr presented an overview of WHO, key milestones following the WHA, the new WEP, approach to responding to emergencies at the WHO, joint external evaluation of IHR implementation, relevant emergency networks, development of WHO guidelines, establishing ITB guidelines use baseline, and the current challenges with emergency preparedness and response.

Canada asked if the evaluations referred to in the presentation were mandatory. The presenter replied that there was a voluntary process and highlighted their willingness to support MS in this field, in cooperation with the IAEA. Mr de la Vega confirmed the interest of IAEA in this cooperation as well.

At the end of the discussion of this point, Ms Heinrich made a proposal based on experiences from other Committees (i.e., RASCC) to include in all the agendas informative presentations from countries on implementation of GSR Part 7.

**EP-10: CLOSING OF THE MEETING**

**EP10.1 Review of EPReSC actions and actions arising from the second meeting of EPReSC**

Ms Heinrich has presented expectations for EPReSC-3, review of actions from this meeting and future actions (see previous points of the minutes), and announced that 2 countries (New Zealand and Belarus) had volunteered to have presentations in EPReSC-3 on actions for implementation on GSR Part 7.

**USA:** Is there opportunity for early bilateral exchanges. For comments that have been rejected so that there is no confusion later.

*Mr de la Vega:* we will keep you informed about the results of the process; the comments resolution are posted in the EPReSC members area so that everybody is informed timely on the outcome of the comments sent. Any suggestion is welcome, but the process allows having you informed within reasonable time and for your involvement in the process;

**USA:** For clarity of phases in DS474, we have to be educated on how we can support to move forward.

*Mr de la Vega:* we consider important your involvement and the Technical Officer will be in contact with you.

*Ms Buglova:* Thank you for your patience during the week. As with all the other Committees, the agenda does not have specific timings and it can be very difficult to manage. When we will know how many publications we will have for discussions, then we may make the planning more precise.

**EP10.3 Dates for future Meetings**
Mr de la Vega provided information on dates for future meetings:

- 3rd EPReSC meeting from Tuesday 29 Nov – to Dec 1; we expect to last till Thursday 1st, it may be that Friday will be also needed. Prior to the meeting we may provide you with more details
- 4th EPReSC meeting: tentative dates: 6 – 9 June 2017

**EP10.4 Closing Remarks**

Ms Buglova expressed her satisfaction regarding the involvement and performance of the participants during this week; She also highlighted the working atmosphere during the meeting. She requested contributions and suggestions to improve the future work of EPReSC and she thanked and the work will continue. If anything else comes to your mind, please bring them here and we will see how to go on. She thanked the Chair, Ms Heinrich, who did an excellent job leading the first EPReSC meeting to review and approve draft standards; And she thanked also Mr de la Vega and Mr Breitinger who provided very good support to the Committee and did outstanding work.

Ms Heinrich thanked the participants and also appreciated the excellent spirit for cooperation developed during the meeting.
Annex

List of Participants

Second Meeting of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Committee (EPReSC)

Member States

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**International Organizations**

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